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The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Donald E. Schwartz**
The shareholder derivative suit today faces extinction. Long considered the
"chief regulator of corporate management," I and a recognized form of litigation
in American courts at least since 1855,2 it now confronts the second great chal-
lenge of its history. Thirty-odd years ago, commentators foresaw the derivative
suit's demise when state legislatures began adopting security-for-expenses stat-
utes to curb the abuses of "strike suit" litigation.' These reports of its death
proved exaggerated, however, as plaintiffs discovered various tactics by which to
outflank these statutes.4 As a result, by the late 1960's, the crisis was past, and
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As this Article went to press, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the decision in Maldonado
v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). The decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980 (Del. May 13, 1981) is discussed in a postscript to this Article.
1. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. The shareholder derivative suit is often said to have originated with Foss v. Harbottle, 67
Eng. Rep. 189, 2 Hare 461 (Ch. 1843). In America, the Supreme Court first recognized a stockhold-
er's right to sue on behalf of his corporation in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856).
See also Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 980
(1957).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (Consol. Supp. 1979). This section was enacted
pursuant to recommendations made by the Special Committee on Corporate Litigation of the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the State of New York, Survey and Report Regarding Stockholder's Derivative
Suits (1944) [hereinafter cited as Wood Report]. See Homstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits in New York, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 123 (1944), for a stinging attack on the scholarship,
accuracy, and objectivity of the Wood Report.
4. The principal such tactic has been to plead a federal cause of action. This is effective be-
cause the federal courts have held that Congress did not intend to subject claims arising under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to state security-for-expenses statutes. McClure v. Bome Chem.
Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (§ 10(b)); Borak v. J.I. Case
Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The requirement of security for
expenses would still apply to a state claim joined with the federal claim. See C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1835, at 408 (1972) for a brief discussion of security-for-
expenses statutes, their history, and their success.
Various other techniques also exist by which to outflank the corporation's motion for security.
See A. Frey, J. Choper, N. Leech & C. Morris, Case and Materials on Corporations 705-06 (2d ed.
1977). The authors note that plaintiffs may overcome the obstacle these statutes present by such
techniques as filing in states with no statute (such as Delaware), by finding other shareholders willing
to intervene and thus boosting the number of shares to the amount necessary to sue without posting
security, or by obtaining stays to inspect company books in order to examine the shareholder list. In
view of this last alternative, the corporation may decline to ask for security, since access to the list is
likely to result in significant adverse publicity and consequent expense to the corporation. See Note,
Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 Colum. J.L. &
Soc. Prob. 50, 62-65 (1968).
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a revival in the action's popularity was duly noted by leading academics.'
Today, the new threat is judicial, rather than legislative, and if the prophe-
cies of doom are again to prove false, countervailing legislation may be neces-
sary. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. Lasker,6 a
number of courts have upheld the capacity of disinterested directors, in the exer-
cise of their business judgment, to terminate a derivative suit on the grounds that
it is adverse to the corporation's best interests. As a practical consequence of
this extension of the business judgment rule, a veto power over derivative ac-
tions may now rest with a corporation's often only nominally independent direc-
tors.
What has caused this transition? Curiously, no court has explicitly reevalu-
ated the derivative suit, condemned it on policy grounds, cited any new consid-
eration, or even reached any legal conclusion that could be described as original.
Rather, the basic process has been a triumph of legal formalism: in theory, the
derivative action asserts a corporate right, and hence, as a matter of formal logic,
the right should be one that the board can waive or compromise. Such a conclu-
sion has the force of logic, but not of experience. Realism suggests that an
unqualified recognition of such a power may make the derivative suit an en-
dangered species of legal action.
Not surprisingly, courts, when confronted with so significant an issue, have
shrunk from its full implications. Thus, for the better part of this century, corpo-
rate law has recognized the simple axiom that a shareholder seeking to file a
derivative suit must first exhaust available intracorporate remedies by making a
demand on the corporation's board of directors, but never adequately explained
the justification underlying this rule.' By itself, this demand rule is only a
procedural hurdle, and in practice a fairly inconsequential one, that serves the
legitimate purpose of giving the subject corporation an opportunity to take over
the suit as its own or pursue internal remedies. However, if its underlying
rationale is to give the directors an opportunity to reject the suit on the grounds
that such a suit is in their judgment contrary to the best interests of the corpora-
tion, then the rule poses a more substantial, and substantive, obstacle-one that
this Article will call the "standing requirement." I
As a result of Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the technique used in
McClure v. Borne Chem. Co. is now less likely to succeed in assuring plaintiff a right to proceed with
some claim in federal court. In Santa Fe Industries, the Supreme Court held that rule lOb-5 did not
reach a simple breach of fiduciary duty absent deception. The consequence has been a trend toward
curtailing federal-law involvement in corporate management affairs and reemphasizing state law. If
the federal claim is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the court is likely to dismiss the
pendent state claim for lack of jurisdiction. However, the other techniques available to discourage the
demand for security may still prevent defendants from using their statutory right. See Note, supra.
5. Between 1956 and 1966 the number of reported derivative suits increased significantly over
the previous decade, and the derivative suit was increasingly viewed as serving an important role in
ensuring corporate accountability. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev.
74 (1967).
6. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
7. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions,
44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168 (1976); and Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to
a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 746 (1960). See also 3B Moore's Federal Practice § 23.1.19 (2d
ed. 1975); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 478-79.
8. "Standing" in the context of derivative actions is not to be confused with its more traditional
function in limiting an individual's right to challenge governmental action. As used in the context of
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Burks v. Lasker 9 neither upheld nor rejected this standing requirement, hold-
ing rather that state law governs unless a federal policy would be frustrated by
the imposition of a business judgment not to sue. Although the majority opinion
in Burks conspicuously avoids any discussion of the prior common law surround-
ing the doctrine, 0 subsequent decisions have treated Burks as removing any bar-
rier to an expansive recognition of the defense. The New York Court of Appeals
has probably gone the furthest in this direction, and in Auerbach v. Bennett"
apparently held that the board's business judgment not to sue is beyond judicial
inquiry, no matter how flawed its reasoning, except to the extent that the good
faith or independence of those reaching the decision can be challenged. How-
ever, the scope of the standing requirement remains unclear even after Burks. In-
deed, a much-noted Delaware decision, Maldonado v. Flynn (Maldonado 11),"2
wholly denied the board's capacity to terminate a derivative suit alleging self-
dealing. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has recently reversed the case,
its own decision (discussed in a postscript to this Article) seems also to be
searching for a middle ground that will salvage the deterrent utility of derivative
actions while curbing their potential for abuse.
Against this backdrop of still-unsettled law, this Article examines the stand-
ing requirement from both a historical and a policy perspective. Others have
surveyed this terrain before us and with considerable skill. 3 We differ from
other commentators, however, in that our inquiry focuses on substantive, rather
than procedural, limits on the defense, and on a legislative, rather than a judicial,
response. Part I assesses the early cases before Burks and finds limitations im-
plicit in them that Burks and its progeny have ignored. Part II looks at the develop-
ments since Burks and the possible boundaries on the defense that remain today.
Of course, the conclusion that recent decisions have cantilevered a new doctrine
upon a narrow foundation is in itself neither exciting nor necessarily important.
The law's evolution has not infrequently proceeded on an overreading of prece-
dent. Thus, Part III examines and compares the policy bases of the standing
requirement and the business judgment rule generally. Finally, Part IV offers a
legislative resolution. Because the issue of the board's authority to terminate
derivative litigation intersects with related issues involving the procedural bar-
riers to the prosecution of a derivative action, our focus expands in this final
derivative suits, the word has become a term of art, and denotes a requirement that minority share-
holders must satisfy in order to sue despite the opposition of the board of directors. For a detailed
discussion of the evolution of this concept see Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in
Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168 (1976).
9. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
10. The concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Powell explicitly assumed that the common
law had recognized such a defense. Id. at 487 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
11. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
12. 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch., 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, No. 113, 1980 (Del. May 13, 1981).
13. Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proxy Derivative
Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 Sec. Reg. L.J. 99 (1980); Buxbaum, Conflict of Interests
Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Statutes, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 1122
(1980); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: the Death of the Deriva-
tive Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 96 (1980). Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits
Against Directors, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 600 (1980).
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section, and the policy trade-offs that must underlie any integrated statutory pro-
vision for a model corporate statute are explored.
This undertaking has a premise that is best announced at the outset. Burks
and the issues it raises belong to a larger pattern. The concept of corporate
accountability ultimately depends on some mechanism for its enforcement. Four
principal remedies are potentially capable of holding corporate management
accountable where shareholders are widely scattered and unorganized: the deriva-
tive suit; private causes of action (chiefly those under the federal securities
laws); the proxy mechanism, under which shareholders can band together to
defeat and possibly to depose the incumbent management; and the "market for
corporate control," which, if management is incompetent or unfaithful, should
in theory respond by discounting the corporation's shares so as to encourage a
hostile takeover by those who believe they can restore value through better man-
agement. All these means have been substantially impaired during the last dec-
ade. In particular, the private cause of action has been radically pruned by the
Supreme Court."' Proxy fights are a rarity, and economists inform us that the
utility of this approach to corporate accountability is dubious in theory as well as
unproven in practice."5 Similarly, despite the current popularity of the tender
offer, the disciplinary effect of such market-based remedies on managers remains
suspect, particularly in the wake of defensive mergers and recent state anti-
takeover legislation.16  The transaction costs of the tender offer have skyrock-
eted, and some surveys have shown that the prospects for the defense in a con-
tested tender offer have actually improved recently.'7 As a consequence, Burks
14. The leading case involving implied private rights of action is Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), in which a unanimous Court denied a private right under the Federal Election Campaign Act.
In two securities law cases, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court expressed doubt as to the availability
of an implied private right of action where an express remedy was available. More importantly, the
Court has narrowed the test even further than the strict Cort tests. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court formulated a test that asks whether an implied cause of action is
necessary to effectuate the congressional goals. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Court refined
and narrowed the test, limiting it to whether Congress intended to create the private right of action
asserted.
15. The standard critique of economists involves the "free rider" problem: no single share-
holder will gratuitously undertake the expenses of organizing an opposition to the incumbent manage-
ment, and no satisfactory mechanism exists for taxing all equally. See M. Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action 54-57 passim (1965).
16. A lively debate exists as to whether the tender offer results in the displacement of ineffi-
cient management. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1978). The counter-view, widely
shared among market professionals, is that inefficient management will be relatively immune, rather
than more vulnerable, to tender offers, because the bidder would prefer to acquire a sound company
than one with significant problems. A recent survey by Touche Ross & Co. of directors at large
corporations found them in agreement that corporate bidders will no longer tender for "problem"
companies, but will limit their attention to companies with "strong management." Touche Ross &
Co., The Effect of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tender Offers on American Business: A Touche Ross
Survey of Corporate Directors' Opinions 6, 11 (1981). State antitakeover statutes, while constitu-
tionally suspect and frequently invalidated, may also shelter inefficient management. See Note,
Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 Yale L.J. 510,
514 nn. 28 & 29 (1979) (listing 36 state statutes).
17. There has been a decline both in the number of tender offers and in the success of contested
tender offers. Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, Mergers and Acquisitions 13 (Summer
[Vol. 81:261
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raises the possibility of a right without a remedy, of an effectively unrestrained
corporate management.
We do not claim, however, that the last outpost is necessarily about to fall.
To date, relatively few state courts have had the opportunity to consider the
standing issue that Burks thrusts upon them. 8 The case law is therefore unde-
veloped, and although we believe legislation is desirable, the possibility remains
for the development of a judicial definition of the standing requirement that
permits the derivative suit to play a significant role in enforcing corporate
accountability.
I. THE STANDING REQUIREMENT: EARLY CASES
The standing doctrine did not originate with Burks v. Lasker. As early as
1882 (only a quarter-century after it recognized the derivative suit), the Supreme
Court had denied standing to shareholders who were otherwise procedurally
eligible to sue, on the grounds that the board's refusal was a legitimate business
judgment decision. 9 The scope of this power remained ambiguous, however,
and some decisions refused to recognize any such substantive power in the board
once demand had been made.' In any event, the doctrine appears to have been
invoked on only a few occasions prior to the last five years.2'
Modem-day proponents of a substantive standing doctrine often cite three
Supreme Court decisions, decided between 1882 and 1917, as establishing that
stockholders may not prosecute a derivative action over the board's objection
unless they first demonstrate fraud or breach of trust on the part of their corpora-
tion's directors. This seems a casual and uncritical reading of precedent. These
three cases-Hawes v. Oakland,2" Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining
1980). See also Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law 101, 132 (1979),
setting forth an impressive list of defeated tender offers. An empirical study has estimated that the
Williams Act raised the cost of tender offers by between 13 and 27 percent. See Smiley, The Effect
of the Williams Amendment and Other Factors on Transaction Costs in Tender Offers, 3 Indus.
Organization Rev. 138, 145 (1975).
18. The few state cases to reach this issue are Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enterprises,
Inc., 593 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (finding that derivative suit plaintiff had made a
sufficient showing of standing to support a temporary injunction, despite an independent special
litigation committee's decision not to prosecute the action); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251
(Del. Ch. 1980) (holding that once demand has been made and refused, a stockholder may assert his
individual and the corporate rights together in a derivative suit), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980 (Del. May 13, 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (applying the business judgment doctrine to bar
judicial inquiry into the determination of the special litigation committee that the corporation should
not pursue the action, thus barring the derivative suit plaintiff from asserting the claim). In addition,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in a diversity case, applied
Virginia law to deny a motion to dismiss, although an independent committee had determined that
the best interests of the corporation would be served by dismissal. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980).
19. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 462 (1882) (water company decision to furnish
water to city free of charge).
20. See Dent, supra note 13, at 100 n.25.
21. But see, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903); Ash v. IBM, Inc.,
353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854,
857 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966).
22. 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
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Co.,23 and United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. 4-shared a
critical common fact: all involved "third party" litigation. The plaintiff share-
holder wished the corporation to sue an entirely separate and unaffiliated entity,
and the board of directors was not subject to even a colorable conflict of in-
terests in any of the cases. This basic point was not overlooked. Writing for the
Court in United Copper, Justice Brandeis noted:
In the instant case there is no allegation that the United Copper Com-
pany is in the control of the alleged wrongdoers or that its directors
stand in any relations to them or that they have been guilty of any
misconduct whatsoever. Nor is there even an allegation that their ac-
tion in refusing to bring such suit is unwise.Y
The special historical context of these cases also limits the breadth of their
holdings. They were a reaction to a collusive practice in which the Court had
previously acquiesced, but which, by the 1880's, had lost any possible justifica-
tion. Before this period, the federal courts had no general federal question juris-
diction, and derivative suits were used collusively to create diversity of
citizenship, thereby enabling federal courts to hear cases otherwise outside their
jurisdiction. The first Supreme Court decision recognizing the derivative suit-
Dodge v. Woolsey26 in 1855-reveals the basic pattern. A Connecticut
stockholder sued an Ohio corporation to enjoin it from paying an allegedly un-
constitutional tax to the state of Ohio. This procedural contrivance of using a
non-Ohio shareholder to sue both his corporation and the true party in interest
(the tax collector) enabled the corporation to place the question of the tax's
constitutionality before a federal trial court. The Supreme Court sustained the
practice over the objection of the Ohio tax collector, who understood what was
occurring and argued that plaintiff lacked standing. Such manufactured federal
jurisdiction persisted until 1882, when the Court noted, in Hawes v. Oakland,
that the growth of corporate litigation since Dodge had overburdened it and re-
quired reconsideration of that decision.27 Meanwhile, federal question jurisdic-
tion had been generally established in 1875,28 and there was no longer a need for
such a dubious device. Hawes thus seems more a policy-motivated decision
seeking to curb a disreputable form of litigation than a pillar for the standing
requirement.2 9
An additional problem with using the Hawes-Corbus-United Copper trilogy
as the foundation for a pervasive standing requirement is raised by Ashwander v.
23. 187 U.S. 455 (1903).
24. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
25. Id. at 264.
26. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
27. 104 U.S. at 452-57. See also 7A C. Wright and A. Miller, supra note 4, § 1821, at
297-99.
28. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § I, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976)).
29. In this respect, Hawes is analogous to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975), which sought to reduce the volume of securities litigation under rule lOb-5. perceived as
frequently extortionate. Id. at 737-49.
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Tennessee Valley Authority." In Ashwander, the Supreme Court upheld the
right of a plaintiff stockholder to conscript his corporation in order to sue a third
party (the T.V.A.) despite the objections of the corporation's board of directors.
Ashwander is thus factually identical with Hawes and Corbus (in each of which
the plaintiff also sought to oppose governmental action). Justice Brandeis's con-
currence in Ashwander (which simply reiterated the position he had earlier taken
in United Copper) is often cited as authority for the business judgment discretion
of directors to refuse to sue. 3' But the plurality opinion reached almost the
opposite conclusion:
In such a case it is not necessary for stockholders-when their cor-
poration refuses to take suitable measures for its protection-to show
that the managing board or trustees have acted with fraudulent intent or
under legal duress. To entitle the complainants to equitable relief, in
the absence of an adequate legal remedy, it is enough for them to show
the breach of trust or duty involved in the injurious and illegal
action.... Thus, the breach of duty may consist in yielding, without
appropriate resistance, to governmental demands which are without
warrant of law or are in violation of constitutional restrictions.
32
Attempts have been made to limit Ashwander to cases involving illegal gov-
ernmental action.33  This distinction, however, is questionable. As a matter of
precedent, both Corbus and Hawes involved similar claims. As a matter of
logic, the asserted distinction is even more dubious, because a board decision
not to resist governmental pressure seems inherently less suspect than most other
decisions. Given the resources at the disposal of the government and the poten-
tial for future retaliation by it, a decision by management not to challenge the
government would appear at least presumptively justified. In contrast to a case
involving an intracorporate dispute, there is not even a latent conflict of in-
terests; instead, there is the foreboding possibility that a victory against the gov-
ernment, in a suit that a single-share plaintiff forces the corporation to bring,
could prove a Pyrrhic one.
Although Ashwander might be read as a repudiation of the Hawes-Corbus-
United Copper trilogy, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Swanson v.
Traer4 clouds the issue and suggests that Ashwander is probably an aberration,
30. 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See also Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 309, 317 (3d
Cir. 1962) (majority vote by shareholders to reject suit ineffective where complaint alleges actions
that "are ultra vires the corporation and are public wrongs."); cf. Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1959) (demand on board unnecessary where complaint charges
illegal acts).
31. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
32. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. at 319.
33. In Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court
distinguished Ashwander narrowly: "In Ashivander, the actions of the TVA were not attacked as
unreasonable. Rather the stockholders challenged the authority's right to act at all." In Klotz, plain-
tiff challenged the Public Service Commission's determination of the particular rate, not its right to
set rates. Such a distinction seems tenuous, but probably reflects a prevalent judicial desire to treat
Ashwander's plurality opinion as an aberrant case.
34. 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
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better explained by the desire of the plurality to reach the constitutional issue
surrounding the T.V.A. than by an intent to establish standards for derivative
suit litigation. In Swanson v. Traer, the Supreme Court remanded a derivative
action to the Seventh Circuit with instructions to determine whether under state
law the action was of "that exceptional character which stockholders may
bring." 3s Although the use of the adjective "exceptional" seems a gratuitously
didactic instruction to the lower court, the decision as a whole is consistent with
the teaching of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins36 that state law should control. Thus,
although its tone suggests a preference for the standing doctrine, its real holding
is that state law, rather than the Hawes-Corbus-United Copper trilogy, controls.
In Swanson, defendants were alleged to have bought certain bus lines and
resold them to their corporation at an inflated price. Thus, it is the only Supreme
Court decision prior to Burks that involved self-dealing. But, like Ashwander, it
may show the Court interpreting the standing requirement in the light of ulterior
motives. As decided below, Swanson raised a difficult issue that the Court found
more convenient to resolve in a companion case: whether the corporation should
be aligned as a plaintiff or as a defendant. 37 If it were classified as the former,
diversity would be destroyed. Finding this issue more clear cut in the companion
case, 38 the Supreme Court turned instead in Swanson to the standing question,
which permitted it to wash its hands of the case by remanding for a determina-
tion of Illinois law. 39  On remand, the Seventh Circuit found that where the
majority of the board that approved the transaction was not subject to any con-
flict of interest or obvious domination, its decision not to sue would be
respected. 40 Thus, not only can Swanson be read as only a circuit court holding
on the nature of the Illinois standing requirement, but there is also at least a hint
that the Supreme Court was only adhering to the "passive virtues" and avoiding
a possibly unripe issue when it remanded to the Seventh Circuit. At the circuit
court level, Swanson is concededly an exception to the pattern of earlier cases in
which the standing requirement proved a barrier only v,here the defendants were
all third parties. Equally important, however, it is an exception involving a
board a majority of whose members were not subject to the conflict, and thus
it does not logically reach the more recent fact pattern of a board, a majority of
whose members are defendants, that expands its size, elects new directors, and
appoints them to a special litigation committee.
4'
35. Id. at 116.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. See Swanson v. Traer, 230 F.2d 228, 235-38 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
38. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
39. Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. at 117.
40. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 1957).
41. Similarly, in Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966), the court noted that only
three of seventeen directors were affiliated with the parent corporation, and therefore accepted the
board's decision to reject the suit.
More recently, some courts have accepted decisions by "special litigation committees" com-
posed of only three directors, appointed Lo the board after initiation of the suit. See Maldonado v.
Flynn (Maldonado 1), 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625,
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The circuit court cases on the standing requirement that immediately fol-
lowed Swanson basically continued to be those involving third-party litigation.
In Stadin v. Union Electric Co.,4 2 the derivative suit was commenced by a plain-
tiff who wished Union Electric to sue Westinghouse for antitrust damages. But
Union Electric had already brought such a suit, and the issue thus reduced to
who would control the litigation. In Ash v. IBM, "3 the plaintiff shareholders of
three corporations tried to force the corporations to seek to enjoin the acquisition
of a fourth corporation by a fifth on antitrust grounds. The denial of standing in
these cases should not be surprising. In neither case was there any indication of
a conflict of interest. Moreover, in Union Electric the desired suit had already
been commenced, and in Ash the benefits of the litigation, even if successful,
seemed very speculative."
Concededly, cases involving third-party litigation can supply no more than a
negative inference. They cannot tell us what the reaction of courts prior to Burks
would have been to a termination decision where plaintiff alleged self-dealing by
management. Relatively few cases have dealt with such a decision. But in sev-
eral of those that have, courts either have declined to accept decisions of the board
that would have terminated derivative litigation or have skirted the issue by de-
clining to grant the requested motion for summary judgment on other grounds.
The first approach is illustrated by Groel v. United Electric Co."' There,
the board had declined to pursue a claim for watered stock against the corpora-
tion's promoters. The corporation stood to recover $20,000,000 of stock. In
response to the asserted business judgment that it was undesirable to sue, the
court held that under the circumstances, "if the complainant sets forth a good
cause of action, . . . it is a clear breach of trust on the part of the directors not
to proceed to recover the same.""I The court further observed that "for [the
directors] to reply that it is by them deemed inexpedient to do so is only to
emphasize the breach of trust they are committing by not doing so." 47 Thus, if
the complaint appears to plead a meritorious cause of action, there is no discre-
tion to reject it." This is concededly the minority rule; only a few cases clearly
hold that the shareholder is automatically entitled to sue once the board rejects
his demand.49
393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1979). These decisions are in our judgment without
persuasive precedent and invite the use of "tame" special litigation committees. Accordingly, our
proposed statute requires that a majority of the board be independent before the defense can be
interposed. See § 49(f) in Appendix infra.
42. 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
43. 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966).
44. At least one commentator has cited Ash, Swanson, and Union Electric for the proposition
that "absent unusual circumstances, [the directors'] decision not to sue will be final." Note, The
Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168, 192
(1976) (footnote omitted). This seems overbroad, since at least two of these cases involve the rel-
atively "unusual" circumstance of third-party litigation.
45. 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (Ch. 1905).
46. Id. at 624, 61 A. at 1064.
47. Id.
48. This position is close to that of the Delaware court in Maldonado v. Flynn (Maldonado I),
413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch. 1980). See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
49. In addition to Maldonado II and Groel v. United Elec. Co., the following cases indicate
that a substantive standing requirement is undesirable: Papilsky v. Bemdt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d
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A second judicial reaction is to permit the case to go forward (at least until
a judicial examination of the merits is reached) and simply to avoid engaging the
substantive question of the board's capacity to reject the suit. Again, this reac-
tion is most discernible in cases involving alleged self-dealing.
Fleishhacker v. Blum " well illustrates this pattern. There, the board refused
to sue after demand had been made in a case involving a bank president who
received side payments for his approval of bank loans. The majority opinion for
the Ninth Circuit barely discusses this rejection, stating only that "all the cir-
cumstances of the case" made it unjustified. 1 But a detailed dissent, which
elaborately restates the prior case law upholding such refusals to sue, shows that
the majority must have been aware of the Supreme Court's trilogy of
opinions.52 Thus, the decision indicates at least that such a refusal may be
rejected by the court even in the absence of any showing of bad faith.
Arguably, Fleishhacker and similar cases 3 show that where the challenged
transaction contains aspects of self-dealing, the court will sub silentio impose a
higher standard of judicial review, even though the directors themselves were not
dominated or controlled by the defendants. A more recent case refused defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment where an alleged "sweetheart" sale of
securities was involved, even though the complaint failed to allege that the
wrongdoers had control of the board.5' In contrast to Groel, these decisions
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1927); Anderson v. Johnson, 45 R.I. 17, 23, 119 A. 642, 644 (1923); Bergman Clay Mfg.
Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 151, 131 P. 485, 488 (1913).
An intermediate position is to distinguish particular classes of claims- typically those involving
illegality or "nonratifiable" wrongs-which plaintiff may seek to redress, regardless of rejection by
the board or shareholders. See Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 309, 317 (3d Cir.
1962); Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 160-61, 119 N.W. 951, 954-55 (1909); Sullivan v. Moun-
tain, 117 Mont. 224, 228-29, 160 P.2d 477, 479-80 (1945); Siegman v. Kissel, 71 N.J. Eq. 123,
125-27, 62 A. 941, 941-42 (Ch. 1906), aff'd sub. nom Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J.
Eq. 403, 409-10, 65 A. 910, 912-13 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907); Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d
969, 981-82 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a
Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 746, 762 (1960); cf. Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F.
Supp. 577, 581-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (challenge to constitutionality of a regulatory statute).
Still other cases have rejected the necessity of demand in cases involving alleged illegal be-
havior by corporate officials, thereby tacitly holding that a board decision to reject the suit would not
be accepted by the court in such circumstances. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d
194, 197 (2d Cir. 1959); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-19, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42
(1912).
50. 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940).
51. Id., at 547.
52. Id. at 551 (noting absence of any proof of bad faith as to board's determination not to sue).
53. See Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1948); Cooper v.
Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio App. 455, 471-72, 183 N.E. 439, 445 (1931). In Fogelson, the
plaintiffs challenged the propriety of a pension plan, and the directors (who included a former Gov-
ernor of Massachusetts and several other respected public figures, see Bernstein v. Mediobanca
Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)) responded
with affidavits asserting that the pension plan was a decision within their business judgment.
Although these affidavits were uncontested, the Second Circuit reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment for defendants, holding that such a showing was too conclusory and could not alone support a
motion for summary judgment on the business judgment defense. 170 F.2d 663. Yet the showing
made by defendants was at least as strong as that made in many of the third party cases in which it
was accepted as dispositive. See also Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enterprises, Inc., 593 S.W.2d
390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
54. Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592,
597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948)).
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may accept the principle of the Hawes-Corbus-United Copper trilogy as applying
beyond the third-party context; but at least in self-dealing cases they show courts
exercising careful oversight and requiring persuasive justifications.
It seems a fair summary of the decisions before Burks that, although they
recognized the business judgment discretion of the board to terminate a deriva-
tive action, they applied that principle to bar such a suit almost exclusively in
the context of third-party litigation and rarely in circumstances that suggested the
board had acquiesced in a self-dealing transaction. Exceptions-and concededly
there are pieces that do not quite fit this jigsaw puzzle 5 -tend to involve
"ordinary" business decisions (such as compensation) rather than structural
changes or intracorporate dealings.
II. Burks AND ITS PROGENY
In a recent case upholding a board's decision to terminate a derivative ac-
tion the Ninth Circuit asserted that in so dismissing the suit it was following "a clear
trend in corporate law." ,6 This may yet prove an accurate prophecy, but for the
present it still seems an alarming overstatement. Again, as in the decisions be-
fore Burks, the recent cases have a hidden common denominator: where once it
was the third-party character of the actions, today it is their outgrowth from
"questionable payments" investigations. Almost all have involved attempts to
hold corporate officials liable for improper payments made typically on behalf of
the corporation and usually in a context where such payments were historically
accepted.57 This is said not to justify such payments, but to caution against
overgeneralization based on essentially one recurring example.
Unmistakably, the pivotal decision in the revival of the standing defense
was Gall v. Exxon,58 a 1976 district court case dealing with the allegedly negli-
gent failure of Exxon executives to detect and report the use of corporate
moneys for political purposes in Italy. In its rhetoric, Gall said little that had not
55. E.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960), on remand sub nom. Elster v. American
Airlines, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 476, 167 A.2d 231 (1961). In this case the Delaware Supreme Court held
that where a disinterested Board of Directors had adopted an option plan designed to secure the
retention of key employees' services, the plan was valid and summary judgment would be entered for
the defendant-directors in the derivative suit challenging the plan. The application of the business
judgment rule was arguably less objectionable in such a case, because the facts involved only a
normal compensation plan, which fell within the scope of routine board decision-making. Swanson v.
Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957), is also an exception; it would be reversed under our statute if
the defendants constituted "controlling persons." See Appendix, infra.
56. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying California law), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980).
57. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Rosengarten v. Intertional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 74 A.D.2d 762,
425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980); Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (1977);
Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Auerbach v. Aldrich,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
58. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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been said before; its significance lay rather in the judicial blessing it gave to a
new defense tactic, the special litigation committee. Gall showed this technique
raised to the level of a formalized methodology: step one, the Board appoints a
special litigation committee and delegates decision-making authority concerning
the lawsuit to it; step two, the committee retains distinguished special counsel,
preferably a retired judge; step three, a lengthy study and report is prepared,
which casts doubt on the strength of plaintiff's case; and step four, the commit-
tee reaches the final decision not to sue, based on the report and the opinion of
special counsel that litigation would not be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.
Gall, however, never clearly addressed the question whether state or federal
law governs termination by directors. This question was "resolved" by Burks v.
Lasker 9 -although Burks probably raises more ambiguities than it clarifies.
Burks involved a derivative suit by shareholders of a mutual fund against several
directors of the fund and its investment adviser. Plaintiffs alleged violations of
the Investment Company Act of 1940
° and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940,6 centering around the fund's substantial purchases of the commercial pa-
per of Penn Central just prior to the insolvency of that corporation. No self-
dealing was alleged on the part of defendants; rather, plaintiffs charged that
defendants, in relying almost exclusively upon the advice of a third-party broker-
age firm, had failed to exercise due care. After the derivative suit was com-
menced, the fund's independent directors decided that the litigation was adverse
to the fund's interests and moved to dismiss. The trial court granted their
motion, 62 but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Investment Company
Act precluded such a decision.' Rejecting the Second Circuit's broad theory,
the Supreme Court instead employed a two-tiered analysis. First, it held that
federal law, although governing, does not displace state law, but incorporates
it," so that ultimately state law governs whether disinterested directors possess
the power to terminate a derivative suit. Second, the Court acknowledged that
even if state law permitted such a decision, there could be circumstances in
which such a state policy was inconsistent with a federal policy underlying the
cause of action, in which case termination would not be allowed. Finding no
such conflict with policies of either federal statute, it remanded for a determina-
tion as to New York law on the board's power to terminate.,.
Although Burks thus deferred to state law, theoretically permitting disparate
results, subsequent decisions have seen it as a reaffirmation of the old pre-Erie
59. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-20 (1976).
62. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2nd Cir.
1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
63. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209 (2nd Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
64. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 477-78.
65. In their concurring opinion, Justices Stewart and Powell characterized the decision to sue
(or not to) as an ordinary one made in accordance with state law, and incapable of conflicting with
the federal law in question. Id. at 487. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun, in a separate concur-
rence, found this position "absolutist." In his view, the task on remand was to explore whether a
conflict with federal policy existed. Id. at 486.
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trilogy of Hawes, Corbus, and United Copper.' This is curious because the
majority opinion in Burks never discusses these decisions.67
Standing alone, Gall and Burks would not resolve the issue of whether the
so-called business judgment defense extends to a self-dealing case. As discussed
above, early cases had generally honored the board's decision not to sue only in
the context of third-party litigation. 61 Burks and Gall suggest that the defense
now will also cover alleged failures in the duty to supervise-or, more broadly,
the duty of due care. The critical question, however, still remains: do Burks and
Gall describe the outer perimeters of the defense, or are they only half-way
points on a slippery slope that leads to a bottom at which the defense can be
raised in self-dealing cases as well? In the wake of Burks several decisions have
faced this question and others that the prior case law has never clearly resolved.
A. Self-Dealing Transactions
The Maldonado litigation graphically shows the degree of uncertainty that
still persists around the business judgment rule. Within the space of two months
in 1980, a distinguished federal judge and a Vice Chancellor of Delaware
reached diametrically opposite conclusions on whether Delaware law permits the
board to deny the plaintiff-shareholder standing in a self-dealing case. In the
federal decision (Maldonado I),69 Judge Weinfeld dismissed the case, apparently
finding no difference between a self-dealing case and the earlier due care deci-
sions. Subequently, in the parallel state case (Maldonado 11), ° the court refused
to dismiss. Declining narrower grounds on which to distinguish the case, it held
broadly that the decision not to sue is so fundamentally different from the kind
of discretion the business judgment rule was intended to protect that it does not
fall within the protection of that rule.
The facts underlying the Maldonado cases pivot around stock options issued
by the Zapata Corporation to its officers and directors." As the date of exercise
for these options approached, Zapata decided for independent reasons to make a
tender offer for its own shares, which would have the effect of raising the price
of the corporation's stock from $18 to $25 per share. This increase in market
value meant that additional federal income tax liability would have resulted for
those exercising the option subsequent to the tender offer, because the gain
would have been measured for tax purposes by the difference between exercise
66. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v.
Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
For a post-Burks decision that continues to cite these cases as authoritative, see Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
67. United Copper, however, is cited in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. at 487. It is also included in a string citation in the majority opinion, but only for the
proposition that Congress did not intend to displace "the entire corpus of state corporation law ...
simply because a plaintiff's action is to be based upon a federal statute." Id. at 478.
68. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
69. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
70. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Za-
pata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980 (Del. May 13, 1981).
71. See id. at 1254-55.
1981]
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price and then-current market value. To reduce the individual income tax liabil-
ity, the directors voted to accelerate the date on which the options could be
exercised to a time before the announcement of the tender offer. However, this
reduced not only the individual tax liability, but the corporation's corresponding
tax deduction as well.
72
Derivative suits were filed in state and federal courts'.71 In the Delaware
Chancery Court, the plaintiff alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by directors who
put their interest in reduced taxes above the corporation's interest in a higher tax
deduction. In federal court, plaintiff's amended complaint asserted federal proxy
rule violations in connection with the reelection of the directors who had so
benefited. Four years after the filing of these suits, the Zapata board appointed
two new directors and constituted them the "Independent Investigation Commit-
tee of Zapata Corporation." Within three months of their appointment, they filed
a "Report and Determination" to the effect that the lawsuits that'had been filed
with respect to the amendment of the stock option plan should be dismissed. At
their direction, the corporation's counsel moved for dismissal.
Delaware had no precedent directly dealing with a board decision not to
sue. Nevertheless, Judge Weinfeld, in the federal action, concluded that the
wealth of Delaware case law upholding the business judgment discretion of
directors implied that the board of a Delaware corporation had authority to ter-
minate derivative litigation. 4 Although he ruled that this authority could be
exercised only by disinterested directors, properly vested with the powers of the
board,7 5 Judge Weinfeld drew no distinction between self-dealing and other
forms of fiduciary breach, or between fiduciary breaches generally and third-
party law suits. Instead, he focused primarily on whether the decision would
frustrate the federal policy underlying the proxy rules. He declined to find that it
would, basically because he believed the policy of the federal proxy rules could
be enforced by means other than a derivative suit.7"
The Delaware court saw the issue quite differently, but equally broadly. It
also gave little attention to the difference between self-dealing cases and cases
involving only a breach of the duty of due care. Rather, it distinguished the
"business judgment" decision not to sue from the traditional "business judg-
ment rule," noting that the policies underlying the latter do not extend to the
former.77 The court drew three principal distinctions. First, it construed the
72. The corporation would be able to deduct only $18 a share, although the price would
appreciate, on announcement of the offer, to $25.
73. A third action was commenced in federal court in Houston, Texas, by a different plaintiff,
who alleged the same facts and other grievances as well. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Tex. 1980).
74. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 278-79 (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980)). In Abbey the court examined relevant
Delaware law and inferred that the business judgment rule would apply to any reasonable good-faith
determination by an independent board stating that a derivative action is not in the corporation's best
interest.
75. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 279-80.
76. Id. at 281.
77. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1257.
[Vol. 81:261
DERIVATIVE SUITS
business judgment rule as essentially a rebuttable presumption of propriety of
directors' decisions-a defensive procedural rule that requires the court to find
for the directors and officers of a corporation unless a plaintiff can show by
specific evidence that the challenged decision was the product of "fraudulent,
illegal, or reckless decisions by the directors."" Under this view, the business
judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of whether the suit should be termi-
nated, because it is not invoked to shield the conduct that the plaintiff
challenges. 79 Second, the court noted that the major prior cases outside of Dela-
ware that had upheld a decision not to sue had involved third-party litigation or
had otherwise been cases in which no evidence existed to overcome or suspend
the normal presumption in favor of the directors."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Delaware court traced the histor-
ical evolution of the derivative suit, emphasizing its dual nature as both an indi-
vidual suit against the corporation to compel a suit and a suit by the corporation
against the alleged wrongdoer. This distinction was critical to the court, because
in its view, the first suit's individual character precluded the existence of any
substantive standing requirement: "It is this dual nature of the derivative suit
which denies the corporation the right to compel the dismissal of a properly
brought stockholder's derivative action, because the stockholder asserts in the
suit not only a right belonging to the corporation but also a right individual to
himself." ", Taken literally, this argument means the plaintiff is under no
obligation to show that the board's decision was unsound.
Unlike the first two arguments in Maldonado 11, which are highly cogent,
the argument that the derivative suit belongs to the individual as well as to the
corporation seems opaque and overbroad. Although the derivative action does
indeed consist of two actions, they are not parallel and coextensive, but rather
vertically integrated: the individual action is analogous to a writ of mandamus
against a public body to perform an official duty-namely, bringing suit to
redress a breach of fiduciary duty. If the derivative action were truly "indi-
vidual" in character, then logic would equally require that it be immune from all
the other procedural barriers surrounding the derivative action and indeed that a
successful plaintiff bear his own legal expenses rather than look to the corpora-
tion for an award. In principle, the benefits and the burdens of the action are
difficult to separate. Undoubtedly, the Delaware court did not intend to write so
broadly, but this "individual action" rationale does not seem easily contained.
78. Id. at 1256.
79. Id. at 1257.
80. Id. at 1258-60.
81. Id. at 1262. The court relied heavily on Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277
(Del. 1927). One commentator has observed that the case is "pivotal" to the vice chancellor's
reasoning, but that it is misplaced authority because the directors who rejected the suit in that case
were not disinterested. Hinsey, Maldonado (N.Y.) v. Maldonado (DE): Which Prevails?, Legal
Times (Wash.), Aug. 4, 1980, at 18, col. 1. However, the court did not cite Sohland as authority for
its view of the business judgment rule, and thus it does not seem pivotal to its reasoning. Moreover,
the fact that the board was interested in its decision not to sue should not logically affect the court's




Thus, Maldonado I seems correctly decided, but at least partially for the
wrong reasons. In this light, the facts of the case may deserve greater attention
than its formal reasoning. Above all, Maldonado involves self-dealing, rather
than simply a violation of the duty of due care. This distinguishes it from the
great majority of recent cases, which involved illegal payments, and in which
courts were asked to enforce the duty of due care against directors who in most
instances had not been personally involved in the illegal transactions. 2 In all
likelihood, courts are reluctant to impose draconian penalties in an area
characterized by evolving moral standards; in addition, they may suspect (but not
wish to state) that the illegality caused no net loss to the corporation since the
illegal payments may have secured profitable contracts in excess of the penalties
imposed. In this context, the court has strong incentives to accept the decision
not to sue and thus to avoid a thicket of problematic issues.
In those cases that do not fit this pattern, the recent judicial response has
been far less consistent or predictable. The Maldonado cases, Galef v.
Alexander,' and Lewis v. Anderson " all involved the propriety of stock options,
and in particular the substitution of newer, more favorable options for existing
ones. In Galef and Maldonado H, the courts did not accept the business judg-
ment rejection.' In Lewis and Maldonado I, where the defense was accepted,
the courts may have seen the issue as only one of executive compensation,
which they may have considered either too mundane or too unmanageable for
close judicial attention. For example, in Lewis v. Anderson, Walt Disney Pro-
ductions granted new stock options through the "stock option committee" of its
board, but then obtained shareholder ratification, which plaintiffs asserted
violated the federal securities laws." Absent authority in the board to terminate,
this action would probably still have been dismissed on the grounds that the
stock options fell within the ordinary "business judgment" discretion of the
board.
At the other extreme, two recent cases suggest that when a major self-
dealing transaction attempts to transform the basic structure of the corporation,
courts will be reluctant to allow directors to terminate derivative suits challeng-
ing the transaction. In Swenson v. Thibaut,87 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected a decision not to sue in a case involving significant transactions
between a parent and its partially owned subsidiary. The court assumed that a
standing requirement existed,88 but found the "disinterested" directors to lack
82. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
83. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980).
85. In Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the court suggested that
the line between Maldonado 11 and cases accepting business judgment decisions may depend on the
presence or absence of "personal gain by the directors." Id. at 688. Such an analysis is consistent
with our own.
86. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 780.
87. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
88. Id. at 105-06, 250 S.E.2d at 297.
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the requisite independence. However, other facts suggest that the court had am-
ple reason to be suspicious of the defendants.'
More recently, in Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp.,' the Fifth
Circuit permitted a derivative action to continue, where subsequent to the filing
of the action the board entered into a settlement with the defendants, who in-
cluded the two controlling shareholders of the corporation. The critical fact in
Clark appears to have been that each director who voted to approve the settle-
ment had been nominated and elected by the votes of the two principal corporate
defendants. 9' Yet such a test is potentially broader than it first appears, for
frequently directors are understood to be the nominees of a particular shareholder.
Thus, although both Clark and Swenson might be viewed simply as decisions
that the board was not "disinterested," they are probably better read as showing
a judicial unwillingness, at least in cases involving significant self-dealing by
controlling shareholders, to deny the plaintiff his day in court based only on the
board's perception of the corporate self-interest.
To summarize, the "clear trend in corporate law" seen by the Ninth Circuit
in Lewis v. Anderson92 may be more illusory than real. At present, there are
multiple trends. At least one court has accepted Maldonado 11 as a correct state-
ment of Delaware law,93 and a thoughtful opinion by Judge Merhige has declared
it also to represent the law of Virginia.' Another approach, taken by a Texas
court, is to delay acceptance of a board's decision not to sue until at least a pre-
liminary review of the merits has been undertaken by the court. 9 Conversely,
one recent federal court opinion has raised the troubling theme that unless
state law recognizes the board's power to terminate derivative litigation, a disin-
centive will arise for businesses to incorporate in that jurisdiction. 96 Once
raised, this argument may well lead to the "race to the bottom," which Profes-
sor Cary has suggested undermines state efforts at reforming corporation laws,7
and the "clear trend" discerned in Lewis may be that dictated by Gresham's
Law.
89. The subject corporation, an insurance company, had been placed in "involuntary rehabilita-
tion," and the state Commissioner of Insurance had determined that the continuation of "present
management would be hazardous to the shareholders and policyholders of the company." Id. at
84-85, 250 S.E.2d at 285.
90. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 52.
92. 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980). See text accom-
panying note 46, supra.
93. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
94. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980).
95. Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enterprises, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
96. See Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (noting that Michi-
gan in framing its law wished to be competitive with New York, which in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), recognized the defense). Ironically, this
leads to the result that those jurisdictions that have longed to "out-Delaware" Delaware may now-
after Maldonado 11 and Auerbach-seek to "out-New York" New York.
97. See generally, Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale




B. The Scope of Judicial Review
Prior to Burks, several cases had indicated that a court need not accept a
"grossly unsound" business judgment."0 After Burks, it is clear that a court
must review the decision at least to the extent that a federal policy might be
implicated. But where federal policy is not implicated, some decisions have now
held that substantive judicial review is at an end, the only reviewable issues
being the good faith and independence of the directors making the decision. The
strongest statement to this effect is that of the New York Court of Appeals in
Auerbach v. Bennett.99 Auerbach involved the familiar pattern of foreign bribes
and kickbacks, paid in this instance by General Telephone & Electronics Cor-
poration to foreign governmental customers. The decision not to sue was reached
by a committee of three directors who had joined the board after the transactions
in question. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
based on this decision.'0 0 The Appellate Division reversed, holding simply that
summary judgment would require a fuller statement of the factors relied upon by
the committee and the relative weight accorded them. Specifically, it asked the
board to devel6p "the reasons for the payments, the advantages or disadvantages
accruing to the corporation by reason of the transactions, the extent of the par-
ticipation or profit by the respondent directors and the loss, if any, of public
confidence in the corporation which might be incurred." '0' Reversing the
Appellate Division, the New York Court of Appeals stated that such information
was unnecessary because substantive judicial review of a board's decision was
unavailable.' 2 Then, in. a broad conclusory statement, it justified this rule: "To
permit judicial probing of such issues would be to emasculate the business judg-
ment doctrine as applied to the actions and determinations of the special litiga-
tion committee. Its substantive evaluation of the problems posed and its judg-
ment in their resolution are beyond our reach." 103
To date, no recent decision has squarely taken issue with Auerbach's
reasoning. Indeed, Judge Weinfeld in Maldonado I clearly indicated that even a
meritorious action might be dismissed.' 4 The logic of Auerbach's iron rule will
be scrutinized later,' 5 but here a conflict in the case law is apparent: Swenson,
Clark, and Maldonado H have each rejected board decisions at least in part
because the court found them unpersuasive.
C. The Procedural Issues
A two-pronged consensus has developed concerning the procedural require-
ments a decision to terminate must meet if a court is to accept it. First, the
98. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
99. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
100. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1978).
101. Id. at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
102. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
103. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
104. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 285.
105. See notes 128-30 and accompanying text infra.
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decision not to sue can be made only by an independent, disinterested body.
Second, the procedures employed by the board and the impartiality shown by
those conducting the inquiry will be the best evidence of their good faith.' 6
Thus, where a de facto decision to resist the suit appeared to have been made by
the board before the special litigation committee reported its findings, the deci-
sion not to sue was rejected."0 ' Some evidence that an independent judgment
was in fact exercised by those delegated the responsibility must affirmatively
appear in the record." s
Substantial doubt, however, exists that a board can reach a decision not to
sue where all of its directors have been made defendants. In Galef v.
Alexander, °9 such a decision was rejected at least in part on this ground. But this
approach creates a paradox. Plaintiffs could seemingly evade the defense simply
by naming every director as a defendant and alleging that even if the director
was not directly involved in the transaction, he was negligent in failing to detect
the alleged fraud. Clearly, this would create a strong incentive for manufactured
pleadings. Yet the issue is not new. Courts have divided for over a decade on
the analogous question of whether demand will be excused when the plaintiff
makes similar charges against the board or a majority thereof."' Cynical as such
106. Auerbach expressly recognizes that courts may and should review "the methodologies and
procedures" employed by the board in their "investigation of facts and the determination of legal
liability." Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
929 (1979). The guidelines in this area are well discussed in Dent, supra note 13, at 128-29.
107. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279, appeal denied, 296 N.C. 740,
254 S.E.2d 181 (1979). One day before appointing an advisory "litigation evaluation committee"
(composed of disinterested directors but lacking any real power) the full board, of which defendants
constituted a majority, had already moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, thus indicating their
hostility toward the litigation. Cf. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d
873 (7th Cir. 1975) (where, pursuant to notification of plaintiff's intent to bring suit, a majority of
the board rejected the suit on behalf of the corporation, there was no need for plaintiff to make a
formal demand under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
108. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-47 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The directors of the
Erie Railroad Company decided to refinance the company through a bond issue, but did not resort to
competitive bidding for the bonds. The court found that because four members of the board had
tested the bond market to determine a fair price, and because they could articulate why they had
limited themselves to one investment banker, their decision was a proper exercise of business judg-
ment (although not necessarily the best decision).
109. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
110. Compare Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975)
(plaintiff's allegations of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the "unaffiliated" majority of the
board in participating in and approving acts of bias and self-dealing by "affiliated" minority direc-
tors held sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand), with In re Kauff-
man Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.) (plaintiff's allegations of domination and control by
"affiliated" directors did not satisfy the requirement of "particularity" in rule requiring that a com-
plaint allege with particularity the reasons for not making demand; defendant's motion to dismiss
granted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). See also Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 518' F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975) (dismissal of the suit held inappropriate because evidence
was sufficient to show that the majority of the board was inflexible in its position that the corporation
would take no action against the derivative suit defendant), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976);
Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (excusing demand where
the complaint had alleged alternative theories of wrongdoing on the part of all directors).
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a ploy by plaintiffs may seem, defendants have found a correspondingly clever
tactic to counter it: the challenged board simply appoints new members and
delegates the decision to them.' Both Maldonado 12 and Lewis v. Anderson",
rejected the argument that such newly installed directors were not "indepen-
dent" because they owed their position to the defendants. On the other hand,
both Swenson and Clark rejected board decisions where the directors involved
had been nominated and elected by the principal defendants."" Obviously, there
is a tension between Maldonado I's acceptance of this tactic and these decisions'
rejection of it. Particularly in this area, a common law approach seems both
inherently inadequate and inferior to a "bright-line" legislative standard, which
would prevent insiders from maintaining a "tame" special litigation committee.
IT. FROM PRECEDENT TO POLICY: THE
IMPACT OF A STANDING REQUIREMENT
Can a substantive standing requirement be reconciled with the concept of
corporate accountability? In the wake of Burks, this is the critical policy
issue. That Burks, Auerbach, and other recent cases may represent a departure
from the prior case law, as we have argued, is not in itself significant unless the
consequences of this change are destructive to the goal of accountability. Un-
doubtedly, this danger is real; but Maldonado H, in its total rejection of the
directors' authority to terminate a derivative suit, represents an unnecessarily ex-
treme answer.
To understand what limitations on Burks are desirable, it is necessary to
survey the policy interests it affects. Our discussion of these interests is orga-
nized around three general issues: (1) the relationship of the standing require-
ment to the business judgment rule; (2) the effect of a standing requirement on
existing state law doctrines concerning the regulation of corporate affairs; and (3)
the possible federal policies that might be "frustrated" by such a defense.
A. The Business Judgment Rule and the Decision Not to Sue: Contextual
Differences
The power to decide not to sue has been characterized as simply an exten-
sion of the business judgment rule; in this light, the power not to sue is but the
correlative of the unchallenged power to sue."' This characterization, however,
111. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 277-78; Swenson v. Thibaut, 39"N.C. App. at
105-07, 250 S.E.2d at 297-98; Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of amended complaint for failure to allege demand on new board mem-
bers rather than on directors in office when suit was commenced).
112. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 283-84.
113. 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980). The dubious-
ness of the independence of directors under these circumstances is thoughtfully expfessed by Profes-
sor Dent. See Dent, supra note 13, at 111-17.
114. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. at 106-08, 250 S.E.2d at 297-98; Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1980).
115. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917)
("Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for damages is,
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misapprehends the business judgment rule, seeing it as an across-the-board pro-
tection rather than as the highly contextual and policy-oriented doctrine that it
is.1 6 The decision not to sue typically occurs in a very different context from
that of the normal business judgment. Four distinctions stand out, and each
makes the case for judicial deference to board decisions not to sue far less per-
suasive than in the context of the ordinary business decisions.
First, normal business judgments are often made under time pressure and
uncertainty, which preclude studied reflection or textbook-style decisionmaking.
Time is money, and excessive prudence can be more a vice than a virtue. The
business judgment rule properly recognizes and tolerates these factors, in order
to encourage entrepreneurial risktaking. In contrast, a decision to terminate
litigation generally permits greater time for investigation; uncertainty is less a
factor because the facts now exist in history rather than lying unknowably in the
future.
Second, in its normal operation, the business judgment rule insulates corpo-
rate officials from liability for decisions made in the exercise of business
judgment. 17  In this sense, the substantive decision is immunized from judicial
review in order to protect the decisionmaker. But directors who decide to termin-
ate a derivative action need no such blanket of immunity, because they face little
like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion
of the directors ...."); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) (decision not to sue is a "second tier" business decision). Even decisions that have rejected
the board's attempt to terminate a derivative action have recognized a close linkage between the
decision not to sue and the business judgment rule. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 n.13
(2d Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, this Article submits that the policy interests underlying judicial defer-
ence to ordinary (or "first tier") business decisions are significantly different from, and stronger
than, those associated with the decision to terminate a derivative action. To date only the Delaware
court in Maldonado II has focused on these differences. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1257-62 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980
(Del. May 13, 1981).
One commentator, while disagreeing with the Delaware court in Maldonado 11, would uphold
the board's action as a proper function of the business judgment doctrine, rather than the business
judgment rule. Hinsey, supra note 81. The difference between the two concepts is that while the rule
only protects first-tier decisionmaking from liability, the doctrine supports the power of an indepen-
dent board to govern the corporation-presumably free from judicial or, for that matter, shareholder
interference.
We cannot fully accept this distinction. While we do not advocate close judicial scrutiny of
board decisions generally, and in fact propose only an intermediate standard of judicial review, see
proposed § 49(f) in Appendix infra, we believe that the corollary of the board's power to govern the
corporation is its duty to do so. This duty requires some mechanism for its enforcement, which in
theory the derivative suit has traditionally afforded.
116. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. Rev. 259,
270-72 (1967), discussing the development and function of the business judgment rule. Manne sug-
gests that the rule effectively precludes the courts from any consideration of an "honest if inept"
business decision, while providing liability for the actions of dishonest, disloyal, or grossly negligent
directors. Professor Manne believes that the rule is principally grounded on the desirability of pre-
venting courts from exercising regulatory control over corporate managers.
117. Traditionally, the business judgment rule only protects corporate officials who have exer-
cised due care and acted upon a reasonable basis in good faith. See Arsht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 134 (1980) (arguing that plaintiff may hold liable a corporate
official who "did not exercise the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances," notwithstanding the business judgment rule). See also Casey v. Wood-
ruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (similar formulation under New York law).
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risk of liability."' By definition, they are not defendants in the action they seek
to terminate, and their decision to terminate, even if erroneous, would be pro-
tected by the ordinary operation of the business judgment rule insofar as their
own liability is concerned. Indeed, when a court rejects a board's decision to
terminate an action, it simply restores the lawsuit, and little damage to the cor-
poration can arise in the brief interval. Because this type of decision is revocable
without adverse effect to the corporation, it does not (unlike an imprudent in-
vestment decision) afford an occasion for liability." 9 Uniquely, then, the deci-
sion not to sue presents a context in which the issue of a decision's wisdom can
be severed from the distinct issue of the need to protect directors from an exces-
sive exposure to personal liability. The social policies that underlie the business
judgment rule (e.g., the need to encourage entrepreneurship and socially desir-
able risktaking) are not here implicated, because personal liability of the direc-
tors does not follow in the wake of a reversal of their decision. Perceptively,
Maldonado 11 so recognized.' °
Third, although most business decisions are not amenable to judicial
review,' 2 ' the decision to terminate a derivative action inherently involves the
creation of a reviewable record.' 22 It is a retrospective decision, rather than a
predictive one, and the court is therefore better able to sift and balance the same
evidence as was presented the board.' Those talents that a court is generally
118. There seems little doubt that if a plaintiff sought to hold directors liable for losses resulting
from a decision on their part to seek dismissal of a derivative action, the directors could raise the
defense of the business judgment rule. Maldonado H so recognizes in distinguishing the issue of the
liability of the directors from that of the reviewability of the decision:
While the business judgment rule may protect the Committee of Independent Directors of
Zapata from personal liability if they have made a good faith decision that this suit is not in
the best interests of Zapata, and should be dismissed, an analysis of the character of a
derivative suit shows that the business judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of whether
the Committee has the authority to compel the dismissal of this suit.
Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1257.
119. In some rare instances, damage to the corporation might occur if the directors delayed the
suit sufficiently to frustrate a recovery (e.g., the defendant becomes insolvent or flees the jurisdic-
tion). Even in these instances, however, a good faith judgment by the board will be protected by the
normal business judgment rule, unless patently unreasonable.
120. Maldonado II characterizes the business judgment rule first "as a defensive rule" and then
as "a shield with which directors may oppose stockholders' attacks on the decisions made by them."
Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1256, 1257. This sword-shield distinction makes particular sense
in the case of judicial review of a board's decision not to sue: judicial reversal of such a decision
should not make the directors who are responsible for it liable, but correspondingly, as the exposure
to liability is reduced, so is a major reason for judicial deference.
121. See Manne, supra note 116, at 270-72.
122. While it may be insignficant in other business decisions, a reviewable record is an inherent
part of the decision not to sue. Auerbach v. Bennett expressly recognized that judical review was
appropriate "[a]s to the methodologies and procedures" used by the board. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1979). Thus, to protect its decision, the board must
demonstrate a careful review of the relevant evidence. But, as Auerbach further states, courts are
"better qualified" than corporate directors to perform such a review, id., and thus again the usual
rules for judicial deference are less applicable.
123. In other areas of the law, courts have recognized that retrospective decisions are more
amenable to judicial review than forward-looking decisions. Essentially, the Supreme Court made
this distinction in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979), in holding that the parole decision (which in the Court's view was a prediction about future
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thought to lack-business intuition, a feel for the marketplace, and the ability to
trade off risk against return-are not here called for to the same degree. Indeed,
to the extent that the determination hinges on an appraisal of the merits of the
litigation, the court's perspective and expertise are superior to the board's.
Finally, there is the problem of structural bias in board determinations.
Others have collected the empirical evidence that board members are still typi-
cally selected and regularly dismissed by the company's senior management.'24
At first glance, this vulnerability of board members might seem to apply equally
to all board decisions, and therefore not distinguish the special case of a decision
not to sue. But shades of difference exist, and this process of director selection
and socialization, which incumbent management dominates, may cause even the
outside director to perceive his role, once litigation is commenced, as that of a
buffer by which to shelter and protect management from hostile and litigious
stockholders. In particular, a derivative action evokes a response of group
loyalty,' so that even a "maverick" director may feel compelled to close ranks
and protect his fellows from the attack of the "strike suiter." 126 As a result, an
outside director independent enough to oppose the chief executive officer with
respect to a proposed transaction that he thinks is unfair or unwise may still be
unable to tell the same officer that he thinks a suit against him has sufficient
merit to proceed. 27 The latter vote would be a far more personal and stigmatiz-
ing form of opposition. In short, prospective rejections can be diplomatic and
couched in terms of the appearances of impropriety, but a refusal to protect
one's peers once events have transpired is seen as disloyal treachery.
behavior by the inmate) could not be subjected to the requirements of due process, even though the
parole revocation decision (which focuses on prior conduct) is so constrained. Id. at 12-13. Corre-
spondingly, the typical investment or business-planning decision is more prospective in orientation
than is the decision not to sue (which by definition focuses on prior conduct), and so merits greater
judicial deference.
124. For a variety of reasons, most studies find the outside director still "economically or
psychologically dependent upon or tied to the corporation's executives, particularly its chief execu-
tive." M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 145 (1976); Solomon, Restructuring the
Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 584-86 (1978).
See generally Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 293, 307
(1979). Beyond the obvious reasons for such domination-e.g., economic inducements, family ties,
or personal selection of the outside director by the chief executive-a more fundamental problem
may be the "structural bias" that grows out of a business ethic under which directors are expected to
"protect" management from attacks by outsiders. See Note, supra note 13, at 619-22 (surveying
recent findings that directors are recruited, nominated, and removed by the chief executive officer).
125. An experienced attorney who has counselled outside directors in the context of a special
committee's review of a shareholder's action explains the intensity of this group loyalty in the fol-
lowing terms: "[V]e are dealing with a situation in which the President of the company, the man or
men who helped build it, and who the directors view as an irreplaceable asset, has his honor and
future under attack. Such men look to 'their' board of directors to support them." Klein, Conduct of
Directors When Litigation is Commenced Against Management, 31 Bus. Law. 1355, 1359 (1976).
Of course, the fact that the chief executive officer may be able to remove a "disloyal" director
through his control of the corporation's proxy machinery may serve to reinforce this sense. A 1971
study found that 37% of chief executive officers surveyed had removed directors for various reasons.
See Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., Profile of the Board of Directors 11 (1971).
126. Professor Buxbaum has also detailed this argument, and we concur with his analysis. See
Buxbaum, supra note 13.
127. Our premise that outside directors find some decisions easier than others cannot easily be
empirically proved. But anecdotal evidence suggests that even "maverick" directors accept the prin-
19811
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Even if the decision not to sue is treated as simply an aspect of the business
judgment rule," it does not follow that the substance of the decision should be
beyond judical review. Although Auerbach apparently permits review only of the
process and procedures leading up to the decision, this result conflicts with the
traditional understanding of the business judgment rule as permitting a limited
degree of judicial review. In a recent Article, two leading members of the corpo-
rate bar (neither of them known for excessive sympathy to plaintiff causes) argue
persuasively that a reasonableness test has always lurked "as a hidden reef in the
business judgment rule safe harbor," and that such a requirement is desirable.2 9
If so, it must lurk as well in the business judgment not to sue. The Third Circuit
appears to have recognized this in Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics
Corp.:
[W]e do not think that the business judgment of the directors should be
totally insulated from judicial review. . . . [W]here the shareholder
contends that the directors' judgment is so unwise or unreasonable as
to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors' sound discre-
tion, a court should, we think, be able to conduct its own analysis of
the reasonableness of that business judgment.'
In terms of the policies underlying judicial deference to directorial discre-
tion, then, the decision not to sue is a less favored decision, which merits closer
judicial scrutiny. But Auerbach, paradoxically, has made it a more favored deci-
sion, which, if the New York Court of Appeals means what it has said, carries
greater immunity than the "true" prospective business judgment made under
conditions of uncertainty. This result, we suggest, invites legislative reexamina-
tion.
B. The Frustration of State Policy
Burks dealt only with the issue of when a business judgment not to sue is
inconsistent with a federal policy; it did not, understandably, face the analogous
issue of whether such a decision can conflict with a state policy as well. Because
ciple that "when the chips are down," an outside director must either support his chief executive or
resign form the board. See J. Bacon & J. Brown, The Board of Directors: New Challenges, New
Directions 30 (1972). See also E. McSweeney, Managing the Managers 106 (1978). See also Lasker
v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978) ("It is asking too much of human nature to expect
that the disinterested directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues
in a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and
liability for the individuals concerned."), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). While the
Second Circuit was here addressing the special context of investment companies, the critical fact
cited was that a majority of the board was constituted by "inside" directors. Accordingly, our
proposed statute limits the defense to corporations having a majority of independent directors. See
proposed § 49(f) in Appendix infra.
128. See Hinsey, supra note 81.
129. Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35
Bus. Law. 947, 962 (1980).
130. 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978).
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the corporation is a "creature of state law" and hence primarily subject to state
policies, this may ultimately prove a more important boundary on the decision
than the federal limit announced in Burks. This Article discusses three state
policies that may conflict with the decision not to sue (though undoubtedly other
examples could be used): the rule of Remillard Brick 3' that self-dealing transac-
tions are not made immune from plaintiff attack by board ratification; the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine, which in some formulations requires prospective dis-
closure and ratification;3 2 and the deterrent theory of the derivative suit set forth
in Diamond v. Oreamuno.
33
By statute in most jurisdictions a transaction between a director and his
corporation is no longer void, or even voidable at the election of the corporation,
if the transaction was approved by the vote of a disinterested board after full
disclosure."' Despite the seemingly dispositive effect these statutes give to
board approval, courts have construed them more narrowly, setting aside the
transaction if the plaintiff can prove unfairness to the corporation. 35  Professor
Henn has summarized these cases as reading the statute so as to "neutralize the
adverse inferences which would otherwise arise, thus subjecting those seeking to
set aside the transaction or to surcharge the fiduciaries to the burden of showing
the required fraud or unfairness." "I Thus, the effect of these statutes, so con-
strued, is to shift the burden of proof: in their absence, defendant must show the
transaction to be fair; in their presence, plaintiff must prove fraud or
unfairness. 131
In effect, the majority rule preserves the plaintiff's right to challenge a
self-dealing transaction, notwithstanding board ratification. But this right will be
lost if instead of ratifying the board can make a business judgment to foreclose
suit.13 An inconsistency seems apparent here: in the face of legislative approval
of board ratification, courts still retained an opportunity for judicial review of the
fairness of a self-dealing transaction, notwithstanding the argument that the
board knew best; but this opportunity is lost if the board can now style its
approval differently.
A second example of an established state rule that seems to dissolve in the
universal solvent of the business judgment defense is one version of the corpo-
131. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418-20, 241 P.2d
66, 73-75 (1952).
132. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
133. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
134. See, e.g., Model Business Corporation Act Annot. § 41; Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 44-48 (1966) (discussing the evolution
of the "fairness doctrine," citing case law in more than twenty states that follow the doctrine and
statutes similar to § 41 that have been enacted in many states).
135. Id. at 46-48; see also Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d
405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974) (burden
still on directors, but with less stringent standard).
136. H. Henn, Corporations § 238, at 469 (2d ed. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
137. In some circumstances, the burden does not shift to the plaintiff and the defendant remains
subject to the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218 (Del. 1976).
138. For a more detailed analysis of this area and the relevant policy implications, see Bux-
baum, supra note 13, at 1124-27.
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rate opportunity doctrine. In some jurisdictions, an arguable corporate opportu-
nity must be disclosed to the board and rejected before a person having a fiduci-
ary relation to the corporation may accept it. Thus, in Kerrigan v. Unity Savings
Ass'n,'39 the failure to make prior disclosure resulted in the court's refusal to
accept both the argument that the opportunity would have been illegal for the
corporation to accept and the claim that the opportunity would have been de-
clined if presented to the corporation. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the "prophylactic purpose of the rule" required it to presume that the
opportunity would have been accepted had the corporation been given the
"opportunity to decide." ,, If the policy of this case and others like it ", is to
enforce prior disclosure, such a policy is vitiated by an unreviewable decision
not to sue.'"2 Cases such as Kerrigan seem to rest on an implicit judicial view
that directorial action taken before the event is more likely to be fair, reliable,
and independent than a ratification decision made after the litigation is com-
menced. If so, it would again elevate form over substance to accept simply a
different means of post-hoc approval by the board of a self-dealing transaction.
A third example involves the issue of whether there must be a "net loss" to
the corporation to support a derivative action. In Diamond v. Oreamuno,"', the
New York Court of Appeals held two executives liable to their corporation for
insider trading. In its opinion, the court stated that it is not always necessary for
a derivative suit to contain an allegation of damage to the corporation,'" and that
the purpose of the derivative suit "is not merely to compensate the plaintiff,"
but to deter.'"5 After Auerbach, however, the same suit could apparently be
dismissed if the board declined to sue, giving as its reason that the corporation
had suffered no loss. Even if less troublesome reasons are given, the deterrent
function of the derivative suit is substantially sacrificed.
Another New York case suggests that the conflict here is even broader. In
Abrams v. Allen,'4 6 the New York Court of Appeals appeared to announce a
"public policy" doctrine: actions taken in violation of public policy can be chal-
lenged by a derivative action."4 7 Yet in Auerbach, the court read the business
judgment doctrine to give the board exclusive jurisdiction over the "weighing
and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, fiscal
and other factors." "48 Although the court elsewhere acknowledged that the
139. 58 Ill. 2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 39 (1974).
140. Id. at 28-29, 317 N.E.2d at 43-44.
141. E.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir., 1971). The court in Moses v. Burgin
announced that it would presume that an opportunity not presented to the corporation would have
been accepted by it.
142. See id. at 376-79. The First Circuit reviewed management's duty to disclose its conflicts
of interest to the disinterested directors, and ramifications of its failure to do so. The court imposed
damages on the directors who failed to disclose, to the extent of the opportunity that was lost. The
Second Circuit reached a similar result in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975).
143. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
144. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
145. Id. (emphasis omitted).
146. 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
147. Id. at 56, 74 N.E.2d at 307.




board's discretion was limited to decisions made "in the lawful and legitimate
furtherance of corporate purposes," "I the first phrasing, which assigns no prior-
ity to ethical considerations, appears to cancel out the suggestion of Abrams that
actions not specifically illegal could still be challenged by a derivative suit.
We do not here contend that Abrams was right and Auerbach wrong, or that
the deterrent objectives of Diamond can be fully realized. Our point is more
modest: the cases must be read together. Otherwise, absurdities result. In this
light, Auerbach is overwritten; some measure of substantive review must be re-
tained by a court considering a board's decision not to sue. Our position is not
that the policies we describe compel the court to insist that a derivative suit
proceed, but only that the court must have a measure of discretion if the deter-
rent role of the derivative action is to survive.
On the other hand, this position does not compel acceptance of Maldonado
11's apparent total rejection of the substantive standing requirement. If the frus-
tration of state policies is to be our touchstone, a strong state policy must still be
recognized in encouraging independent and energetic boards of directors. Little
will more discourage their development than the result of Maldonado H, which
effectively denies them any decisionmaking role in derivative litigation. Con-
versely, the knowledge that an independent board has the power to terminate
derivative litigation encourages corporate insiders to protect themselves by estab-
lishing an independent director representation on their board. Of course, the in-
sider's real incentive may be to establish a pseudo-independent board-one that
meets the minimal judicial criteria for accepting a decision not to sue but is still
dominated by those seeking its protection. Judicial review may help solve this
dilemma, however, by providing a crutch upon which independent directors
struggling to assert themselves and make disinterested judgments can lean. Judi-
cial oversight fosters board independence because it enables independent direc-
tors to justify their refusal to do as management wishes (reject the suit) on the
grounds that a reviewing court would not accept the weak or disingenuous
reasons proffered.
C. Federal Frustration: When is the Burks Test Met?
Burks announced that a decision to terminate derivative litigation may not
be made where it frustrates a federal policy,'50 but then cautiously applied this
principle, determining that a decision to terminate was not in principle inconsist-
ent with the Investment Company Act.' Because the Second Circuit had found
precisely such a conflict and had reached the sweeping conclusion that the statu-
tory scheme of the Investment Company Act implied "that the statutorily disin-
terested directors of a registered investment company were never meant to have
the final word in determining whether it is in the best interest of a mutual fund
to press claims against [insiders]," ' the Supreme Court's reversal might seem
149. Id. at 629, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
150. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 479.
151. See id. at 484-85.
152. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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to suggest that the Court will only rarely find an inconsistency between the
decision not to sue and a federal policy. This, however, would be an oversimple
interpretation, and would overlook the Court's sensible view of the policies
underlying the Investment Company Act.
,ks the Court explicitly recognized, the Investment Company Act places its
principal reliance on independent directors, rather than on direct shareholder
democracy or administrative agency oversight. "3 Not only does the Act require
that forty percent of a fund's board be composed of independent outside
directors '-1 (and in some circumstances dictate that a majority be independent '-"),
but it assigns specific duties to these independent directors and thus takes them
away from the discretion of the board as a whole.'
56
As with Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, what is most
important in this context is what the Act does not do. Not only did Congress
reject a proposal made by the SEC to require court approval before a fund settles
claims against insiders,"7 but the Act also contains a clear negative pregnant:
section 36(b) of the Act, added in 1970, in effect denies the board power to
terminate derivative litigation challenging a breach of fiduciary duty with respect
to the investment adviser's fees.' 8 The narrowness of this prohibition inevitably
suggests that the independent members of the board retained the power to ter-
minate other forms of derivative litigation. Indeed, given the importance attached
by the Act to independent directors, it could be argued that a state rule (such as
that in Maldonado I1) denying the independent directors of a mutual fund the
authority to terminate derivative litigation would itself conflict with the Act.
The position of the Second Circuit thus seems weak, insofar as it denies
power even to the independent directors of an investment company. But, by this
same token, Burks does not truly signal any general reluctance to find an incon-
sistency between federal policy and the decision not to sue. Other federal secur-
ities statutes contain policies quite different from those of the Investment Com-
pany Act and, in particular, rely to a greater extent on private litigation for their
enforcement.5 9 Thus, it is necessary to avoid overgeneralizations and examine
the specific policies underlying a statutory provision.
This Article attempts, therefore, to survey arguments that might be reason-
ably made in the contexts most likely to arise. In so doing, it must address a
question Burks never squarely faced: the meaning of "frustration". Because the
Burks Court found the policy of the Investment Company Act to have been
misunderstood by the Second Circuit, it did not have to consider how significant
a tension can exist between state and federal policies before the latter is truly
frustrated. Our premise is that in resolving this question courts should focus on
153. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 482-85.
154. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976).
155. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1-3) (1976).
156. Investment Company Act of 1940, §'8, 15 U.S.C. § 80-15(c) (1976).
157. See S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 33(a) (1940).
158. Investment Company Act of 1940 (as amended in 1970), § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)
(2) (1976).
159. See text accompanying notes 162-99 infra.
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the adequacy of alternative remedies to the derivative action. Can other means of
enforcement adequately protect the substantive federal policy? Or does the de-
rivative action have unique properties that make its viability critical to the poli-
cy's enforcement? Such a perspective, which already has a hint of judicial sup-
port in Judge Weinfeld's opinion in Maldonado I,6' supplies very different
answers to the problem of defining frustration from those derived by simply
looking at the importance of the federal policy involved. Indeed, it could reason-
ably be argued that precisely to the extent that express or implied causes of
action do not exist under the statute setting forth the federal policy, the deriva-
tive action becomes the principal means of private enforcement and so the ter-
mination of such a derivative action becomes more, rather than less, suspect.
1. Express Federal Action. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provides the clearest example of this first category. 6' Because the "short
swing" profits recovered by this action go to the corporation, it seems fair to
characterize this type of action as essentially derivative. The 1934 Act specifical-
ly authorizes the shareholder to file suit 60 days after a request is made upon the
corporation (if the corporation fails to file the suit), and there thus seems little
doubt that a decision not to sue by even the most independent of boards would
be in direct conflict with the policy of the statute.62 Conceivably, where the
applicability of section 16(b) is unclear, a decision by the board to settle such an
action for less than the value of the insider's gains might be respected, if the
board sought to justify it on the grounds that the litigation costs would exceed
the difference in recovery. But even here, the statute's provision that the share-
holder may intervene if the corporation "shall fail diligently to prosecute" ,163
seems to reflect a strong statutory policy giving the shareholder-plaintiff the ulti-
mate discretion with respect to any proposed termination of the litigation.
2. Express Federal Duty. Typically, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
does not provide or imply a private cause of action for every duty it imposes.
For example, section 13(b)(2) of the Act" requires "reporting" issuers to install
and maintain a system of adequate internal accounting controls. No private cause
160. In Maldonado I, Judge Weinfeld wrote:
Plaintiff's argument also implies incorrectly that derivative actions are the sole private
means of redressing violations of Section 14(a) and enforcing the Congressional policy of
protecting investors. The cause of action implied under Section 14(a), however, can also be
asserted by an individual shareholder in his own behalf or as a class action on behalf of all
affected shareholders and therefore the business judgment rule cannot be said to preclude
private enforcement of the proxy rules.
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 281 (footnote omitted). But see text accompanying notes
195-99 infra for a critical analysis of Judge Weinfeld's view that a class action is an adequate
substitute for a derivative action.
161. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
162. In Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,683 (D. Colo. 1980), a
federal court denied a motion to dismiss a § 16(b) suit after finding that the special litigation commit-
tee was not independent. By implication, this suggests that the court believed a properly constituted
committee could have dismissed the action, a view that we find in conflict with the statute's 60-day
time limit for board action to recover the short swing profit. We disagree with the implication that an
independent board would have such a power.
163. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
164. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1976).
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of action is expressly provided, and most commentators doubt after recent Su-
preme Court decisions that such a cause of action will be implied. 6' The ab-
sence of a direct cause of action enhances the importance of the derivative suit as
a primary means of enforcing compliance with the directors' duty to install
federally mandated monitoring controls. To illustrate, consider a derivative ac-
tion alleging that illegal political payoffs were made by a reporting issuer; fol-
lowing their disclosure, foreign governments cancelled profitable contracts, and
the corporation suffered a significant loss.'" Assume further that the suit names
the corporation's directors as defendants and alleges that a proximate cause of
the loss was their failure to install adequate accounting controls after due notice
that the absence of such controls facilitated the illegal payments. Subsequent to
the commencement of the suit, three new independent directors are appointed to
the board and, once constituted as a litigation committee, they decide to termin-
ate the suit on the grounds that it is not in the corporation's best interests be-
cause it would chill outsiders' willingness to serve as directors. 67
If the directors' decision is accepted, it arguably perpetuates the absence of
adequate accounting controls. Other available remedies to enforce this duty will
be inapplicable or inadequate in some cases. Antifraud suits for nondisclosure
will be of little use if the corporation's stock value has not declined so as to
provide some measure of damages. (It may have risen for reasons quite indepen-
dent of, and partially offset by, the illegal conduct.) Similarly, the SEC's en-
forcement resources are limited, and the SEC has recently displayed a reduced
interest in enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." Thus, if the derivative
165. See Siegal, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 Colum. L.
Rev. 1085, 1112 (1979). Professor Schwartz expressed a similar view at the Seventh Annual Secur-
ities Regulation Institute of the University of California. [1980] 538 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
D-8.
166. Federal jurisdiction might be based on diversity as well as on an established federal cause
of action. Thus, even if no private right is applicable to the provisions alleged to have been violated,
the court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter under some other provision of law, and it
should consider the standard of conduct prescribed in the statute. For example, although a state court
lacks jurisdiction to enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it may be called upon to determine
whether defendants violated public policy or acted recklessly; in making its evaluation, it should
assume that federally legislated standards establish the standards of behavior expected of the reason-
able man. In this manner, the standard of reasonableness may evolve over time as the legislature
speaks or customs change, since the reasonable man does not defy the legislature's pronouncement of
governing community standards. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1185-90
(1977). Others have also suggested that state law's interpretation of nonspecific duties should be
guided by relevant federal standards. See L. Loss, Securities Regulation 973 (2d ed. 1961). Analo-
gously, state courts have found that violations of the antitrust laws, which provide no state remedy
for the offending corporation against its directors in a derivative suit, still may support an action at
common law. Thus, even if the statute is not itself a basis for jurisdiction, it may still set the
standard of conduct. Comment, Federal Anti-Trust Law-Stockholders' Remedies for Corporate In-
jury Resulting From Anti-Trust Violations: Derivative of Anti-Trust Suit and Fiduciary Duty Actions,
59 Mich. L. Rev. 904, 912-29 (1961).
167. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
168. In a recent speech, SEC Chairman Harold Williams emphasized that the Commission has
exercised great caution in enforcing the Act's provisions, noting that the Commission "has not
sought out violations of the accounting provisions for their own sake; indeed, we have not chosen to
bring a single case under these provisions which did not also involve other violations of law." The
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suit can be terminated-without at least some judicial inquiry into the adequacy
of the accounting controls-the disturbing prospect of a right without a remedy
appears likely."
3. Established Implied Causes of Action. Implied federal causes of action
have been clearly established under several sections of the federal securities laws
and continue to be viewed as vital to the statutory scheme of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The leading examples are sections 10(b) and 14(a) of
that Act, which proscribe fraud in connection with securities transactions and in
the solicitation of proxies, respectively.'70 The policies that these implied ac-
tions protect are well known: full and fair disclosure and fair corporate suffrage.
Thus, there is a sharp contrast with Burks, where an implied cause of action was
not clearly established under the Investment Company Act.' More important,
the central concern of the Investment Company Act is not with violations of the
duty of due care-plaintiff's basic theory in Burks-but rather with conflicts of
interest. Thus, neither the statute's basic policy nor its scheme of enforcement
was offended by dismissal of the Burks suit.
Conversely, since J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,7 2 the importance of private
enforcement through the derivative suit has been recognized in the context of
proxy and securities litigation. However, this policy does not necessarily extend
to every case alleging a violation of either section, because direct shareholder
actions under rule lOb-5 " or rule 14a-9 11 may be adequate to enforce the stat-
ute's policies. Thus, it seems important to inquire of both rules whether there
Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis, [1981] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,811, at 83,934 (1981). But if the Commission litigates only when other legal violations
are involved, then it is in effect giving little independent significance to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Hence, private enforcement through derivative actions arguably becomes an important means of
enforcing the duties Congress imposed. We do not mean to suggest that the question of "frustration"
should vary with the enforcement policy of each Administration, but the general lack of enforcement
effort or resources over time should be relevent.
169. The prospect of a right without a remedy was used by the Court in J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to justify the implication of a private cause of action as a "necessary
supplement to Commission action." Id. at 432-35. While the standards for the implication of private
causes of action have no doubt changed since that decision, see note 14 and text accompanying note
165 supra, it seems a far less ambitious judicial act to refuse to dismiss an action grounded on an
established theory because the action was also a "necessary supplement" to public enforcement than
to create a new cause of action in the first instance.
170. Although recent Supreme Court decisions have drastically cut back on implied private
remedies, see note 14 supra and cases cited therein, it seems a safe prediction that neither Borak nor
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), which recognized private
causes of action under sections 14(a) and 10(b) of the Act, respectively, will be reversed as they
apply to those statutory sections. In fact, in a recent dissent from an opinion implying a private right
under title IX of the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), Justice Powell, who con-
curred in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (favoring a total reap-
praisal of standards for judicial implication of private causes of action and advocating a "strict intent
of Congress" test) has explicitly rejected overruling Borak. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 735 n.6 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. See Olson, Courts Firm Against Creation of U.S. Corporation Law, Legal Times (Wash.),
Apr. 21, 1980, at 42, col. 1.
172. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
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are special cases where the derivative action seems uniquely capable of provid-
ing a remedy.
a. Rule 10b-5 Violations. One clear case seems to exist under rule lOb-5
where current law recognizes a right that a board termination would frustrate. In
Goldberg v. Meridor,'7 the Second Circuit ruled that a plaintiff stockholder
states a cause of action under rule lOb-5 when he alleges that a self-dealing
transaction between his corporation and its controlling parent involving the
issuance of securities was unfair to the former and was made possible by the
parent's domination of the subsidiary's board. Defendants had argued that since
the directors of the subsidiary had intimate knowledge of all material facts of the
transaction, full disclosure had occurred, and the rule's interests were therefore
satisfied. 76 Rejecting this view in the light of the directors' conflict of interests,
the Second Circuit concluded that only disclosure of the material facts directly to
the minority shareholders would suffice.'" The critical fact about Goldberg v.
Meridor from our perspective, however, is that a minority shareholder in the
subsidiary could not sue directly because he would not meet the "purchaser/
seller" test of Blue Chip.2 8 Thus, only the subsidiary has standing to assert the
rule lOb-5 claim, and a board termination of a derivative suit raising such a
claim effectively nullifies Goldberg's conclusion that disclosure must be given to
the minority shareholders. Logically, Goldberg implies that derivative actions
based on rule lOb-5 violations should be dismissed only when the action is
against a third party or the board is otherwise independent.,
Concededly, some decisions suggest that Goldberg's logic will not be fol-
lowed this far. In Lewis v. Anderson,1lu Walt Disney Productions substituted one
series of stock options for another, allegedly so as to benefit insiders at the
expense of the corporation. The Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that the board's
decision not to sue did not conflict with the policies underlying section 10(b).111
Still, the Court's reasoning in Lewis does not necessarily conflict with our analy-
sis of Goldberg's implications, given the Lewis court's narrow view of the pol-
icy underlying section 10(b). Because the Lewis court saw that policy as one of
protecting "the purity of the securities market" "I2 and because the excessive
compensation alleged to have resulted from the issuance of new stock options
did not touch the capital markets, it concluded that no federal policy was frus-
trated. Although the limited scope given by Lewis to the operation of rule lOb-5
175. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
176. Defendants maintained that, under Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
the fairness of the transaction was beyond the court's scrutiny under rule 10b-5 and, since the board
of the subsidiary was well acquainted with the parent corporation's financial condition, there could
be no disclosure violation. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 214-18 (2d Cir. 1977).
177. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977).
178. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must be either a
purchaser or seller of securities to maintain a cause of action under rule 10b-5).
179. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm
Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1980).
181. Id. at 783-84.




seems questionable,'83 the logic of the decision is simply that federal policy stops
short of reaching plaintiff's allegations. Lewis thus approaches being a sub silen-
tio holding that there is no available federal theory on which relief can be
granted, rather than a decision on the scope of the business judgment defense.
Even under the logic of Lewis, it would be a quite different matter if the
alleged fraud resulted in the issuance of falsified financial statements upon which
public investors had relied. For example, in Kamin v. American Express Co.,'
plaintiffs objected to the payment of a dividend in kind, consisting of stock that
had declined in value below its cost. Sale of the stock and distribution of the
proceeds would have produced the identical result to shareholders and given the
corporation a sizeable tax deduction. This alternative would have reduced re-
ported earnings but increased cash flow, thereby affecting the level of manage-
ment's incentive compensation. For our purposes, however, the important point
is not the conflict of interests between management and shareholders, but the
significance of a board decision that arguably allows the corporation to overstate
its earnings and thereby distort its financial statements as a claimed matter of
business judgment. The good faith of the business judgment is largely irrelevant,
because if the result is to overstate earnings, the directors are at least acting to
benefit stockholders by deceiving public investors. Of course, to the exnt that
directors are fiduciaries for stockholders rather than for the world at large, this is
exactly what one might expect them to do within the limits of the law. But it
conflicts with a federal policy that places disclosure to investors above the in-
terests of the corporation.'"
Kamin thus presents a case where the underlying conduct implicates no
federal policy, but the board's justification of it may-since it seems to suggest
that the desire to overstate earnings supplies a legitimate reason for declining to
minimize federal taxes.
b. Proxy Rule Violations. The proxy context is complicated by the tendency
for the alleged securities law violations to be only tangentially related to the core
theory of the case. Thus, in Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,' 6 the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the policies underlying section 14(a) were only tangentially re-
lated to a derivative action arising out of illegal payments to foreign govern-
ments, and accordingly it accepted the board's decision not to sue. Still, it
would seem a mistake to generalize broadly from Abbey. The payments in Abbey
were not alleged to have been made by persons who were candidates for election
to the board, and this seems critical to the issue of whether a sufficient nexus
existed between the federal interest and the alleged wrong.
Precedent, however, suggests that if the facts in Abbey were only margin-
ally different the action should not have been dismissed. Although a number of
183. In contrast to Lewis v. Anderson's narrow view of the scope of rule lOb-5, see Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (holding that rule lOb-5 reaches
"garden variety" frauds as well as those perpetrated on stock exchanges).
184. 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (S. Ct. 1976).
185. It appears settled that a conscious decision to violate a statute is outside the scope of the
business judgment rule. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
186. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979).
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cases have dismissed section 14(a) actions where the illegal payments were too
remote from the election of the directors for the court to see the requisite causal
nexus,'87 an important counter-principle has been set forth in Weisberg v. Coastal
States Gas Corp.'88 There, plaintiff alleged a continuing "cover-up," and the
court concluded that if such allegations could be proven, they would be material
to shareholders in the election of directors. Thus, the absence of involvement by
the directors seeking reelection in Abbey becomes the critical distinction between
it and Weisberg. A second limitation on Abbey seems apparent from Galef v.
Alexander,'89 which suggests that when the alleged nondiclosure relates to a be-
nefit received by the directors themselves (or at least some of them), its causal
relationship with the proxy solicitation will be sufficiently strong to preclude a
board decision to dismiss the derivative action.190
The Galef argument has, however, a potential flaw: even if a section 14(a)
violation has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that a derivative suit is the
necessary or preferable means of remedying it. As Judge Weinfeld noted in
Maldonado I, the availability of individual and class actions to challenge proxy
rule violations makes it difficult to claim that the derivative action is
indispensable.' 9' Of course, if the action were brought as a class action, the
corporation, not being a party to the suit, could not exercise its business judg-
ment to terminate it. A court may therefore feel little sympathy for a plaintiff
who elected the wrong remedy.
Still, Judge Weinfeld's argument should not be accepted too quickly. In-
deed, in Galef the Second Circuit seemed to endorse the opposite conclusion:
Obviously the goal of § 14(a) that communications from management
be accurate and complete as to all material facts is a vital one. Its
achievement would quite clearly be frustrated if a director who was
made a defendant in a derivative action for providing inadequate in-
formation in connection with a proxy solicitation were permitted to
cause the dismissal of that action simply on the basis of his judgment
that its pursuit was not in the best interest of the corporation. The very
premises which give life to a derivative right of action to enforce §
14(a) must save it from a premature death.
Unfortunately, although Galef states that the derivative suit is vital to the en-
forcement of section 14(a), it never quite explains why. But such an explanation
187. Nemo v. Allen, [1979] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Herman v.
Beretta, [1978] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 96,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Tenneco Sec. Litigation,
[1978] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,492 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Kamerman v. Pakco Cos., Inc., [1978]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,318 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lewis v. Elam, [1977] Fed. Sec. L. Rep,
(CCH) T 96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1977] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,899
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
188. 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979). See Block and Barton, supra note 13, at 117.
189. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 65-66.
191. Id. See note 160 supra.
192. Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 63-64 (emphasis added).
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can be given: at least potentially, the derivative action offers the prospect of
greater deterrence than a direct action. It does so for two basic reasons over-
looked by Judge Weinfeld in Maldonado I.
First, in direct actions, it is normally possible to indemnify the defendant
directors for fines, penalties, and settlement payments unless they should have
recognized that their action was illegal. In derivative actions, by contrast, such
amounts may not be indemnified.' Even though indemnification is more ques-
tionable in a direct action for liabilities imposed under the federal securities
laws, contribution remains possible between the individual defendants and their
corporation.' 9 As a result, the derivative action still generally poses a greater
deterrent threat to the defendant, since he cannot as easily escape its sanctions.
Second, the economic incentives for plaintiff's counsel will frequently be
stronger in derivative actions than in direct ones, particularly where nonmonetary
relief is involved. Rarely will counsel in a class action be able to recover a fee
from the class unless he succeeds in creating a fund, 95 and even more rarely will
counsel be awarded a fee from the losing party." In a derivative suit, however,
counsel would be entitled to receive a fee from his "client," the corporation, so
long as a benefit was conferred, even if the "benefit" consisted only of setting
aside an improperly conducted election, enjoining a transaction, or securing a
settlement that is "forward looking." "9 For example, if the court in Maldo-
nado I had nullified the election of directors and issued an injunction against fur-
ther misleading proxy statements, but denied damages, it still could have awarded
193. See Model Business Corporation Act § 5 [hereinafter cited as MBCA]. For an explanation
of the new structure of § 5, as recently amended, see Report of Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel,
36 Bus. Law. 99 (1980).
194. See generally Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The status of indemnification under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 has not yet been judicially resolved, and it can be distinguished from Globus since
scienter is not a necessary element of the cause of action. Nonetheless, we doubt that a different
answer will result. Still, although indemnification will probably be barred, equitable contribution
among joint tortfeasors will almost certainly be allowed. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971); Rice v. McDonnell & Co., 442 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Outside
the securities law context, this same distinction has also been made between permissible contribution
and impermissible indemnification. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182-87 (8th Cir. 1979).
195. In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980), the Court stated the general rule to
be that "a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than
himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole." Id. at 478.
The Court noted that the common fund "stands as well-recognized exception to the general principle
that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees .... Id. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597 (1974).
196. This is the so-called "American rule," to which exceptions are rarely made. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
Irving Morris, one of the leading representative suit lawyers in the country (and plaintiff's
counsel in Maldonado I/) has vividly described the problem of the victorious plaintiff's counsel who
has neglected to create a fund in a class action. Morris muses about the morning-after feeling of
emptiness that follows a "victory" without a fund. Morris, A View of Representative Actions,
Derivative and Class, From a Plaintiff's Attorney's Vantage Point, 3 Del. J. Corp. L. 273 (1978).
197. Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966); Rosenthal v. Burry
Biscuit Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 279, 209 A.2d 459 (1949).
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a fee to counsel in a derivative suit. On the other hand, it would have had
difficulty assessing a fee on the class members. Indeed, such a levy seems
essentially uncollectable since most shareholders will be unaware of the exist-
ence of the suit and will resist efforts at its collection. Yet nonmonetary relief
can have great importance, and will be ignored unless some means can be found
to compensate the counsel who secures it. At present, the derivative action re-
sponds to this problem, but the class action does not.
To be sure, it is not in every case that the need to compensate counsel tips
the balance in favor of permitting the derivative suit to proceed. In some in-
stances, the award of interim attorney's fees in a class action can produce an
equivalent result.9 ' To date, however, such awards have been rare and hardly
overgenerous.'" Moreover, particularly in the novel case where nonpecuniary
relief is a major portion of plaintiff's requested remedy, the balance should tip
in favor of the derivative suit. Clearly, this resolution is a transitional one: as the
law on attorneys fees changes, so may our conclusion on the centrality of the
derivative suit to the enforcement of section 14(a) require reexamination. But for
the present, Maldonado I seems to have missed some critical points in its asser-
tion that class actions are an adequate substitute for the derivative suit.
4. Self-Regulatory Rules. A considerable literature once debated the ques-
tion whether private causes of action could be implied for violations of stock
exchange rules. °° The argument in favor, which was accepted by most com-
mentators and not a few courts, was that often such rules were a substitute for
direct federal regulation? Although the issue of an implied cause of action for
violations of stock exchange rules seems moribund in the wake of recent Su-
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), Justice Harlan noted that the derivative
suit provides the most prominent example of the award of attorney's fees where an action "does not
bring a fund into court or add to the assets of the corporation, but it does benefit the holders of the
remaining shares by enhancing their value." Id. at 394.
198. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 393-94.
199. The Court in Mills recognized the possibility that no monetary recovery would ever be
produced, even though the decision represented a final judgment that the defendants had violated
their legal obligations to the plaintiff class. Ordinarily such a finding will produce some fund, but in
this case an arduous hearing lay ahead to establish recovery. In fact, the Court's suspicion was
confirmed; no fund was ever created. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1978). The award of an interlocu-
tory fee, given all the work that had been done and all that had been accomplished for the class, was
understandable. Still, the absence of a fund gave the Court pause, and the additional fees later
awarded were mainly symbolic.
200. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
12 (1966); Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the
Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-
Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 925 (1966); Note, Private Actions As A Remedy for
Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 825 (1970).
201. One example is found in Judge Friendly's opinion in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966). While rejecting a private cause for that case, Judge Friendly
noted that courts must examine the particular rule to determine whether to imply a private right of
action. The case is strongest when the rule imposes a duty unknown at common law. At least one
commentator agrees. Suggesting that remedies be implied for violations of moderately specific re-
quirements that are direct substitutes for SEC regulations, he concludes that doing so would serve
two purposes: protecting investors and promoting reliance on self-regulators. See Shipman, supra
note 200, at 1009-10.
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preme Court decisions,' the case for treating such rules as a form of surrogate
regulation is now much stronger, because the SEC has acquired direct supervis-
ory authority over their adoption. Under section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the SEC may now "abrogate, add to, and delete from" the rules
of a self-regulatory organization as it deems "necessary or appropriate . . . in
furtherance of the purposes of [the Act]."' This authority itself takes us well
down the road toward meeting the test Judge Friendly set forth in Colonial
Realty 0 for implying a cause of action from stock exchange rules: that the rule
be a substitute for federal regulation, and that it impose an explicit regulatory
duty unknown to the common law? 5
Of course, implied causes of action are not the focus of our concern, and
Judge Friendly's test has been replaced by the more restrictive one developed by
the Supreme Court.? Our claim, however, is more modest: such rules can con-
stitute federal policies even if they cannot give rise to a federal cause of action.
The New York Stock Exchange's rule requiring audit committees for listed com-
panies is a good example. The history of its adoption suggests strongly that the
Exchange was prodded into promulgating such a rule by the threat that the Com-
mission could impose a still tougher rule on it.0
Accordingly, consider the case of a corporation that establishes a "token"
audit committee to satisfy the New York Stock Exchange. The committee sel-
dom meets and exists as a practical matter in name only. The corporation's
outside accountants are informed not to discuss matters of accounting or auditing
policy with members of the committee unless authorized to do so by senior
management. As a result, highly questionable accounting policies are followed,
which result in an overstatement of income. Assume further that the mislead-
ing financial statements published by our hypothetical company result in secur-
ities law actions and liabilities. Stockholders who bear the cost of these liabilities
in turn seek to hold management and the members of the "token" audit commit-
tee accountable. If even truly independent directors can simply reject such a
derivative suit as not in the best interests of the corporation, a federal policy is
arguably frustrated. Moreover, to the extent that neither express nor implied
private federal causes of action exist by which to redress violations of stock
202. See note 14 supra; Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
203. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. 146 (amending
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976)) (emphasis added).
204. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
205. Id. at 182.
206. This is the "congressional intent" test applied in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 568 (1979), and followed in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 15-16 (1979).
207. In 1976, then SEC Chairman Hills wrote to the Chairman of the New York Stock Ex-
change urging that the Exchange amend its listing agreement to require a listed company to have an
audit committee composed primarily of outside directors. After some discussion and the apparent
possibility that the Commission could itself amend the Exchange's rules to impose such a require-
ment, the Exchange bowed to the SEC's wishes and adopted an amendment similar to that proposed
by Chairman Hills. See Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, 41 L. & Con-
temp. Prob. 115, 141 (Summer 1977).
208. This scenario summarizes some of the allegations made in a newspaper article on Califor-
nia Life Corporation. See Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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exchange rules, the case for rejecting the decision not to sue is comparatively
stronger than in the rule lOb-5 or proxy-rule cases.
We do not mean to assert that such a case may never be dismissed. For
example, if new procedures have been instituted and the audit committee is
properly restructured, it may then be appropriate for the litigation committee to
decide not to sue. But even here, plaintiffs may have conferred a benefit on the
corporation that justifies an award of attorney's fees if they brought the inade-
quacy of the audit committee to light or were the first to bring a legal challenge
to it.
209
5. Miscellany. Several contexts remain that we might have addressed: de-
rivative actions against directors who resist a lucrative tender offer; 2 10 the "going
private" context; specific issues under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; 2 I and
others. Our treatment does not purport to be exhaustive; rather its intent has been
to expound a relatively modest thesis: the Investment Company Act context dealt
with by Burks is the exception rather than the rule. In general, specific federal
policies exist that are frequently inconsistent with decisions not to sue.
All this leads to the broader question, whether decisions not to sue can be
overturned because they offend a federal policy outside of the federal securities
law. Our answer takes us back over the terrain just covered. The key question
must be whether derivative litigation is likely substantially to further and enforce
the policies of the federal statute in a manner superior to other means of enforce-
ment. Although a federal interest in a clean environment, nondiscriminatory hir-
ing, and consumers' rights no doubt exists, we cannot say that these goals will
be substantially furthered by the derivative suit. We do not mean to foreclose the
possibility that derivative actions could serve to further these goals, but once
again the relative advantages of direct actions under these statutes must be asses-
sed and compared.
6. Is There a Federal Interest in an Effective Board of Directors? No feder-
al statute or SEC rule of general applicability requires that the majority of a
board be independent, that it be equipped with a specific staff, or that corpora-
tions of any size or type have an independent nominating committee for direc-
tors. Similarly, the Supreme Court has emphasized on several recent occasions
that corporate governance is primarily a matter of state law.2 12 As the Court in
Burks phrased it, "federal law in this area is largely regulatory and prohibitory
in nature-it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only rarely cre-
ates it.'' 213
209. Under the modem rule, the plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees in a derivative action if he
"causes" internal reforms, which defendants undertake subsequent to his demand; a judgment or a
formal settlement is not essential so long as the court finds that the action was sufficiently merito-
rious to have provoked the ultimate reforms or compromise. See Wechsler v. Southeastern Prop-
erties, Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Palley, 310 A.2d 635 (Del.
1973); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 395 A.2d 375 (Del. Ch. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v.
Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 256-57, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966).
210. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. I11. 1980); Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). But see Lipton, supra note 17.
211. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
212. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84-85 (1975).
213. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 478.
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Nonetheless, in the case of "reporting" corporations there is arguably a
federal interest in an effective board. The federal interest does not necessarily
require structural reform (such as a nominating committee or a staff), nor is it
associated with any particular substantive decision. What is required is not a
correct decision, but rather a correctly reached decision, one that evidences
reasonable monitoring by the board of managerial disclosures. The SEC seems to
have expressed such a conclusion in its Stirling Homex staff report,"' in its
testimony before Congress,215 in its new requirement that directors sign the cor-
poration's Annual Report on Form 10-K, 6 and in its consent decrees, which
with increasing frequency have responded to deficiencies in corporate disclosure
by instituting additional monitoring controls, by disqualifying certain corporate
officials, and by revising the composition of the board." 7
During the 1970's, the Commission attempted to formulate a set of stan-
dards for the outside director. 28 The project was abandoned when the complex-
ity of the task became apparent, but such an attempt, even if ultimately infeasi-
ble, illustrates the Commission's view that an effective board is necessary for
adequate disclosure. Indeed, the Commission found after its improper-payments
investigations that a breakdown in internal corporate controls and accountability
was the universal common denominator in such cases.
21 9
Still, on several occasions, federal courts have recently declined to accept
the Commission's view as to the reach of the federal securities laws .2  Thus, in
considering this asserted federal interest, courts may for the present feel con-
trolled by decisions, such as Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,"' that declined
to interfere with the board's judgment if it satisfies the state law standard. Cer-
214. SEC, Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to
Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, Release No. 39-11516 (July 16,
1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,219.
215. Report of the Securities & Exchange Commission on Questionable & Illegal Corporate
Payments & Practices, submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee, 1976.
216. Under Securities Act Release No. 6231, 20 SEC Docket 1058 (1980), a majority of a
registrant's directors must sign its Annual Report on Form 10-K with respect to all fiscal years
ending after December 15, 1980. Previously, only the principal executive, financial, and accounting
officers were required to sign Form 10-K. Behind this new signature requirement seems to lie an
attempt by the SEC to establish an implicit duty of director diligence, since under section 18(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, those "who make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed" with the SEC that is materially misleading are liable to
investors who rely thereon, unless they can establish a good faith defense. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). See also Securities Act Release No. 6176, 19 SEC
Docket 186 (1980).
217. See SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. 1974);
Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, in Corporations at the
Crossroads 127 nn.69-71 (D. DeMott ed. 1980).
218. Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 217, at 125 n.61.
219. See note 215 supra.
220. The Supreme Court has disagreed with the Commission as to the meaning of the key term
"security," United Housing Fdundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-58, 858 n.25 (1975);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the elements of a claim under the
anti-fraud rules, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), and the scope of the insider trading restriction, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
221. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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tainly, this is the pattern suggested by Lewis v. Anderson' and Abbey v. Control
Data Corporation."' Still, the federal interest here described does not necessari-
ly invade the zone of regulatory autonomy over corporate behavior, which the
Supreme Court has given the states in its recent decisions. State law universally
requires that the body deciding not to sue be independent. But state law gener-
ally defines this concept narrowly, requiring only that there be no direct domina-
tion by the defendants and no financial interest in the outcome.Y4 The federal
interest might require a more rigorous standard, under which the board is shown
to have effectively reviewed at least those decisions that affected the quality of
corporate disclosure. This is no more than the theory the SEC adopted in its
Stirling Homex report, when it took the outside directors to task for not doing
SO. 
5 Accordingly, the judicial inquiry undertaken by a federal court need not
rely exclusively on the definition of independence under prevailing state law, but
might focus on the directors' actual involvement in the process, their access to
information, their relationship with counsel, and the general adequacy of the
investigative procedures followed. Such a standard does not conflict with state
policies because it never denies directors the substantive power to terminate, but
only superimposes a stricter procedural requirement of care and attention.
The short-term prospects for such a theory are admittedly not bright. But
pendulum swings have characterized this area of federal law, and if the conse-
quence of recent decisions is to immunize egregious behavior, federal courts
may find it easier to discern such a federal interest than to reject the independ-
ence of the board-an approach that involves state law issues.
In summary, the board's capacity to reject a derivative suit exists in poten-
tial tension with a variety of state and federal policies. On policy grounds, the
board's decision not to sue is not entitled to the same degree of judicial inde-
pendence as the ordinary business judgment, which in its typical form is predic-
tive, irreversible, and relatively unreviewable. Still, if we are to encourage the
development of independent boards, a middle ground between Maldonado I and
Maldonado 11 would make more sense than the polar position taken in either
case. We now turn to the formulation of such a position.
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM: A POLICY
EVALUATION AND PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
The common law approach has its inevitable limits. The vague standard of
fiduciary duty cannot easily give rise to prophylactic rules, "bright line" tests,
or detailed procedures by which to achieve an appropriate balancing of the pub-
222. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980).
223. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
224. See generally Note, supra note 124, at 619.
225. See note 146 supra.
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lic's interest in an accountable management and the corporation's interest in ter-
minating litigation truly injurious to it. 2 6 The problem of defining an "indepen-
dent board" provides an effective illustration of these deficiencies in the ad hoc
approach of the common law. Ideally, the "independent board" might be de-
fined in terms of objective characteristics: a majority of nonmanagement direc-
tors, an independent nominating committee, adequate staff, and the absence of a
controlling stockholder. Such a definition is, of course, legislatively possible,
but inevitably the judiciary's reach here must exceed its grasp. Although a court
can recognize that such characteristics make a board "independent," it cannot
declare that a board lacking them is necessarily passive or servile. As a result, it
must judge a board in moral terms, looking for some special fact showing the
absence of good faith. Because good faith in turn tends to lie in the eye of the
beholder, a case law founded on it will both lack certainty and tend towards
conservatism, as the court must virtually discredit the board's integrity in order
to reject its judgment.2 22  Ultimately, the language of fiduciary-duty analysis
leaves the court able at most to deal with instances of actual bias, yet impotent
when faced with the subtler problems of structural bias that inhere in a corporate
structure under which top management chooses, and frequently removes,
directors.'
Thus, we are led to the need for a statutory solution, which would substi-
tute a legislative definition of independence for case-by-case judgments. How-
ever, having started down the road toward a legislative rescue of the derivative
suit, we found it impossible to deal only with the issue of the board's decision
not to sue. Other issues must also be faced if the derivative suit is to have more
than a nuisance value. Although these issues have been individually addressed
by others, an integrated treatment of the policy issues surrounding the derivative
action has not been attempted in a number of years.2 29  But with the recent
curtailment of private actions under the federal securities laws,"0 such a wide-
226. Much this same point has been made by Professor Marvin Chirelstein in a related context:
My own view is that the development of adequate fairness standards ... is never likely to
result from a process of case-by-case, common-law decision-making. The problems are
complicated, and in most instances the best solutions lie beyond the competence of courts
acting under a vague and general standard of fiduciary duty.. .. What is needed, there-
fore, is detailed and specific legislation based on an analysis of recurring problems.
Speech by Marvin A. Chirelstein, Legislative Solutions for Fiduciary Problems, American Enterprise
Institute (June 1976).
227. The language of fiduciary-duty analysis is inherently pejorative and stigmatizing.
On occasion-and Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978), see notes
87-89 and accompanying text supra, supplies an example-the facts will be egregious enough for the
court to invoke the language. But in the majority of cases the court will shrink from such rhetoric
even if it believes the directors behaved imprudently.
228. For statistics on the prevalence of appointment and removal of board members by the chief
executive officer, see Note, supra note 13, at 619-22 & nn.98-109.
229. Probably, the last thorough assessments of the derivative action from a policy perspective
were Dykstra, supra note 5; Block, Current Critical Points in Stockholder Litigation, 62 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 181 (1967); and Hornstein, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit in the United States, 1967 J.
Bus. L. 282. Since these articles (all published in 1967), the attention of commentators has chiefly
focused on securities litigation as a means toward corporate accountability. But with the restriction of
these actions, the time has come for a serious reexamination of the derivative action.
230. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
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angle examination of the derivative action seems to us increasingly necessary.
We have, therefore, looked afresh and borrowed from the corporation law of
several jurisdictions (New York, California, and Pennsylvania), as well as the
Model Business Corporation Act, to draft a model statutory provision that
achieves, we believe, a fairer balancing of the interests of the plaintiff and the
defendant.
What follows is a form of prepackaged legislative history for our model
statute. Necessarily, our treatment of some of these issues is cursory, and
reasonable disagreement is no doubt possible with virtually every position we
have taken. But we doubt seriously that a coherent legislative policy toward the
derivative action can be fashioned without facing the issues and balancing the
trade-offs we pose.
A. The Choice of Rationales: Deterrence Versus Compensation
At the outset, we must ask the most basic questions: What can the deriva-
tive action realistically accomplish? What is its purpose? To our minds, the orga-
nizing principle around which the derivative action should be reconstructed is a
deterrent one: the derivative action should serve as the principal means by which
to enforce the fiduciary duties of corporate officials and to penalize the violation
thereof. Of course, this may seem obvious. Yet, although a deterrent rationale
for the derivative action has been occasionally recognized by courts-most not-
ably in Diamond v. Oreamuno -it has never been the dominant rationale, and
indeed some decisions appear frankly skeptical of it."' By and large, courts
have instead assumed that a compensatory rationale underlies the derivative
action." Such a rationale may have been appropriate when the derivative action
first emerged, but today the changed relationship between the shareholder and
his corporation makes such a rationale seem increasingly anachronistic. In three
critical respects, compensation is a goal that the derivative action can realize
only imperfectly.
First, there is the problem of the constantly changing composition of the
shareholders. A corporate recovery does not redress the injury to shareholders to
the extent that the shareholders at the time of the injury subsequently disposed of
their shares prior to the time of the recovery. To this extent, incoming sharehold-
ers receive a windfall gain. Somewhat inconsistently, the traditional theory of
the derivative action both recognized and repressed this difficulty in identifying
231. 24 N.Y. 2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). In Diamond, the New York
Court of Appeals wrote that "the function of su'ch an action ... is not merely to compensate the
plaintiff for wrongs committed by the defendant but . . . 'to prevent them, by removing ... all
inducement .... I Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (quoting Dutton v. Willner,
52 N.Y. 312, 319 (1873)) (emphasis in original).
232. The leading example of a decision skeptical of a deterrence rationale is Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc., v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). The Court primarily empha-
sized the unjust windfall that would result if deterrence alone could justify an action. Id. at 717-18 &
n.14.
233. See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 673, 93 N.W. 1024, 1035 (1903) ("It is
not the function of courts of equity to administer punishment. ... A plaintiff must recover on the
strength of his own case, not on the weakness of the defendant's case.").
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the "true" victim of the fiduciary abuse. On the one hand, it accepted the
baldest of legal fictions, that it was the corporation itself that was the injured
party; on the other hand, it disqualified noncontemporaneous shareholders from
bringing a derivative action.- Yet, to be consistent, this latter perception of the
derivative action, as intended to benefit injured shareholders, would also dictate
either that the corporate recovery be reduced by the percentage of noncontempo-
raneous holders or that some portion of the recovery be redirected to the indi-
vidual shareholders who sold in the intervening period since the time of the
wrong. This does not happen." Instead, the traditional theory glosses over this
problem by pretending that the corporation has suffered the injury. But if this
legal fiction were truly believed, it should also follow that noncontemporaneous
shareholders be accepted as eligible plaintiffs. 6 To some degree, the anthropo-
morphic fallacy inherent in viewing the corporation, rather than its shareholders,
as the victim is probably a necessary fiction accepted by courts in order to avoid
the potentially enormous problems involved in identifying the true victims. But
to concede this is also to concede that courts are accepting an obvious fiction
because they are less interested in compensation than in seeing that wrongdoers
do not escape sanctions. In short, the fiction of compensation serves the reality
of deterrence.
234. This produces a paradox when all the shares of an injured corporation are held by noncon-
temporaneous shareholders: can the corporation sue even though the shareholder would not be able
to? Compare Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952) (corporation may
institute suit in its own behalf), and Mauck v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 361 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D.
I11. 1973) (same), with Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 A.D. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291
(1950), aff'd mem., 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951) (suit by corporation barred when share-
holders lack standing). See generally Note, Corporate Incapacity to Sue Where Stockholders Would
be Barred From Suing Derivatively-The Vicarious Incapacity Rule: A Public Interest Exception, 54
B.U.L. Rev. 355 (1974).
235. Courts do disqualify plaintiffs subject to personal defenses, including generally sharehold-
ers who ratified the act in question, and, possibly, their transferees. See Bloodworth v. Bloodworth,
225 Ga. 379, 169 S.E.2d 150 (1969); Note, supra note 234, at 362-66. But where the corporation is
permitted to sue, it is only in the rare case that the corporate recovery is diminished on account of
the ineligible shareholders. Concededly, in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), the Court did preclude a suit by the corporation, but there the remaining
contemporaneous shareholders constituted about 1% of the remaining shares. In cases where a major-
ity of the shares in the corporation are still held by contemporaneous owners, we are unaware of any
decisions involving public corporations that have reduced the damages allowed by the percentage of
noncontemporaneous owners. Compare also Hawkins v. Mall, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 369, 387-89 (Mo.
1969), with Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 112 Colo. 331, 149 P.2d 653 (1944). In a few
cases where a majority of the shareholders are noncontemporaneous holders, courts have directed
pro-rata recovery to the contemporaneous holders. See Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 P. 29
(1921); Chounis v. Laing, 125 W. Va. 275, 23 S.E.2d 628 (1942); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110
W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931).
236. Although the contemporaneous ownership rule is virtually the universal common law rule,
some courts have found a means by which to outflank it in appropriate cases: they have characterized
the wrong as a "continuing" one and thus deemed the incoming shareholder a "contemporaneous"
one, eligible to bring suit. See Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Maclary v. Pleasant
Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (1954); Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 307 A.2d
210 (Me. 1973); Goldie v. Yaker, 78 N.M. 485, 432 P.2d 841 (1967) (dictum). We suspect that in
deciding whether the wrong was a continuing one courts have often looked to whether a culpable
defendant would otherwise go unpunished; if so, considerations of deterrence reenter through the
back door although barred at the front.
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A second problem with a compensatory rationale is that the corporate injury
resulting from a fiduciary breach is not necessarily the same as the injury suf-
fered by shareholders. Even assuming an efficient securities market that auto-
matically translates any injury suffered by the corporation into a decline in its
share values, "7 it is still plausible that the stockholders' aggregate loss will ex-
ceed that of the corporation-basically because the events will be seen by the
marketplace as creating a risk of repetition. For example, a self-dealing transac-
tion between a controlling shareholder and his corporation may result in a
hypothetical loss of $1 million to the corporation. But to the extent that this
signals to the marketplace that the shareholders in the corporation are vulnerable
to such abuse, the market would rationally discount the aggregate value of the
corporation's shares by more than $1 million in anticipation of future abuses. In
short, for legal purposes, the corporation's loss is a historical concept, measured
by accounting conventions and limited to injuries that have actually occurred; in
contrast, the shareholder's loss may be greater, because in a securities market
that discounts future possibilities, predictions of future loss are immediately con-
verted into a present decline in share values.233
Conversely, a corporate recovery does not necessarily produce a corre-
sponding benefit to shareholders. Where one shareholder holds a large enough
block of stock to carry a control premium, the corporate recovery may dispro-
portionately benefit his shares, and thus have a less than proportionate impact on
the shares of minority shareholders. "9 Alternatively, a corporate recovery may
be dissipated by excess managerial remuneration. Whatever the scenario-and
many are possible-compensation of shareholders does not automatically follow
from a corporate recovery.
A final, and partially countervailing, problem with a compensatory rationale
is that the typical recovery in a derivative action, although large in absolute
terms, is seldom more than de minimis on a per share basis. In some well-
known cases, it has amounted only to a few pennies a share.24° If all the deriva-
tive suit accomplishes is the refund of a few cents per share to thousands of
individual shareholders, it is difficult to conclude that such a result justifies the
237. For accessible explanations of this theory, see J. Lone & M. Hamilton, The Stock Market:
Theories and Evidence 70-97 (1973); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031 (1977).
238. Thus, for example, if an unfair self-dealing transaction between a parent corporation and a
subsidiary having a minority ownership were enjoined, the market value of the minority's interest
logically might not rise to its value prior to the proposed transaction, since the majority has signalled
its intent to deal unfairly with the minority and might achieve the same result by other means (e.g., a
.going private" transaction) in the future.
239. This was clearly recognized by the California Supreme Court in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson
& Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
240. In Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), the three
plaintiffs gained 8¢ per share for the 90 shares held between them. In Hornstein v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 266 A.D. 659, 41
N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), aff'd per curiam, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944), defendants asserted
that the five plaintiffs stood to gain $3.57, $0.41, $2.41, $0.17, and $0.65 respectively. See W.
Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 888 (5th ed. unabr. 1980). See also
Wood Report, supra note 3, at 49-50.
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considerable drain on judicial time and court resources that the litigation of this
complex form of action creates."1 Such a recovery will be neither much noticed
by the individual shareholder nor responded to by the stock market." ' Of
course, this objection applies as well to many class actions. In this light, the
great achievement of both class and derivative actions is not that they yield
meaningful compensation, but that by aggregating such individual losses, they
produce a great enough sanction to create real deterrence.
These three objections-the likelihood of share transfers between the time
of the wrong and that of the recovery, the lack of congruence between corporate
gains and losses and those of shareholders, and the trivial size of the typical
recovery on a pro-rated basis-do not imply that compensation is an illusory or
insignificant goal. But they do cast considerable doubt on its ability to serve as
the central rationale of the derivative action.
In contrast, a deterrent rationale for the derivative action is not significantly
affected by these problems. From a deterrent perspective, it matters less who
gets the recovery than who pays it; sanctions have a role independent of their
ability to make victims whole. In addition, the derivative action is in some ways
naturally adapted to a deterrent rationale, principally because it harnesses private
enforcement resources and focuses its penalties on the individual rather than the
corporation.2 3  Class actions, particularly those under the securities laws, may
also accomplish this, but in several respects the derivative action is at least
potentially superior as a deterrent remedy. First, the derivative action is basically
unaffected by the line of recent cases that have restricted the availability of
direct private causes of action.' Second, the recovery it yields will less fre-
quently come out of the pockets of the shareholders themselves, since their cor-
poration will not be the principal defendant in the action, but rather a nominal
plaintiff."5 Third, the derivative action can better justify an award of attorney's
241. Representative actions, including the derivative suit, place special burdens on the court
because of the existence of multiple parties and appear to contribute disproportionately to judicial
congestion. See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4
1. Legal Stud. 47 (1975); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58
F.R.D. 299, 300 (1973).
242. In principle, stock market values reflect discounted future earnings and thus should not
respond dramatically to a nonrecurring decline in earnings caused by self-dealing in a single year,
unless the self-dealing is seen as foretelling a future pattern of behavior.
243. Economists have argued that private enforcement will produce a higher level of enforce-
ment activity than public enforcement because, as a profit maximizer, the private enforcer will re-
spond to the prospect of high fines and damages more zealously than the public enforcer. See Landes
& Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law; 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975).
The individual focus of the derivative action is also important. A fine levied against a corpora-
tion may have little deterrent impact because the expected gain from the misbehavior exceeds the
penalty; yet if, through the derivative action, such a fine can be reallocated against the individual
officer (who typically receives relatively little of the corporation's gain from a violation of law), the
deterrent impact of the penalty may vastly increase. See Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A
Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 419, 456-59
(1980).
244. For the cases restricting the availability of private actions, see cases cited in note 14 supra.
With respect to derivative liability for a knowing or reckless violation of law, see note 250 infra.
245. For example, plaintiff's counsel in a securities class action will logically pursue the
deepest pocket, which will be that of the corporation rather than that of its officers. In a settlement,
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fees in those cases where the relief is substantially nonmonetary, both because
the fee comes in theory from the corporation, rather than its shareholders, and
because the corporation's deep pocket provides a source for a fee that could not
feasibly be levied against a sizeable class of individual shareholders." 6 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, there is a sharp contrast between direct and de-
rivative actions in the ability of the defendant to obtain indemnification: in a
direct action, the defendant can obtain reimbursement from the corporation for
expenses paid in a settlement and potentially even for criminal fines and civil
penalties, while in a derivative action settlement expenses may not be
reimbursed.2 7
To sharpen this contrast, consider a hypothetical securities law violation
committed by a corporation. If the conduct has resulted in a fine or other penalty
levied by a court or the SEC, it is still likely that this penalty will be modest in
proportion to the firm's assets and income.2 18  Private enforcement, however,
can amplify the penalty into an effective deterrent. Under the securities laws,
injured private parties might be able to sue for damages of considerably greater
magnitude, but increasingly, today, they face an insurmountable barrier if a pri-
vate cause of action was not expressly authorized by Congress.4 9 On the other
hand, the derivative suit plaintiff does not face such a hurdle: an allegation that a
corporate official knowingly or recklessly caused the corporation to commit a
violation of law, or negligently suffered it to do so, continues to state a valid
it is predictable that the lion's share of the financial contribution will come from the corporation,
rather than from the individual defendants (who may control the corporate defendant). Under the
common view that there is a separation between the ownership and the control of the modem public
corporation, the primary sanction in these instances falls indirectly on the owners of the corporation,
who may have little ability to control its behavior.
246. As noted earlier, in a class action, the plaintiff's attorney must create some fund out of
which attorney's fees can be paid. But in a derivative action the test is more favorable to him: has he
obtained a "substantial benefit" for the corporation? See text accompanying notes 195-97 supra.
247. Under § 5 of the MBCA, the corporation may generally indemnify a corporate official
against "judgments, penalties, fines, settlements and reasonable expenses" if the official acted "in
good faith" and "had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful." However, in the
case of derivative actions, § 5(c) of the Act limits indemnification to "reasonable expenses," and
thereby precludes indemnification of judgments or settlement expenses. Otherwise the recovery
would be returned to the defendants and the result would be circular. For the recently revised text of
§ 5 and an explanation of the draftsmen's intent, see Report of Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel,
34 Bus. Law. 1595 (1979).
248. Punitive damages are not authorized under the federal securities laws, and although the
SEC may obtain a variety of ancillary remedies, its enforcement jurisdiction does not entitle it to
impose penalties under the guise of obtaining equitable relief. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-06 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforce-
ment Suits, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1779, 1800-05 (1976).
As a general matter, the fines imposed against corporations in both civil and criminal proceed-
ings have been low in relation to their income and assets. See Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate
Criminals, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 377 (1972). Our point here is not to urge more severe penalties directed
at the corporation, but to argue for the relative desirability of an individual focus through the use of
the derivative action.
249. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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cause of action, subject to only limited exceptions. 50 Finally, even if the plain-
tiffs in the class action are successful, their target will typically be the corpora-
tion, whose deeper pockets make it a more inviting target than the responsible
officials. Even if the individual defendants are held liable or forced to contribute
to a settlement, they may still be able to obtain indemnification and so escape
the brunt of the loss.' In contrast, the derivative action provides a means of
reallocating damages and penalties that are imposed on the corporation (but are
likely to have only modest deterrent effect with respect to it) so that their cost
falls ultimately on the parties responsible for the firm's violation. On this lesser
scale, a penalty that is insignificant to the firm may be more than sufficient to
deter individual officials within it. 2
This argument can of course be carried too far. Because the derivative ac-
tion neither imposes punitive damages nor otherwise increases its penalty to
compensate for a low risk of apprehension s3 it only cancels the gain that an
individual seeking to benefit at the expense of his corporation expects. If the
only risk the defendant faces is the potential obligation to return the misappropri-
ated funds, he is hardly deterred. Hence, the derivative action, standing alone, is
an inadequate deterrent for predatory forms of self-dealing. But in the more
typical case of conduct by which the manager seeks to benefit the corporation,
but engages in a violation of law or otherwise accepts extreme risks in order to
do so, the prospects for deterrence are greater because the limited gain to the
individual corporate official from such conduct will not approach his potential
liability. In short, due care violations typically involve little expected gain and
frequently threaten enormous liabilities, and thus the potential deterrent threat
posed by the derivative action in this context is significant.
The differences between deterrent and compensatory rationales come into
clearest focus when one poses the hardest practical questions about derivative
250. See Coffee, supra note 166, at 1162-90. Compare Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1974), with Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Blake, The Shareholders'
Role In Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 143, 170-78 (1961); Forte, Liabilities of Corpo-
rate Officials for Violations of Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Antritrust Laws, 40 Ind. L.J. 313,
319-25 (1965); Note, Stockholders' Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 480, 490-91 (1953).
251. See note 244 supra.
252. Blake, supra note 250, at 157; Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 Tex.
L. Rev. 60, 75 (1968).
253. Among economists, there is a consensus that in order to deter an activity, one must raise
its "expected punishment cost" to a level equal to, or in excess of, the expected gain. The "ex-
pected punishment cost" is simply the mean penalty discounted by the risk of apprehension. Thus, if
the likelihood of apprehension for a fiduciary violation is only 50%, an expected penalty of $10,000
cannot offset an expected gain of $10,000 since ex ante it creates an "expected punishment cost" of
only $5,000. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 167-72 (2d ed. 1977); Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). Absent multiple damages or
other special sanctions, the compensatory ceiling on the derivative action's capacity to impose a
sanction prevents it from being an effective deterrent against self-dealing (assuming that the likeli-
hood of apprehension is well below 100%). Of course, the defendant may incur other losses as well
if he is unsuccessful (e.g., his own legal expenses, a degree of stigma, and possible loss of employ-
ment). To respond to this likely deficit in adequate deterrence, subsection (b) of our proposed statute
authorizes the court to disqualify corporate officials and to grant other equitable relief. See proposed
§ 49(b) in Appendix infra. Section 188 of the British Companies Act has long authorized a similar
sanction. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, § 188, at 554.
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litigation: Should a court dismiss an otherwise meritorious derivative action if it
appears that costs of litigation will exceed the likely recovery? Should a defen-
dant be permitted to raise the defense that the crime paid, that the benefits of
illegal action undertaken by him on behalf of the corporation exceeded the costs
and penalties imposed on the corporation as a result?,- Should a shareholder
not injured by the misconduct be denied the ability to bring a meritorious deriva-
tive action that otherwise would not be pursued? In each of these cases, a deter-
rent perspective tends to answer in the negative, while a compensatory rationale
tends to respond in the affirmative. At the same time, these questions also illus-
trate how unacceptable a legal system would be that took either position and
applied it in a doctrinaire fashion to answer all questions that arose. Under a
pure "bounty-hunter" rationale, nothing more would be required of a plaintiff
than a willingness and competence to prosecute the action. If the supposed pro-
tector of the shareholders were to force the corporation to incur costs in connec-
tion with the litigation well in excess of even the maximum possible recovery,
these costs would be simply rationalized as necessary to produce adequate deter-
rence. Conversely, under a purely compensatory rationale, the court would be
placed in the morally compromising position of having to offset the fruits of
misconduct against the penalties imposed therefor and possibly to acknowledge
that, despite the best efforts of the state, crime did indeed pay. Both alternatives
quickly produce absurd results."'
Thus, a balance must be struck, and the statute here proposed recognizes
that equitable constraints must be placed on the pursuit of deterrence. In general,
economists have warned that reliance on private enforcement of law may lead to
overenforcement. 6 The derivative action presents a context in which such dan-
gers are aggravated, because it is an exception to the "American rule," under
which each party bears its own legal expenses." 7 In consequence, a plaintiff
may seek to conscript the corporation by means of the derivative action in order
to redress alleged wrongs that are of little significance and that would not be of
interest to an adversary required to bear his own expenses. Accordingly, the
principle is recognized that at some point considerations of cost and corporate
injury may justify termination of derivative litigation.2 18  At the same time,
254. For an assessment of the law in this area, see Coffee, supra note 166, at 1213-22.
255. For example, even as advocates of a deterrent rationale, we would be disquieted by an
action in which the subject corporation was forced to expend $1,000,000 in legal expenses in order
to recover $100,000 from a faithless fiduciary. Standing alone, the deterrent rationale is too
openended and clearly needs some limits. But see note 258 infra.
256. See Landes & Posner, supra note 243; K. Elzinga & W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A
Study in Law and Economics 72-77, 84-96 (1976).
257. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1975) (reaf-
firming the "American rule" with respect to direct actions, but acknowledging that the derivative
action stood apart as an exception to it); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); see
also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 256-57, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (1966).
258. We do not assume, however, that simply because the costs to the corporation of securing a
recovery exceed the expected recovery, the action should be dismissed. Specific and general deter-
rence are generated by a successful prosecution, whether civil or criminal, and constitute a benefit to
the corporation. In addition, the benefit of general deterrence may have greater value to the stockhold-
ers as a class than to the corporation, because stockholders typically hold a portfolio of securities
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however, a fundamentally deterrent orientation is inherent in the statute we pro-
pose, and the specific trade-offs between the two rationales are best discussed
contextually in terms of the problems next addressed.
B. A Diagnosis: What Ails the Derivative Suit?
This Article has argued that the present state of board discretion to termi-
nate derivative actions represents the primary threat to the derivative action's
survival as an effective check on management. But, from a legislative perspec-
tive, four other general obstacles also require attention.
First, the derivative action has long placed unique procedural and standing
hurdles in the path of potential plaintiffs. Although the policies underlying these
barriers express justifiable concerns about the dangers of frivolous litigation and
unjust enrichment, their legislative implementation has been overbroad, chilling
meritorious and nonmeritorious actions alike and unnecessarily disqualifying tru-
ly injured plaintiffs.
Second, the derivative action is particularly vulnerable to the problem of
collusive settlements, under which the adversaries agree to nominal relief in
order to justify a substantial award of attorney's fees, the cost of which is borne
not by defendants, but by the stockholders theoretically protected by the action.
Judicial review alone is not adequate to deal with this problem,, 9 and the basic
solution here advanced requires that the relationship between the litigating parties
be made more adversarial.
Third, because plaintiff's counsel is effectively the true party in interest in a
derivative action, it is vital that economic inducements be held out to such coun-
sel that are at least commensurate with those available from other forms of con-
tingent-fee litigation.
Fourth, an invisible barrier to adequate deterrence is always the possibility
of judicial nullification of the law based on a sense that the potential penalties
are disproportionate to the misbehavior involved. The paucity of cases imposing
liability on corporate officials for violations of the duty of due care 260 suggests
the existence of such a phenomenon and makes advisable the establishment of a
fair ceiling on the financial exposure of a corporate official adjudged liable ex-
clusively for negligence.
Other barriers to effective deterrence could also be cited,26' but in our view
the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) sets forth acceptable standards in
rather than a single investment in one corporation. Thus, to the extent that the general deterrent
effect of a successful derivative action benefits investors as a class by demonstrating that manage-
ment may be held accountable, the benefit to the corporation's shareholders transcends that to the
individual corporation.
259. See text accompanying note 311 infra.
260. After examining the case law, Professor Bishop has asserted that there have been only
"four. . . specimens" where directors of industrial corporations have been held liable for negligence
uncomplicated by self-dealing. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L.J. 1078, 1099-1100 (1968). Although
we recognize that other candidates for this list exist, there seems no doubt that the list, as so
supplemented, would still remain remarkably short today.
261. In addition to the policy issues discussed in the text, there is the important threshold
question of choice of law. Our statute takes a compromise position on the issue of which choice of
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most of these areas. 2" Thus, we have chosen to concentrate our attention on
those areas where significant contrasts now exist between our proposal and the
current MBCA. Each of these five areas will be examined below, and the con-
trasting approaches outlined.
1. Procedural and Standing Barriers. These obstacles are well known and
will not be discussed in detail. They may be conveniently grouped into three
categories: (1) disqualifications that apply to those whose interest in the corpora-
tion is not recognized or is deemed inadequate; (2) security for expenses pro-
visions; and (3) the requirement that the plaintiff exhaust intracorporate remedies
before suing.
The first category includes provisions that disqualify beneficial holders, hold-
ers of convertible debentures, and stockholders whose interest in the corpora-
tion was acquired subsequent to the time of the alleged wrong. Each such re-
striction is grounded on an arguably valid purpose, but is severely overextended
when applied to all cases within the category.
law rule should govern corporate affairs: the "internal affairs" rule, under which the state of incor-
poration is decisive, or the modem "center of gravity" rule, which now governs in related areas of
law and which might make applicable the law of the jurisdiction in which the corporation has the
largest presence or on which the transaction had the greatest effect. See generally Baraf, The Foreign
Corporation-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 219 (1967); Kaplan,
Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 433 (1968); Latty, Pseudo-
Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955); Ratner & Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heit-
ner on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 641 (1979).
Basically, our statute accepts the Supreme Court's statement that the rationale for the majority
"internal affairs" rule lies more in the "need for a uniform and certain standard to govern the
internal affairs of a corporation than on the perceived interests of the State of incorporation." Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44. (1977). In this light, the deficiency of a "center of gravity" or
similar balancing test is that it is highly uncertain in its application. However, two exceptions to the
internal affairs rule are clearly justifiable: rules of judicial procedure, including those applicable to
derivative actions, are the prerogative of the forum jurisdiction, and the legislature of the forum
jurisdiction is entitled to classify some foreign corporations as substantially equivalent to domestic
corporations because of such corporations' preponderance of contacts with the forum jurisdiction. See
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1317-1320 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980); Cal. Corp. Code § 2115
(West Supp. 1980). See also Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California General
Corporation Law-The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations, 23
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1282 (1976).
Thus, to the extent that this statute's requirements are procedural, they apply to all actions
commenced within the jurisdiction against both domestic and foreign corporations. However, because
limitations on the business judgment decision arguably regulate internal affairs of the corporation, our
proposed statute applies this limitation only to corporations subject to the state's ability to subject
them to its substantive corporate law. This includes both corporations incorporated within the state
and certain other corporations, typically called "pseudo-foreign corporations," which are incorpo.
rated elsewhere but doing business predominantly within the state. It is here contemplated that the
jurisdiction will have already adopted a definition of "pseudo-foreign corporation" in its corporation
code, which may be incorporated by reference. If it is not, the California statute supplies an attrac-
tive model.
262. A major topic, best left outside the scope of this Article, is the ability of defendants to
obtain indemnification and insurance so as to avoid sanctions. This is the other major area in corpo-
rate law where courts have adopted a "frustration of public policy" test. See Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). However, as
noted earlier, see note 247 supra, § 5(b) of the MBCA substantially restricts indemnification in
derivative (but not direct) actions. The MBCA does not attempt to resolve the choice of law issue
discussed in note 261 supra.
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Of these restrictions, the most obviously overbroad is the exclusion of ben-
eficial holders. Although the common law has been generous in permitting ben-
eficial holders to bring a derivative action, 3 some ten states follow the current
version of the MBCA and require a plaintiff to have been a shareholder of
record. At a time when securities are increasingly held in the "street names"
for customers by brokerage houses, this requirement seems pointless and strik-
ingly inconsistent with the treatment of beneficial holders required by the federal
proxy rules. 5  In recognition of the outdated character of such a provision, a
proposed change in the MBCA would permit a "beneficial owner of shares held
by a nominee" to sue.' This restricted liberalization clearly covers the broker
who holds securities as a nominee, but seemingly not the bank or other institu-
tion that holds securities as a trustee. 7 This is unfortunate for several reasons.
The institutional trustee may have a conflict of interest because of its lending or
other relationships with the corporation in question and its officials. Such a trus-
tee has little incentive to sue in any event, and might not be able to recover
expenses so incurred from the trust corpus. And beneficiaries of the same trust
might disagree over the desirability of the suit and even more so over the alloca-
tion among them of expenses arising from it.
263. See Stephenson v. Landegger, 464 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
(1972); Arfsten v. Higby, 372 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1962); Jones v. Taylor, 348 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch.
1975); LaHue v. Keystone Inv. Co., 496 P.2d 343 (Wash. 1972). See also H. Henn, Law of
Corporations § 361 (2d ed. 1970).
264. The following 10 states require the plaintiff to be a stockholder of record or a "reg-
istered" holder: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-049 (1977); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 13-A, § 627
(1974); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-514 (1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2047 (1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. §
53-11-47 (1978); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-43.1 (1969); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23A.08.460 (1969);
W. Va. Code § 31-1-103 (1974); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.405 (West 1957); Wyo. Stat. § 17-1-141.1
(1980 Cum. Supp.). In addition, Georgia ambiguously requires that the plaintiff either "had pur-
chased his shares or was a shareholder of record." Ga. Code Ann. § 22-615 (1977).
265. Rule 14a-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-2 (1980),
exempts the broker holding securities for a customer from the application of the proxy rules if the
broker forwards the soliciting material to the beneficial holder and "does no more than impartially
instruct the person solicited to forward a proxy .. " 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(1)(iii) (1980).
Under rule 452 of the New York Stock Exchange, a broker cannot, without instructions, give a
proxy with respect to a matter "which may affect substantially the rights or privileges of such
stock." NY Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) 2452. Finally, rule 14a-3(d) of the proxy rules, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(d) (1980), requires issuers to supply copies of soliciting materials to brokers,
banks, and other custodians in sufficient quantities for mailing to beneficial holders. The interaction
among these provisions effectively ensures that the voting decision will be given to the beneficial
holder (although not necessarily exercised by him).
266. The Subcommittee on Shareholders' Powers of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association has proposed a redrafted § 49 to the Model Business Corporation Act. To
date, the full Committee on Corporate Laws has not yet approved the report of the Subcommittee,
which was chaired by Francis Wheat, a former SEC Commissioner. As redrafted, § 49 would require
that "the plaintiff was a shareholder of record or the beneficial holder of shares held by a nominee or
the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of the transaction of which he complains" or that he
acquires such shares by devolution from such an owner or holder. See Subcommittee on Sharehold-
ers' Powers, Memorandum to Committee on Corporate Laws, date September 3, 1980 (on file
with Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report]. It should be noted that the
report is both tentative and unofficial.
267. It seems difficult to consider a trustee exercising investment discretion over a portfolio of




Thus, it seems wiser to vest the decision whether to litigate in the indi-
vidual holders (while still permitting the trustee to sue on their behalf). Our
proposed statute does substantially this, 26 but with two important restrictions.
First, it recognizes that a trustor may wish to deny beneficiaries the power to
bring a derivative action.2 Second, it specifies that only those holding a "sub-
stantial beneficial interest" in the trust corpus, exceeding ten percent of the
value of such corpus, may bring suit, and only to the extent that it is "actuarially
possible to determine the value" of such person's interest. 0 The term "ben-
eficial holder" has had little judicial interpretation, and these limitations re-
spond to the problems that would arise if those holding remote or contingent'
interests in substantial collective funds, such as pension trusts or university en-
dowments, could seek to sue derivatively on behalf of the corporations whose
securities were held by such a fund. For example, absent such a restriction on
the concept of "beneficial" ownership, it is at least arguable that an individual
with vested pension rights could seek to sue derivatively any of the hundred or
more corporations whose shares are held by his pension trust. Similarly, the
student body of a university might claim a sufficient beneficial interest in its
university's endowment to support such a suit. Such scenarios, while perhaps
fanciful, remind us of the economist's observation that private enforcement
might lead to overenforcement and the excessive allocation of resources to the
prosecution of claims having little prospect of success."' To deal with them, a
limitation on standing seems appropriate. Thus, the requirement of a "substantial
beneficial interest" in the fund negates the possibility of a suit based only on
vested pension benefits, and the necessity of an actuarially identifiable interest
precludes the students' suit.
A more significant, and indeed pervasive, restriction on shareholder stand-
ing is the contemporaneous ownership rule, which requires the shareholder to
have owned his shares at the time of the alleged wrong (or thereafter acquired
them by devolution). 272 Underlying this rule is an understandable policy: inves-
tors should not be able to "buy" law suits, and unjust enrichment may result if
the shareholder seeking recovery bought his shares at a discounted price that
already reflected the injury. Conversely, from an exclusively deterrent perspec-
tive, any qualified attorney should arguably be permitted to redress a wrong.
Interestingly, the Canadian Business Corporation Act has recently eliminated the
contemporaneous ownership requirement. 273  Still, the rule seems deeply en-
268. See the definition of "Qualified Owner" in proposed § 49(a)(1 1) in Appendix infra.
269. Id. (providing that if trust instrument "expressly denies the power to commence a deriva-
tive action to such beneficiary," he shall not be deemed a "Qualified Owner").
270. Id.
271. See note 256 and accompanying text supra.
272. For an overview of this requirement, see H. Henn, supra note 263, § 362; see also Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
273. Under § 231 of the Canadian Business Corporation Act, not only is the contemporaneous
ownership doctrine abandoned, but the court in its discretion may even permit a nonshareholder to
commence a derivative action; the term "complainant" is defined to include any person (in addition
to shareholders and directors) the cdurt determines to be a proper plaintiff. See Can. Stat. 1974-
1975, c. 33, § 231.
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grained within our own legal system, and thus our objection is more limited: a
requirement of contemporaneous ownership is seriously overbroad. It is simply
fallacious to assume that all who bought after the time of the wrong had knowl-
edge of it or purchased at a price that fully discounted the injury. Accordingly,
our proposed statute follows the pattern of the California statute, which substi-
tutes the time of public disclosure for the time of the alleged wrong in determin-
ing whether shareholders will be denied standing. 74 In addition, following a
Pennsylvania statute,275 our proposal authorizes the court to permit suit by a non-
contemporaneous shareholder if a substantial injustice would otherwise result.
Another overbroad exclusion is that denying holders of convertible deben-
tures standing to bring a derivative suit. 6 Again, the basic notion is under-
standable: the interests of equity holders and those of creditors frequently con-
flict, and the board cannot serve both equally in making determinations about
business risks.2n Convertible debentures, however, are a hybrid security, having
characteristics of both debt and equity; frequently the principal value of such a
security will come from its convertibility into equity. Thus, in defining equity
security, our proposed statute includes convertible debentures if they would be
deemed "common stock equivalents" under generally accepted accounting
principles.278 At present, Accounting Principle Board Opinion No. 15 sets forth
the governing criteria."9 Such a test provides a "bright line" formula for ex-
274. See Cal. Corp. Code, § 800(b)(1) (West 1977). The California statute specifies several
additional conditions: (a) there is a "strong prima facie" case in favor of the claim asserted, (b) no
other action has been or is likely to be asserted, (c) the defendant would otherwise retain a gain
derived from the defendant's willful breach of a fiduciary duty, and (d) the requested relief will not
result in unjust enrichment. We have incorporated condition (a) in our proposed statute. See proposed
§ 49(c) in Appendix infra. The others appear unnecessary or, in the case of condition (c), undesirable
(because it seems to permit a contemporaneous owner to sue only in a self-dealing, and not a "due
care," case, where there would normally be no gain derived from negligence).
275. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1516 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1980). In contrast to the
California statute, the Pennsylvania one does not look to the time of disclosure as a cut-off and thus
approaches the broad scope of the Canadian statute, see note 272 supra. From an exclusively deter-
rent perspective, this may seem preferable to the California approach. We recognize, however, that
the absence of a temporal cut-off would raise the spectre of inviting champerty, since in theory any
plaintiff could buy one share and commence suit. Moreover, we doubt that the interests of deterrence
require the total elimination of all barriers to shareholder eligibility to commence suit. The critical
element from a deterrent perspective is not the shareholder, but the plaintiff's attorney, and so long
as the class of eligible plaintiffs is not defined in an overly restrictive manner, it is predictable that
legal "underground railroads" will develop by which eligible plaintiffs are directed to those attorneys
able (and willing) to prosecute derivative actions on a contingent fee basis.
276. See Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52
F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
277. Although others have recommended a creditor's derivative action against the solvent cor-
poration, we are dubious for fear that such an action might chill socially desirable risktaking.
Moreover, to the extent that the primary utility of the derivative action is in contesting self-dealing
transactions and violations of the duty of loyalty, eligible shareholder-plaintiffs can serve as adequate
proxy champions for debt holders. Traditionally, the common law has denied standing to the debt
holder. See Dodge v. First Wis. Trust Co., 394 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Dorfman v.
Chemical Bank, 56 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on
Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88 Yale L.J. 1299 (1979).
278. See proposed § 49(a)(8) in Appendix infra.
279. Adopted in 1969, Accounting Principle Board Opinion No. 15 classifies debt securities as
"common stock equivalents" if at the time of their issuance the debt security "has a cash yield of
less than 66 2/3% of the then current bank prime interest rate." American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, APB Opinion No. 15, para. 33.
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cluding those convertible debentures that are most likely to have their principal
value as debt securities, while granting standing to those whose center of gravity
is likely to be an equity security.
The security for expenses bond represents still another procedural barrier
that has an inherent overbreadth. Again, the underlying policy premise cannot be
wholly denied: the derivative action has frequently been characterized by abuse,
because plaintiff's counsel has an incentive to file nonmeritorious actions if he
can thereby obtain a settlement based on the action's nuisance value.28 But as a
remedy for this problem, the security for expenses statute fails adequately to
distinguish between meritorious and nonmeritorious actions and thereby chills
both. Although the court has discretion in setting the amount of the bond, it may
be incapable of, or uninterested in, distinguishing the probable merit of the
litigation at the outset."' Thus, a more effective remedy for abusive or extor-
tionate litigation would be a backward-looking one that invites the court to im-
pose a penalty after it has determined the merits of the case, but not before.
Accordingly, our statute denies the court power to impose a security for ex-
penses bond, but does empower the court to award reasonable costs and ex-
penses if an action is found to have been commenced without "reasonable
cause."" To be evenhanded, this authority also applies to defendants, and the
court is specifically authorized to award interim costs and expenses where an
action is prolonged by frivolous motions, abuse of discovery, or unreasonable
resistance to discovery efforts. The Supreme Court has recently upheld judicial
authority to impose such an award against an attorney,2 3 and in the context of
the derivative action the plaintiff's attorney is the more logical party on whom to
focus disincentives.
A final perspective on the security for expenses bond is supplied by empir-
ical studies reporting that motions for security by defendants have become less
frequent. ' In part, this is because the sophisticated plaintiff can plead a federal
cause of action, with respect to which state provisions respecting security are
inapplicable.?4 But even where the action is in state court, the customary coun-
termove of the plaintiff to the defendant's request for security is to request a stay
280. For the classic statement of this view, see Wood Report, supra note 3. This study found
that in the case of publicly held corporations, only 2% of derivative actions surveyed had resulted in
favorable judgments, and only 6% had been settled with court approval. Another quarter of the cases
had been settled in a confidential manner, suggesting that the settlement may not have been received
by the injured corporation. Id. at 7, 32. But see Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liabil-
ity for Negligence, 1972 Duke L.J. 895, 901 n.21; Hornstein, supra note 3.
281. MBCA § 49 currently provides that "the corporation in whose right such action is brought
shall be entitled ... to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses,
including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by it ... or ... by other parties named as
defendants for which it may become legally liable." The amount of security so required is, however,
basically placed "in the discretion of the court," as is the corporation's recourse to it upon termina-
tion of the action.
282. See proposed § 49(h)(1) in Appendix infra.
283. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980).
284. See Note, supra note 4, at 50, 62-65.




during which it will attempt to communicate with other shareholders in order to
aggregate sufficient shareholders to comply with a common statutory provision
that exempts substantial shareholders from the obligation to post such a bond. 6
Fearing adverse publicity from such efforts, defendants have apparently declined
to request security even where the motion would be granted. In this light then,
the substitution of a postdecision penalty (the award of costs) for a pretrial bur-
den (the security bond) seems not only fairer, but more effective as well.
Two other procedural requirements are also simplified by the proposed stat-
ute: the requirement of a verified complaint is eliminated, and demand on share-
holders is abolished, although demand on the board is retained. While federal
rule 23.1 requires a verified complaint,' and a tentatively proposed revision of
the MBCA would also require it, 8 occasions arise, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, in which a qualified plaintiff in a meritorious action may be unable
to meet the verification requirement because of either lack of access to the rel-
evant facts or financial naivete. 9  In view of this, the danger of vexatious or
frivolous litigation is better addressed by empowering the court to award costs
against the responsible attorney. Demand on shareholders is abolished, as such a
requirement places both an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff and unrealistic
expectations on the ability of often widely scattered shareholders to communicate
or reach an expeditious or informed decision. 290 Demand on directors is a uni-
versal requirement, grounded in part on the desire to avoid unnecessary litigation
and encourage intracorporate settlements.29 To some degree, decisions dealing
with the demand requirement have been motivated by the court's attitude toward
the question of the board's power to terminate a derivative action.' Our pro-
posed statute, however, severs these two questions, because the demand require-
ment is based on other policies as well. Thus, the fact that demand on the board
is not excused by a court should not imply that the same board is sufficiently
independent to be able to terminate the action.
286. See Note, supra note 4, at 62-65. Under § 49 of the MBCA, security is not required if the
stockholdings of the plaintiffs exceed 5% of the outstanding shares of the class or have a market
value in excess of $25,000.
287. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (providing that "the complaint shall be verified").
288. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 266. In justifying such a requirement, the Subcom-
mittee on Shareholders' Powers argued that "a verification requirement might provide some marginal
protection against groundless suits." Id. at 6. We disagree. It is at least as possible that such a
requirement will only dissuade the more reputable attorney, but not the "strike suit" lawyer who
brings an action based on its nuisance value alone. We do not doubt that such actions are filed, but
believe the award of costs against the irresponsible plaintiff's attorney is the more appropriate re-
medy.
289. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
290. Several major jurisdictions now expressly reject the necessity of demand on shareholders.
See Cal. Corp. Code § 800(b)(2) (West 1976); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(c) (McKinney 1963);
N.C. Bus. Corp. Act § 55-55(b) (1973). See also Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458
(1958).
291. See Note, supra note 49.
292. See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (stat-
ing that courts "have generally been lenient in excusing demand"); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d
731, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975) (excusing demand).
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2. Incentives to Counsel. Plaintiff's counsel is the engine that drives the
derivative action. For the action to constitute an effective deterrent, counsel must
be compensated on a basis at least commensurate with that applicable to class
actions and other forms of contingent-fee litigation. Traditionally, the successful
plaintiff's counsel in a derivative suit was compensated under a salvage-value
formula, under which he would receive twenty to twenty-five percent of the first
million dollars recovered and a lesser percentage thereafter. 9 ' Such a formula is
clearly inappropriate for evaluating the services of counsel in any action that is
settled in substantial part on the basis of nonmonetary relief. More recently,
federal courts in class-action settlement hearings have turned to a different for-
mula, which places principal emphasis on the value of the attorney's time, com-
puted at his normal hourly rate, and then adjusts this "lodestar figure" to reflect
the risk assumed and any special skill demonstrated in the case.29' Thus, we
have sought to codify these precedents and extend them to the derivative-suit
context.
25
The concept of an adequate incentive to plaintiff's counsel also requires that
the proof of damages not be overly difficult. At one time, a series of New York
cases required the plaintiff in an action alleging illegal behavior by a corporate
official to prove not only that the violation of law had occurred, but also that the
losses caused thereby in the form of damages and fines were not outweighed by
the profits from the criminal enterprise.2 The apparent assumption here, that
crime does pay unless the plaintiff can prove otherwise, is objectionable from
the standpoint of public policy and also from a traditional procedural viewpoint,
because it forces the plaintiff to prove facts uniquely within the knowledge of
the defendant. 97  Although the continuing authority of these cases is
questionable, 99 a clear legislative expression of the court's authority to disregard
profits from criminal behavior where their recognition would frustrate public
policy seems desirable from a deterrent perspective. In addition, our statute re-
verses the burden of proof and requires the defendant to prove any such
offsets.'
3. The Nullification Problem. An additional problem, countervailing to that
of providing economic inducements to plaintiff's counsel, is the danger that if
penalties are elevated to a level that is disproportionate to the culpability of the
293. See Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Homstein Re-
visited, 6 U. Rich. L. Rev. 259 (1972); Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and
Derivative Suits, 3 J. Corp. L. 267 (1978).
294. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d
102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
295. See proposed § 49(f) in Appendix infra.
296. See Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Spinella v. Heights' Ice Corp.,
62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Note, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 174 (1964).
297. See Coffee, supra note 166, at 1216-17.
298. In particular, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910
(1969), suggests that an allegation of net loss either is not necessary or can be inferred from the
stigma and loss of goodwill that corporate involvement in misconduct creates. See also Knopfler v.
Bohen, 15 A.D.2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1962).
299. See proposed § 49(d) in Appendix infra.
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underlying behavior, courts and juries will refuse to enforce them. This tendency
of the law to nullify extreme penalties and to distort the substantive law in an
effort to avoid punishments that do not fit the crime has been much discussed in
the criminal-law context,-" but only rarely in the civil law.-° Nonetheless, there
is reason to believe that many of the complexities and procedural barriers that
have grown up to surround the derivative action are the consequence of efforts
by courts in individual cases to avoid the imposition of substantial damages on
corporate officials guilty of nothing more than negligence or inattention. For
example, despite universal recognition of the principle that directors owe a duty
of due care to their corporations, one well-known survey found only a handful of
decisions-perhaps no more than four-in which courts have actually imposed
liability for negligence on the directors of a nonfinancial corporation. 2 Argu-
ably, such a generalization is an overstatement, and surely many other cases
have been settled in anticipation of possible liability; but in the main, courts
have proven remarkably reluctant to impose liability where no element of self-
dealing or personal benefit was present. In addition, it is increasingly true that
the potential liability for a due care violation, absent some statutory ceiling, may
be bankrupting." 3 The result is that the civil liability for conduct not involving
any element of scienter or willfulness may exceed the highest authorized fine for
any criminal felony. Given such disparity, it would not be surprising if courts at
times reacted by softening the law, placing additional burdens on plaintiffs, or
recognizing new defenses. In the long run, this reaction both distorts the sub-
stantive command of the law and undermines its deterrent threat, since such
legal rules, once created, cannot be easily limited to those cases where the equi-
table factors favor the defendant. Thus, we propose an alternative: a statutory
ceiling keyed to the financial circumstances of the individual defendant and ap-
plicable only to cases involving exclusively violations of the duty of due care. 304
To implement such a proposal, legislation seems necessary, since at com-
mon law the negligent tortfeasor is liable for all damages proximately caused by
his negligence."5 As a model, we have looked to the Federal Securities Code,
300. The literature in this area is vast. For a seminal article, see Michael & Wechsler, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide Pt. 2, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1261, 1265 (1937). See also Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-303 (1976) (finding death penalty to have historically pro-
duced jury nullification); Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev.
748, 750-51 (1935).
301. But see Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer
Now and Then, 68 Geo. L.J. 1131, 1134 n.20 (1980); Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 43 n.141 (1979).
302. See Bishop, supra note 260. Indeed, it seems more likely than not that in the four cases
cited by Professor Bishop, the courts perceived some element of self-dealing, but declined to articu-
late this theme for lack of clear evidence.
303. Consider, for example, the position of an outside director of Penn Central, Lockheed,
Chrysler, W.T. Grant, or another major corporation that is facing or has experienced insolvency. The
financial rewards are small, and should a court ultimately find that such a director failed to exercise
due care, the damages proximately caused by such negligence might be bankrupting. Indeed, the
risk-averse defendant may agree to a very large settlement if the action is not dismissed at an early
stage.
304. See proposed § 49(k) in Appendix infra.
305. A caveat is necessary here. Some decisions have found that a director's negligence, even
though egregious, was not the proximate cause of the corporation's loss; through this mitigating
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which, for certain violations not involving scienter or profit to the defendant,
limits the defendant's liability to the greater of $100,000 or one percent of its
gross revenues (up to a maximum of $1,000,000). °6 Such a measure seems
equitable,n and its corollary here is a ceiling based on the defendant's highest
annual gross income during the five years preceding the verdict. However,
although such a ceiling equalizes defendants of different means, it must be rec-
ognized that defendants are not necessarily equal among themselves in terms of
culpability or involvement. Thus, we would grant the court discretion to set the
ceiling within a range bounded by the defendant's annual gross income and his
aggregate fees and compensation as a director. This latter boundary, which also
has a corollary in the Federal Securities Code,"'3 has an obvious rationale: a
director who has been negligent has not earned his compensation and should
return it. The combined effect of these two boundaries on the ceiling for "due
care" liability permits the court to recognize degrees of responsibility and avoid
the injustice of treating unequal defendants equally.
4. The Problem of Collusion. Representative actions such as the derivative
suit have a built-in conflict of interests: the economic interest of plaintiff's coun-
sel is not in a large recovery, but in a large award of attorney's fees. To the
extent that defendants can offer a settlement involving only nominal relief or a
small monetary recovery, but a substantial award of fees (paid by the corporation
in most instances), counsel's self-interest is in conflict with that of the class of
shareholders he represents, most of whom have too small an individual interest
in the litigation to give it close attention.9
In response, federal rule 23.1 requires judicial approval of all settlements,
compromises, or discontinuances, and a pending revision of the MBCA would
do likewise.3 1 1 Yet, as Judge Friendly has observed, this is a weak reed on
which to rely, once defendant and plaintiff's counsel have formed a coalition to
advance the settlement to the court .3 1  Thus, to reduce the possibility of such an
finding, such decisions have avoided the imposition of otherwise enormous damages. See Bames v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.). Still, such judicial escape valves are of
uncertain effect, and a legislative ceiling seems preferable.
306. See ALl, Federal Securities Code § 1708(c)(2) (1980). This limit would apply, for exam-
ple, in the case of a materially misleading corporate press release.
307. Indeed, a well-known criminal law equivalent is the "day-fine," which attempts to equal-
ize financial penalties among defendants of unequal wealth. Under this approach, defendants con-
victed of the same substantive offense might each be fined 30 days' wages, which in the case of the
higher-income defendant would result in a higher monetary value. See Note, Criminal Procedure-
The Use of the Fine as a Criminal Sanction in New Jersey: Some Suggested Improvements, 28 Rut.
L. Rev. 1185, 1190-93 (1975).
308. See ALI, Federal Securities Code § 1716 (1980) (establishing penalty for violation of
"margin rule" regulations in terms of a multiple of the interest paid by borrower on illegal borrow-
ings plus certain trading losses made possible by the loan). We acknowledge that the analogy to this
section was suggested to us by Professor Louis Loss, Reporter for the Federal Securities Code.
309. Examples are not hard to find in which plaintiffs' attorneys have agreed to dismiss or
settle class or derivative actions in return for little discernible relief but substantial fees to them-
selves. See Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fistel v. Christman,
133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockhol-
ders' Actions-Part I9: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
310. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 266, at 11-12.
311. See Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.).
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alliance, which imposes the costs of the litigation on the shareholders, additional
remedies must be found. A liberal intervention standard is a partial answer, since
with adequate notice other plaintiffs' attorneys will come forward to contest an
inadequate settlement.12  But two other measures seem potentially useful in pre-
venting such an alliance, by keeping the interests of the parties fundamentally
antagonistic so that settlements are the product of mutual estimates of the likely
results of litigation, rather than of collusion to pass costs on to the unrepresented
shareholders.
First, some minimal financial contribution must be required from the defen-
dant who is adjudged liable or chooses to settle-in effect, there must be a
corresponding floor to the ceiling placed on liability by our proposed statute. At
present, such a defendant may escape financial liability in one of two recurring
ways: (1) although the defendant is found to have violated a duty to the stock-
holders (chiefly one involving disclosure), there may be no ascertainable dam-
ages to award the corporation,3"3 or (2) the defendant agrees to a settlement
involving only nonmonetary, therapeutic relief, but providing for a substantial
payment of attorney's fees by the corporation to plaintiff's counsel.3"' In both
instances, defendant's defeat is a bloodless one, and the real financial loss is
absorbed by the corporation. But this description in turn suggests an answer: if
the attorney's fees awarded plaintiff's counsel came out of defendant's pocket
rather than the corporation's, the possibility of collusive settlements would be
diminished, because the contest would once again be a "zero sum" one in
which plaintiff's gain is defendant's loss. This does not mean that the defendant
must directly pay the plaintiff's expenses, but that when the financial contribu-
tion by the defendant is less than the proposed award of expenses, the court
should exercise caution and generally refrain from approving the settlement."'
Such a resolution also answers the problem of how to generate deterrence when
there is a proven violation but no apparent damages: the cost to the corporation
of redressing the violation (i.e., the cost of plaintiff's counsel) represents the
minimum damages for which defendant should be held accountable. Thus, at a
312. See 2 G. Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 724 (1959). "Liberal" decisions have
permitted plaintiffs who would otherwise be time-barred by the statute of limitations to intervene and
prosecute an action. See Duncan v. National Tea Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771 (App.
Ct. 1960). Conversely, federal decisions have generally required intervenors to be contemporaneous
owners. See Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). This seems unnecessary, since
the action will proceed in any event, and it ignores the utility of intervention as a check on collusive
settlements.
313. The dilemma here is well illustrated by the subsequent history of Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Having found a disclosure violation, the Court remanded to the
Seventh Circuit for assessment of damages. The circuit court found that there were none. Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). From a deterrent stand-
point, the result is an unpunished violation. To remedy this problem, we recommend that the court
impose the plaintiff's attorney's fees on the defendants. See proposed § 49(h)(3) in Appendix infra.
314. It is well recognized that nonmonetary relief can justify an award of attorney's fees to
plaintiffs. See Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423
(1960); Homstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 658, 663 (1956). We do not quarrel with this principle, but only point to the potential for its
distortion.
315. See proposed § 49(h)(3), (j)(4) in Appendix infra.
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stroke, we achieve a means of compensating counsel for obtaining often import-
ant nonmonetary relief without imposing the burden on shareholders, while also
reducing defendant's ability to escape unscathed.
In rebuttal, two objections will predictably be raised. First, such a realloca-
tion of costs will chill settlements, and, second, it is a deviation from the
"American rule," that each side bears its own expenses. Both these arguments
are correct as far as they go. Imposing a minimum burden on the defendant who
settles will chill his urge to settle-precisely by discouraging those settlements
that have the highest potential for being collusive. In addition, the derivative
action has long been an exception to the American rule,31 6 and for good reason.
Basically, it is a three-sided litigation in which one party (the corporation) is for
the most part an uninvolved bystander until the time comes to pay plaintiff's
fees and defendant's indemnification. Such a result should not be rationalized by
reference to a rule that developed in the simpler context of two-sided litigation
between active parties. In addition, the fiduciary status of the defendants makes
such a proposal appropriate. It is a maxim of tort law that "danger invites req-
cue," and here it is the danger to the corporation that prompts the plaintiff's
efforts on its behalf. Having invited those efforts, the defendant should bear their
cost.
A second means of realigning the interests of the parties to reduce the
potential for collusion is to give the plaintiff's counsel a strong interest in oppos-
ing indemnification of the defendants. This is most directly accomplished by
making the presence or absence of indemnification payments one of the factors
to be considered by the court in determining the size of the counsel fees to be
awarded to plaintiff's attorney. Logically, any indemnification paid by the cor-
poration reduces the net monetary recovery received by it, and thus such
amounts should be subtracted from the recovery figure that is to be used as a
base in determining counsel fees." 7 Procedurally, such a proposal would require
the parties to inform the court as to the amount of any indemnification paid or to
be paid as a result of the litigation at the time of the settlement hearing. Absent
such a provision, both parties have a mutual interest in exaggerating the size of
the settlement to the court (thereby justifying judicial approval of the settlement
and a high award of attorney's fees). Thereafter, post-settlement indemnification
may be quietly blinked at by plaintiff's counsel as an implicit condition of the
settlement. To prevent this, the trio of settlement, counsel fees, and indemnifica-
tion must be recognized as an integrated issue, one that needs to be resolved in a
single judicial proceeding at which the parties have a fully adversarial rela-
tionship.
5. The Board's Decision to Terminate a Derivative Action. The simplest
legislative resolution of the Burks v. Lasker crisis would be to overturn the
316. See note 257 supra.
317. See Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (estimated indemnification ex-
penses of $28,500 subtracted from gross settlement of $110,000 in determining fund generated by
derivative action, and award of attorney's fees correspondingly reduced from $27,500 to $15,000).
See also proposed § 49(j)(4) (advising court to consider extent to which corporate recovery will be
offset by indemnification in determining of counsel fees) in Appendix infra.
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decision and abolish the defense. In support of this position, a strong argument
exists that the derivative action is in principle no different from the other com-
mon form of representative action-the class action-which clearly cannot be
terminated by an adverse party over the plaintiff's objection. Alternatively, the
termination decision could be transferred from the board to the court-as the
recently revised Canadian Business Corporation Act has in fact done. ', Such an
approach both screens frivolous actions and assures greater impartiality. '19
Experience, rather than logic, however, leads us to the conclusion that such
solutions are unlikely to gain significant support. Moreover, we see persuasive
arguments why a legislative resolution that accepts the basic thrust of Burks v.
Lasker is indeed preferable. Three reasons lead us to this conclusion and in turn
explain the structure of our proposed statutory treatment of the Burks issue.
First, the power to terminate can be used as an important incentive to en-
courage the trend toward independent boards. Conditioning the availability of
such a defense on the existence of a board that meets specific and meaningful
criteria of independence, including a requirement of majority nonmanagement
directors, not only creates such an incentive, but makes it strongest for those
trouble-plagued companies that might otherwise be the most resistant to the cur-
rent trend.32° In contrast, abolition of the defense would leave little incentive for
such "problem" corporations to install or maintain an outsider presence on their
boards. In this light, a difficult trade-off must be recognized: eliminating the
obstacles Burks poses for the plaintiff might result in more plaintiff victories, but
less independent boards-a result that could only be described as a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for the public interest.
A second basic premise behind our approach is that the historic utility of
the derivative action has been its ability to enforce the duty of loyalty, not the
318. Canadian Business Corporation Act, Can. Stat. 1974-1975, c.33, § 232. Section 232(2)
creates as a precondition to the prosecution of a derivative action the requirement that "the court is
satisfied that . . . (c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the
action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued." Under § 232(i), a "complainant" must
apply to the court "for leave to bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation," and the
court is required to make the above-quoted finding before permitting it to proceed. A functionally
similar approach is authorized under a California statute that permits the court to impose a securities
bond if it determines that "there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the cause of
action . . . will benefit the corporation or its shareholders." See Cal. Corp. Code § 800(c) (West
1977).
319. Our principal reservation about the Canadian approach is that it places the burden on the
plaintiff to justify the action, rather than on defendant to show a substantial business justification for
its dismissal. At least the initial burden of production with respect to such a motion belongs on the
defendant. Moreover, under the Canadian approach, the decision comes too early-before plaintiff
has had an opportunity to obtain any discovery. In contrast, on a motion to dismiss, the court can
permit some discovery, particularly with respect to the board's level of independence. Finally, the
independent members of the board are likely to be far less involved in the decision under the Cana-
dian format, since the individual defendants need not necessarily involve the corporation at all in
opposing the plaintiff's application. The California statute is less subject to these objections, but the
securities-for-expenses bond is vulnerable to other problems already noted, including that it may be
evaded by a variety of techniques. See text accompanying note 284 supra.
320. Proxy survey data released by the SEC with respect to 1980 filings shows that the number
of companies with nominating committees jumped by 31% over 1979. Audit committees were found
in 85% of all companies surveyed. In addition, the number of retained attorneys and investment




duty of due care. Thus, rather than seeking to overturn Burks, we have sought to
contain it and carve out those situations most fraught with the potential for self-
dealing. Specifically, we have provided that the board may not dismiss actions
involving self-dealing or transactions between the corporation and any interested
"controlling person" thereof (including any parent or affiliated person, the chief
executive officer, and certain others in a position to dominate corporate decision-
making).32" ' This does not prohibit such transactions, but only subjects them to
the normal fiduciary principles established by the courts or legislature of the
jurisdiction, which principles might otherwise be rendered irrelevant by the abil-
ity of a nominally independent board to cut off judicial examination.,2 Such a
limitation on Burks's scope can be justified either on the grounds that the legisla-
tive policy set forth in "interested director" statutes would otherwise be frus-
trated or on the rationale that the existence of a controlling person is logically
inconsistent with the notion of an "independent" board.
The priority we give to self-dealing cases does not mean that we have dis-
missed the possibility of liability based on a due care violation. Although such
liability seems more likely to be effectively enforced through federal securities
law actions,3" derivative actions enforcing such a duty remain likely in two con-
texts: (1) where there has been a substantial management transition and the in-
coming officers have little desire to protect their predecessors, 24 and (2) where a
significant decision made by the board proves disastrous and thereby either enti-
tes a trustee to commence suit or results in the disqualification of a majority of
321. See proposed §§ 49(f)(5) & (a)(3) in Appendix infra. Basically, this codifies the result in
Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980). As a matter of legal
doctrinae, the existence of a "controlling" person is inconsistent with the existence of an "indepen-
dent" board. Concededly, our definiton of "controlling person" is more inclusive than that of the
common law to date, but this is precisely the virtue of a legislative resolution, which can adopt
prophylactic rules.
322. At common law, a court may review a self-dealing transaction for fairness, notwithstand-
ing approval by a disinterested board. Statutes in many jurisdictions have modified this rule, but
generally a retrospective evaluation of fairness by a court remains possible. See Buxbaum, supra note
13, at 1124-27. See also Note, The Status of the Fairness Test Under Section 713 of the New York
Business Corporation Law, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1156 (1976). As discussed earlier, this opportunity
for retrospective judicial review is lost if the board may terminate the derivative action. Thus, our
proposed § 49(f)(5) is intended to reconcile state conflict-of-interest law with the body of law on
dismissal of derivative actions. A limited inconsistency remains under our statute since only in-
terested transactions involving controlling persons may not be terminated; thus, an action challenging
a transaction between the corporation and an outside director could be terminated even though the
transaction was unfair and voidable in principle. See proposed § 49(f)(5) in Appendix infra, We are
less concerned about structural bias in this context of noncontrolling persons, but others may wish to
substitute for our § 49(f)(5) broader language covering all material self-dealing transactions.
323. Federal law has imposed substantial damages on negligent directors if their inattention has
come within the ambit of a particular securities statute imposing liability. See Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In particular, the new requirement that a majority of the directors sign the
corporation's annual report on form 10-K will enforce this duty. See 20 SEC Docket 1058 (Sept. 16,
1980); Securities Act of 1933 Release 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980).
324. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974),
for an extreme example of this pattern. See note 235 supra. In other cases involving corporate
officials who have resigned in disrepute (such as after disclosure of a substantial program of illegal
payments and political payoffs), the board may be too embarrassed by the disclosures to seek to
protect the former official.
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the board so that the defense cannot be invoked. 3 5 Without attempting a survey,
we suspect that most historical instances of due care liability have involved one
of these fact patterns and that attempts to impose due care liability on only a
minority of the board were rare prior to the recent spurt of "questionable pay-
ments" cases. 326 Thus limited, the Burks rule is an inroad upon, but not the
death-knell of, the derivative action.
Finally, as our third premise, we sense that what is most appealing to the
corporate community in Burks, Auerbach, and their more recent progeny is the
deference they pay to the principle of corporate autonomy. Collectively, these
decisions can be read to say that the business of business is business, not the
redressing of social wrongs or the enforcing of fiduciary duties. In a time wary
of overregulation and judicial activism, the strength of such a sentiment cannot
be discounted, and hence proposals for close substantive judicial review of the
board's decision to dismiss are likely to be unpalatable. Thus, we have attempted
to rethink the interaction between the court and the board in order to achieve
a compromise that minimizes the perceived danger of judicial regulation of
corporate behavior, but also strengthens the goal of corporate accountability.
Against the backdrop of these premises, limitations placed by our proposed
statute on the termination of derivative actions become more understandable.
First, on a structural level, we have sought to place limits on the use of the
special litigation committee. Such a committee (often composed of only three
outside directors and sometimes appointed to the board only after the onset of
the litigation) is too easily tamed and held hostage, either by explicit agreement
or (as is more likely) by the expectations of the rest of the board. A critical mass
level of independence is necessary before a board becomes its own master,
rather than merely the buffer for management. On the other hand, a smaller,
more intimate body, such as a board committee, may be able to conduct a more
candid and fuller inquiry. To strike a balance between these two considerations,
we have provided that a majority of the board must be independent, but permit-
ted the investigation to be conducted by a committee. 327  Ultimately, a majority
of the independent directors must reject the suit for the court to grant the board's
motion . 31
One other limitation deserves special mention. We require that counsel
advising the board be similarly independent. This disqualifies not only the cor-
poration's house counsel and any outside counsel regularly in the employ of the
corporation, but also special counsel who has served the independent directors
within the prior three years.329 This prevents counsel from anticipating future
325. See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967);
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
326. See cases cited at note 57 supra.
327. See proposed § 49(f)(2) in Appendix infra.
328. See proposed § 49(f)(1), (3) in Appendix infra.
329. See proposed § 49(a)(12) in Appendix infra (requiring special counsel to meet same stan-
dard as independent director). Admittedly, some incentive for counsel to be predisposed towards
terminating the action remains: by gaining a reputation as "friendly," such a counsel might secure
additional appointments as special counsel for other corporations, while a "tough" counsel may
never again be invited to so serve. If such a pattern develops (and it has not to this point), the
appropriate solution might be to interpret such continued employment as a violation of the attorney's
ethical obligation to avoid an appearance of impropriety.
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employment if it delivers the desired advice. We anticipate the rejoinder that
such a prophylactic rule is inefficient both because it ignores the need for trust
and confidence to develop between the independent directors and their counsel,
and because the complexity of some corporate structures requires a substantial
learning period before counsel is familiar with all the relevant background facts.
Nonetheless, we sense that the appearance of an impropriety surrounds a situa-
tion in which the same counsel repeatedly advises a committee of directors that
it may terminate a derivative action.
Our second major proposed limitation is operational rather than structural:
the board must advance "a substantial business judgment independent of the
merits of the litigation" 330 to justify termination. "Substantial," of course,
means more than "colorable" or "arguable," but it does not require the board
to meet a "preponderance of the evidence" test. By insisting that the justifica-
tion for termination be "independent of the merits of the litigation, this formula-
tion recognizes the validity of both Vice Chancellor Hartnett's statement in Mal-
donado H, that in "our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the
merits of litigation," 33 ' and the argument of Auerbach v. Bennett," and subse-
quent decisions, that there may be more important corporate interests at stake
than securing a financial recovery. The court then remains free to reject the
board's justification if it finds that either (a) it is not "substantial," (b) it was
not advanced "in good faith," (c) the justification is "outweighed by the prob-
able recovery or other relief likely to result from the litigation," or (d) the justi-
ification "frustrates" public policy.3 3 This negative phrasing, which requires the
court to make contrary findings before it overrules the board, is intended to re-
strain the court from lightly substituting its own judgment for that of the board.
In effect, although this standard of review resembles the traditional "substan-
tial evidence" standard employed by courts in reviewing the determinations of
administrative agencies, 3 ' it differs by providing the court several bases upon
which to reject a decision that has a substantial business justification. Still, our
formula does not require the board to demonstrate the cogency of its reasons by a
preponderance of the evidence, and thus it may disappoint proponents of a more
aggressively substantive style of judicial review. Our reasons for disdaining the
path of judicial activism therefore require explanation. Despite our analogy to
administrative law, we are doubtful that courts are entitled to intervene directly in
the decisionmaking of private autonomous bodies, such as the corporation, to the
330. See proposed § 49(f)(4) in Appendix infra.
331. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980 (Del. May 13, 1981).
332. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
333. See proposed § 49(f)(4) in Appendix infra.
334. On the meaning of "substantial evidence," see Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938) ("such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion"). We understand that such a standard is easily satisfied and so have sup-
plemented it by providing three bases for rejecting the justification.
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same extent as they have in recent years in public agency decisionmaking.33 5 To
begin with, standards for judicial intervention are less apparent because the corpo-
rate charter and the state's incorporation statute hardly provide guideposts for
judicial review comparable to the organic statute under which most administrative
agencies are established and managed. Not only is a legislative definition of pur-
pose lacking in the case of the corporation, but corporate managers regularly
pursue diverse ends, not all of which can be described as "profit-maximizing." 336
If we thus seem to be accepting the statement in Auerbach v. Bennett that
there is no "objective standard by which the correctness of every corporate deci-
sion may be measured," 137 we do not agree that the implications of such a
statement preclude close judicial review of board decisions. Rather, it should
change the nature and character of such review. Thus, we contemplate a form of
review that is less substantive and more therapeutic in orientation-one that
seeks less to measure the correctness of the result than to inquire, raise alterna-
tive possibilities, and engage in a dialogue with the decisionmaker1 38  In so
doing, judicial review should not replace the decisionmaker (here, the board),
but rather activate it. Such a model resembles one well known to students of
both administrative 39 and constitutional3'0 law as one in which the court "re-
335. See generally 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6:1 (2d ed. 1978) (surveying
judicial innovations in review of agency rule-making during 1970's); see also Sive, Some Thoughts
of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612,
614-19 (1970) (advocating judicial activism in review of agency determinations).
336. See, e.g. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1972) (cor-
poration may have duties to public and employees transcending duty of profit-maximization to share-
holders).
337. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
338. In the terms of a distinction offered by Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, we suggest
that judicial review in this area should be "agenda forcing" rather than "solution forcing" and
should be governed by what they term the "principle of full inquiry"-i.e., requiring the fullest
possible inquiry into competing options. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and
the Clean Air Act, 89 Yale L.J. 1466, 1556-59 (1980). On the significance of placing a matter on an
organization's "agenda," see K. Arrow, The Limits of Organization 45-59 (1974).
339. This model for the appropriate interaction between the court and the board is patterned
after the rule developed in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See also Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620-25 (2d Cir. 1965). In Chenery,
the Court held that if a matter is given to the discretion of an agency, but the reasons for the
agency's action appear inadequate, the court may remand the matter for further consideration in order
to induce the agency to refine and develop its own analysis. We are aware that subsequent to
Chenery more activist models of judicial review of agency action have emerged, see, e.g., Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), but we feel it necessary to resist the
normal urge to carry the familiar legal doctrines of one area of law over into another, because the
differences between a public agency and a private body are significant, and the dangers of judicial
overregulation real.
We anticipate the rejoinder from some academic colleagues that such a posture of judicial re-
straint will only produce manufactured responses prepared for the independent directors by counsel
whose real loyalty is to management. This danger is real, and thus we have insisted on a rigorous
definition of "Special Counsel." See text accompanying note 329 supra. However, even though
instances in which the board committee has determined to sue (i.e., has declined to interpose a
business judgment defense) are still conspicuous by their absence, instances are likely in which the
board committee will signal to defendant corporate officials their reluctance or unwillingness to
interpose the defense and thereby force a favorable settlement for plaintiffs. There is evidence that
board committees that are independent will today take action against corporate insiders on some
occasions. See Bauer, Why Big Business Is Firing the Boss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6
(Magazine), at 22, 84 (citing case examples).
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mands" issues to the agency or legislature for further consideration.
Here, this approach is especially appealing because by employing it, the
court may substantially alter the balance of power between the board and senior
management in favor of the former. So long as the board is represented by a
truly independent special counsel and includes a majority of independent direc-
tors, such judicial attention may help crystallize a sense of self-awareness that in
the last analysis is a far more important objective than the determination of
liability in a particular case. Under this middle course, the court could indicate
that the reasons given to support a decision not to sue were either partially
invalid, incomplete, or insufficiently articulated; but, rather than deny defen-
dants' motion to dismiss, it would ask for clarification. A role might also be
created for plaintiff's counsel in this process, and the award of counsel fees to
such attorneys would be justified if the result of the dialogue between the board
and the court were a significant change in corporate policies or practices."
CONCLUSION
Our diagnosis of the derivative action suggests that there are three distinct
barriers, each requiring a different response, before the action can serve as an
effective deterrent.
First, the ability of even a truly independent board to terminate an action
plainly means that meritorious cases will sometimes be aborted. Although one
may wish that recent case law could be reversed, the most realistic line of de-
fense in our judgment is to confine the board's power to cases not involving
material self-dealing. If cases involving breaches of the duty of loyalty are so
excluded, then the historic role of the derivative action is not jeopardized, even
if its potential for expansion is thereby eclipsed. As we have suggested, such a
compromise is consistent with the weight of the case law.
Second, the adversaries themselves may not be relied upon to discount the
probable outcome of the case in their settlement negotiations. Because the con-
340. One example of this process occurs when the court "narrowly construes" federal statutes
to avoid broad delegations, thus finding administrative action unauthorized as a statutory matter,
rather than holding the statute unconstitutional. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-17,
at 288-89 & n.14 (1978). A well known case employing this procedure is Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958), in which the Court read a passport control statute narrowly and denied the Secretary of
State the authority to withhold passports on the basis of beliefs or associations, emphasizing that the
right to travel is an aspect of constitutionally protected liberty. Consequently, any limit on the right
must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress; and if that power is delegated it must be
by adequately articulated standards. In effect the Court was telling Congress that it could limit the
right to travel only by means of a statute that stated a compelling reason so that the limitation would
pass the Court's strict-scrutiny test. This is viewed by commentators as a remand to the legislature.
See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, Cases and Materials 1675-76 & n.l (10th ed. 1980).
341. Traditionally, counsel need not win a judgment or even a settlement to be entitled to an
award of legal fees. Rather, the criterion has been whether plaintiff "caused" a benefit, and causa-
tion has been inferred when the claim raised was "meritorious" and the corporation took action on
its own in the wake of plaintiff's demand. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A.2d
384, 387 (Del. 1966).
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test is not a "zero sum" one, the problem of collusive settlements requires that
we realign the incentives for both parties in order to reduce the current pressure
to settle. By requiring the defendant to contribute at least the amount of
plaintiff's expenses to any settlement and by giving a plaintiff an incentive to
contest indemnification, our statute forces the parties into a more adversarial
posture. Undoubtedly, both plaintiff and defendant will resist this proposal, but
the public interest may lie in their being induced to fight rather than settle.
Finally, if the derivative action is ever to deal effectively with the duty of
care, the current "all or nothing" choice confronting the court must be changed,
or the present pattern of high rhetoric and low liability will predictably persist.
We have suggested that the variance of possible outcomes be reduced by impos-
ing a ceiling on liability after litigation (for due care violations) and a floor on
the expected financial contribution required of settling defendants. This floor-
ceiling limitation on exposure to recovery is consistent with recent thinking
among criminal law reformers that punishment should be "fair and certain"-
reduced in its severity, but increased in its probability." 2
Others will of course challenge both our assumptions and our attempt at
their implementation. But unless the policy trade-offs that we have addressed in
this Article are more candidly debated in legislative and judicial forums, the
derivative action seems unlikely to survive as more than a nuisance to defendants
and an occasional modest source of income for plaintiffs' attorneys.
POSTSCRIPT
As this Article goes to press, the Delaware Supreme Court has written the
most important chapter in the still continuing saga of the Maldonado litigation.
Reversing Maldonado 11, the court upheld the basic power of a board, or a
properly delegated committee thereof, to control corporate litigation and in prin-
ciple to seek dismissal of even a meritorious action that is not in the corpora-
tion's best interest."3 Still, for the corporate bar this affirmation of orthodoxy is
likely to seem a Pyrrhic victory. In sharp contrast to Auerbach v. Bennett,"' the
decision (now restyled as Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado) expressly refused to
accept the " 'business judgment' rationale" under which decisions to terminate
derivative litigation were seen as but another aspect of the board's authority to
manage the corporation." 5 Instead, after finding "a sufficient risk in the reali-
ties of a situation like the one presented in this case" to make it unwilling to
trust "the theory of business judgment," 3 the court faced the problem squarely:
342. See Twentieth Century Funa Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, Fair and Certain Punish-
ment (1976).
343. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980, slip op. at 12, 15-16 (Del. May 13, 1981).
In essence, the decision upheld the legal power of the board to reject the suit, but subjected it to
equitable limitations. This distinction between legal power and equitable limitation has a long history
in Delaware corporate law. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
344. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
345. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, No. 113, 1980, slip op. at 22 (Del. May 13, 1981). The
decision cited Maldonado I as a decision that had incorrectly adopted this business judgment theory,
thus suggesting that it should be reversed on appeal. Id. at 21.
346. Id. at 22.
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At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively simple. If,
on the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest bona fide deriva-
tive actions away from well-meaning plaintiffs through the use of the
committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of
its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intracorporate means of
policing boards of directors. If, on the other hand, corporations are
unable to rid themselves of meritless or harmful litigation and strike
suits, the derivative action, created to benefit the corporation, will pro-
duce the opposite, unintended result.- 7
Thus, seeing the fate of the derivative action as hanging in the balance, the court
set out to find a "balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring
corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of direc-
tors, but the corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation." 348
Here, the candor of the decision is remarkable and potentially a turning
point. Missing is the customary presumption that the board acts in good faith
and in the best interests of all shareholders unless clearly proven otherwise.
Instead, there is a frank recognition of the potential for structural bias in ter-
mination decisions-what the court aptly terms the possibility of "a 'there but
for the grace of God go I' empathy" on the part of the independent directors.4
9
To justify substantive judicial review, the court analogized the termination deci-
sion to judicial approval of a settlement-a context where the burden is tradi-
tionally on the proponent and where judicial discretion is clearly established.5 0
Although this analogy may amount to bootstrapping for a Delaware court (since
Delaware has no general requirement of judicial approval of settlements in de-
rivative actions35), it is apt, and the rules in these two functionally related areas
clearly should be integrated. 2
But if Zapata's diagnosis seems incisive, its prescription raises difficult
problems about judicial competence. Ultimately, the court fashions a two-part
test. First, the corporation seeking dismissal must establish the independence and
good faith of the committee reaching the decision and the reasonableness of their
investigative efforts. The burden on the corporation will apparently resemble the
"intrinsic fairness" standard governing interested-director transactions.
353
347. Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
348. Id. at 21.
349. Id. at 23.
350. Id. at 23-24. See also notes 309-11 and accompanying text supra.
351. As the court notes, judicial approval is required in Delaware when the directors are also
settling defendants and thus are on both sides of the transaction. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, slip
op. at 23-24. See Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479, 486 (Del. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
808 (1947).
352. On policy grounds, it seems a perverse result to require greater procedural formality in the
case of a settlement, where the corporation at least receives some recovery, than in the case of a
termination decision, where it receives none.
353. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, slip op. at 27 n.17. Auerbach would also permit some in-
quiry into these areas, but denies the court the power to "inquire as to which factors were considered
by [the] committee or the relative weight accorded them. ... Auerbach v. Bennet, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979).
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Second, the chancery court in its discretion may then apply its. own "indepen-
dent business judgment" in determining whether to accept the decision. 31
This concept of a judicial business judgment is obviously founded upon a
public-policy view of the derivative action, with which we are in agreement.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court instructs the chancery court to "give spe-
cial consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corpora-
tion's best interests," 355 thus recognizing that there can be a transcending impor-
tance to the concept of corporate accountability, over and above the narrow
interests of a particular corporation in a given case.
But are courts in fact competent to exercise business judgment? 356 The
traditional view of judicial review has often stressed that its legitimacy rests on
reasoned elaboration of principles capable of evenhanded application. In con-
trast, business judgments, as we have earlier stressed, tend to be intuitive, pre-
dictive, and constantly shifting in the criteria employed. A common law of busi-
ness judgment cannot easily be built on such a foundation. We should be
cautious here not to overstate: if forced to choose between the dogmatic assertion in
Auerbach that courts can never review business judgments and the somewhat
facile confidence in judicial competence in Zapata, we undoubtedly would prefer
the latter, and the risk of harm seems slight. But, absent such a stark choice, the
corollary to the chancery court's assertion, in Maldonado II, that "under our
system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation," 35 7
is that boards, and not courts, are entitled to exercise business judgment. Our
concern is not just for the formal constraints on judicial review. Rather, we
suspect that courts, despite the new authority given them by Zapata, will con-
tinue to defer to the business judgment justifications that the board offers. En-
grained traditions do not disappear overnight; rather, they persist in ways that
have low visibility.
In this light, there are a number of uncertainties and problems surrounding
the scope of the Zapata holding. First, it is unclear how much weight Delaware
courts will place in the future on whether the plaintiff was obligated to make
demand. A close reading of the decision suggests that plaintiffs who are required
to make demand will bear the burden of proving that the board's rejection was
wrongful, while, conversely, the corporation will have the procedural burden in
those cases where demand was properly excused. 58 Second, Zapata will
354. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, slip op. at 28.
355. Id. This suggestion that public policy considerations can outweigh the corporation's best
interests is reinforced by other language in the opinion, which refers to the role of the derivative suit
in "policing boards of directors." Id. at 20. Both references suggest a deterrence rationale.
356. The concept of a judicial business judgment, though unorthodox to say the least, has an
earlier history in Delaware corporate law. See Neponsit Investment Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97,
100 (Del. 1979); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp.. 47 A.2d 479. 488 (Del. 1946). cert. denied. 329 U.S.
808 (1947).
357. 413 A.2d at 1263. In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged its general
agreement with this statement. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, slip op. at 28 n.18.
358. Plaintiff never made demand on the board in the Maldonado litigation, see Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, slip op. at 2, and the Delaware Supreme Court treats demand as properly excused on
the facts of the case, given the involvement of the directors in the stock options at issue, id. at 14.
The court makes clear, however, that where demand is required, "a board decision to cause a
derivative suit to be dismissed as detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and
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apparently still permit a board heavily dominated by defendants to appoint a
committee of three independent directors to reach a predictable decision to
terminate.35 9 Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court's critical second step-i.e.,
the "independent business judgment" review-is entirely optional and discre-
tionary with the individual chancery court judge.mO This would appear to mean
that appellate review will be essentially unavailable if the lower court decides
against such a review. If this second step is, as the Supreme Court said, the
"essential key in striking the balance," 1' it seems inconsistent to permit a lower
court to disregard it.
These ambiguities suggest again the superiority of a legislative resolution
and in particular of prophylactic rules. Rather than depend on judicial activism
in an area where no trails are well marked and few definite standards exist, we
believe it safer and more efficient to carve out the context of self-dealing trans-
actions between the corporation and certain defined "controlling persons" from
the scope of the board's power to terminate. This will not prohibit such transac-
tions, but will ensure that the merits of the case can eventually be reached. To
prefer this approach is not to criticize the Delaware Supreme Court for failing to
adopt it judicially. The reach of courts in this area inevitably falls short of the
legislature's. On its own terms, the Zapata decision deserves recognition as a
serious effort at judicial statesmanship by the Delaware Supreme Court-but one
that needs legislative codification and embroidery.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED REVISION TO SECTION 49 OF THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Section 49. Shareholder's Derivative Action
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Aggregate Director's Fees" shall mean with respect to any director
the total of all salary, fees, and other compensation, including fees received for
attendance at board or committee meetings, received by such individual from the
Corporation in respect of such office, less reasonable expenses actually incurred
in connection with attendance at such meetings or the performance of other spe-
cifically delegated duties.
(2) "Annual Gross Income" shall mean an individual's gross income,
exclusive of capital gains, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service or such
refused, will be respected unless it was wrongful." Id. at 12. In a footnote, it adds that in the case
of rejection after demand, "the board's decision falls under the 'business judgment' rule and will be
respected if the requirements of the rule are met." Id. at 12 n.10. This statement is then clouded by
the court's recognition, in the final sentence of the footnote, that "the two contexts can overlap in
practice." Id. Nonetheless, read literally, the court's statement appears to mean that in a case where
demand was required the chancery court would not be entitled to apply its own 'independent busi-
ness judgment." Although there is a logic to this distinction, we submit that such a dramatic differ-
ence in treatment is not warranted, and hence a legislative codification of the termination power that
would subject all such decisions to some measure of substantive judicial review is preferable.
359. Id. at 18-20 (noting that the "interest taint of the board majority" is not 'per se a legal
bar to the delegation of the board's power to an independent committee").
360. Id. at 27.
361. Id. at 28.
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higher amount as may be derivable from a recomputation of such person's fed-
eral tax liability as finally determined by such agency or a federal court.
(3) "Controlling Person" shall mean any person who possesses the abil-
ity to determine the principal policies or practices of the Corporation, whether by
reason of stock ownership, managerial position, board membership, or other-
wise. The chief executive officer of the Corporation shall be deemed to be a
controlling person, but membership on the board of directors of the corporation
shall not by itself cause a person to be considered a Controlling Person.
(4) "Corporation" shall include unincorporated associations, part-
nerships, and not-for-profit corporations and, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, shall mean the corporation, partnership, or other business entity in whose
name the derivative action is instituted.
(5) "Damage Ceiling" shall mean with respect to any individual such
individual's highest Annual Gross Income during the five years immediately pre-
ceding the verdict in the derivative action.
(6) "Domestic Corporation" shall mean a Corporation incorporated
under the laws of this state or a foreign corporation made statutorily subject to
the substantive corporate law of this state because of its contacts with this state.
(7) "Due Care Violation" shall mean a violation of the duty of due care
owed by a corporate official to the Corporation or a substantially similar fiduci-
ary breach by such an individual not involving self-dealing or the receipt of any
improper personal benefit.
(8) "Equity Security" shall include (A) any share of stock, regardless of
class, preference or other designation, issued by the Corporation, (B) warrants or
options issued by the Corporation which are convertible into shares of its stock,
and (C) those debt securities of the Corporation that are classified under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles in effect at the time of the suit's commence-
ment as "common stock equivalents," but such term shall exclude those debt
securities not so classified.
(9) "Independent Director" shall mean a director elected by the
shareholders who is not described by any of the following subparagraphs (A)
through (E):
(A) any person who is, or who within five years preceding his
appointment to the board of directors has been, an officer or employee of the
Corporation, any of its parents, subsidiaries, or other affiliates;
(B) any person who is related to any senior executive officer of the
Corporation, any of its parents, subsidiaries, or other affiliates, by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption (excluding relationships more remote than first cousin);
(C) any person who has served as a lawyer, investment banker,
commercial banker, or supplier to the Corporation, or any of its parents, sub-
sidiaries, or other affiliates, and who has received, or whose firm or company
(with which he is associated) has received, payments of a material amount to
such recipient in the last three years, or to whom it is proposed that such pay-
ment will be made in the current or next year;




(E) any person who has any other relationship to the Corporation
which the court determines would impair that person's exercise of disinterested
judgment. The fact that such person is a defendant in the lawsuit in question
shall not disqualify that person from being deemed independent if the court affir-
matively determines that the inclusion of such person as a defendant was without
substantial merit or that the primary purpose of naming such person as a defen-
dant was to prevent him from being deemed an independent director.
(10) "Person" shall include in addition to natural persons any corpora-
tion, partnership, business trust, joint stock association, or other business entity.
(11) "Qualified Owner" shall mean a holder of an Equity Security
issued by the Corporation and includes, in addition to registered holders, (A) the
holders of voting trust certificates issued with respect to any Equity Security and
(B) any person entitled to a substantial beneficial interest in any trust or fund
holding an Equity Security in the name of a nominee or fiduciary if it is
actuarially possible to determine the value of such interest and such person's
interest in the fund exceeds ten per cent; provided, however, that in the case of
both (A) and (B) above if the governing trust instrument expressly denies the
power to commence a derivative action to such beneficiary, then such person
shall not be a Qualified Owner for purposes of this section.
(12) "Special Counsel" shall mean an individual attorney capable of dis-
interested judgment who has not participated in, or advised with respect to, the
transactions or events under review and who is not described by any of subpara-
graphs (a)(9)(A) through (a)(9)(E) of this Section.
(b) An action may be brought in the right of a Corporation, domestic or
foreign, to procure a judgment in its favor by a Qualified Owner. Upon judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the court may award damages and/or grant any equitable
relief it deems just and necessary in the circumstances, including a decree sus-
pending or removing a corporate official or director from office.
(c) In any such action, the plaintiff must aver and prove that it is a Qual-
ified Owner at the time of bringing the action and that either (1) it was such an
owner at the time of the transaction of which it complains; or (2) its shares or
interest therein devolved upon it by operation of law from a person who was
such an owner at such time; or (3) it did not have actual knowledge of the
transaction of which it complains at the time it acquired its shares or interest and
the Corporation had not made sufficient disclosure in a public manner by such
time to have given it constructive knowledge; or (4) there is a strong prima facie
case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the Corporation and without such
suit serious injustice will result. The complaint shall also allege with particularity
the efforts made by the plaintiff to obtain the action it desires from the directors
or comparable authority or the reasons why such a demand would be futile. The
suit may not be maintained if the court finds the reasons so set forth to be
inadequate or that the plaintiff cannot fairly and adequately represent the in-
terests of the security holders similarly situated in enforcing the rights of the
Corporation. No demand or request for action need be made upon security hold-
ers generally.
(d) Suit may be brought under this Section to recover any losses or damages
suffered by any Corporation, domestic or foreign, in connection with a breach of
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a legal or equitable obligation to the Corporation or to recover any expenses
incurred by the Corporation in connection with a violation of law by the Cor-
poration. In computing the amount recoverable under this section, (1) the defen-
dant shall be permitted to prove that the transaction resulted in a net benefit to
the Corporation; provided, however, that the court may disregard any such be-
nefit to the Corporation if the offset would frustrate a public policy of the state
under this or any other provision of law, and (2) the plaintiff shall be permitted
to prove that a transaction or policy resulted in intangible losses or damages to
.the Corporation if such losses or damages can be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence. The court may direct that recovery shall be awarded to
individual shareholders on a pro rata basis if it finds that a corporate recovery
would result in unjust enrichment.
(e) An action under this Section may be dismissed on the grounds that the
board of directors has determined that the action is contrary to the Corporation's
best interests, or on substantially similar grounds, under the following circum-
stances and not otherwise:
(1) If the Corporation is a Domestic Corporation and the action asserts
a breach of a fiduciary duty by a corporate official, employee, director, or Con-
trolling Person, the court shall dismiss the action as it pertains to such defen-
dants if the applicable conditions of subsection (f) below are satisfied;
(2) If the Corporation is not a Domestic Corporation, the court shall
dismiss the action if the law of the Corporation's state of incorporation would
accept such a defense on the facts of the case; provided, however, that the court
shall not dismiss such an action if to do so would substantially frustrate a public
policy of this state that is necessarily implicated by the board's decision;
(3) In all other cases, the court may dismiss the action unless the
board's action appears clearly unreasonable or lacking in good faith.
(f) In the case of an action brought on behalf of a Domestic Corporation
and asserting the breach of a fiduciary duty to such corporation, the court may
dismiss such action against such corporate fiduciaries, and shall do so, if the
court finds that the Corporation has established each of the following conditions:
(1) A majority of the board of directors consists of persons qualifying
as Independent Directors, and the full plenary authority of the board of directors
with respect to the litigation was delegated by the board to such directors;
(2) The Independent Directors conducted, or caused to be conducted,
an adequate investigation into the underlying transaction or transactions and, to
the extent that expert advice formed a basis for their decision, they relied upon
the advice of Special Counsel and other experts independent of the Corporation
who had not previously participated in or advised with respect to the transactions
or matters under review;
(3) Dismissal of the action was approved by a vote of a majority of the
Independent Directors without any other directors or defendants participating in
the discussions or decisions;
(4) In so approving dismissal, the Independent Directors adopted a re-
port (which may have been prepared by a special committee of the Independent
Directors) that identifies a substantial business justification independent of the
merits of the litigation, and in the court's judgment such justification (A) is not
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
outweighed by the net probable recovery or other relief that the court finds is
likely to result from the action, (B) does not frustrate any authoritatively estab-
lished public policy, and (C) is advanced in good faith; and
(5) The basic subject matter of the suit does not involve to a significant
degree transactions or dealings, direct or indirect, between the Corporation, or a
subsidiary thereof, and any Controlling Person of the corporation or any person
controlling, under the control of, or under common control with, such Control-
ling Person.
Before reaching a decision to dismiss the action, the court shall permit the plain-
tiff a reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery and to contest the Corporation's
position.
(g) If the action on behalf of the Corporation is successful, in whole or in
part, or if a substantial benefit was caused or conferred by any plaintiff or other
claimant as the result of the action, whether by judgment, compromise, settle-
ment or otherwise, the court shall award such plaintiff or claimant reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, but shall direct any plaintiff or claimant who
has received any payment or other property as a result of the action in excess of
such amount to account to the Corporation for the balance of any such proceeds
so received. In determining the appropriate counsel fee to award to such a plain-
tiff or plaintiffs, the court may consider the size of the recovery received by the
Corporation as a result of the action, but shall place primary emphasis on the
following facts:
(1) the time and labor reasonably expended by each attorney;
(2) the difficulty of the case and the risk assumed by the attorney;
(3) the quality of the attorney's work;
(4) the degree to which the financial recovery is offset by any indemni-
fication payments paid or to be paid the defendant;
(5) in a case involving nonpecuniary relief, the importance of the statu-
tory policies protected or vindicated; and
(6) the effect of the allowance on the public interest and willingness of
attorneys generally to accept similar cases.
(h) In any action brought under this Section in a court of this state, no bond
or other security for expenses may be required by the court. The court may in its
discretion award applicable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, against a
party, or against counsel, in the following circumstances:
(1) The court may award costs against plaintiffs or their counsel if it
concludes upon final judgment for the defendants that the action was brought
without reasonable cause;
(2) The court may award costs against any party or their counsel at
any time if it finds with respect to such party or counsel that a motion, request
for discovery, attempt to resist discovery, or appeal was made without reason-
able cause and either materially protracted the litigation or constituted an abuse
of the discovery process; or
(3) The court may award costs against the defendant or defendants if
the expenses incurred by the Corporation in connection with the action, includ-
ing the expenses awarded to a successful plaintiff, would otherwise exceed the
monetary recovery received from the defendant or defendants. Such costs may
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be allocated among multiple defendants in such proportion as the court deems
fair and equitable in view of their respective involvement and responsibility.
(i) An action authorized by this Section shall not be discontinued, compro-
mised, or settled without approval by the court having jurisdiction of the action.
If the court shall determine that the interests of the holders of Equity Securities
or of any class thereof will be substantially affected by the discontinuance, com-
promise, or settlement, the court shall direct that notice, by publication or other-
wise, be given to such holders whose interests will be so affected. If notice is so
directed to be given, the court may determine which one or more of the parties
to the action shall bear the expense of giving the notice, in such amount as the
court determines and finds to be reasonable in the circumstances. The amount of
such expense shall be awarded as special costs of the action and recoverable in
the same manner as statutory taxable costs. Upon request, objecting holders shall
be permitted a reasonable opportunity to present testimony and evidence, to
obtain discovery, to cross-examine witnesses for the proponents of settlement,
and to appeal a decision by the court approving a settlement.
(j) In evaluating the adequacy of a proposed settlement, the court shall give
primary attention to the following factors:
(1) the size of the recovery and the value of any other relief in relation
to the most probable recovery;
(2) the impact of further delay on the value of the most probable re-
covery;
(3) the extent of any corrective measures required by the settlement or
undertaken as a result of the litigation and their adequacy in preventing possible
future fiduciary breaches;
(4) the adequacy of the financial contribution paid by the settling de-
fendants as a disincentive for future violations, both by them individually and by
other corporate officials generally, and the extent to Which such contribution will
be reduced by any indemnification payments paid or to be paid by the Corpo-
ration; and
(5) the availability of other plaintiffs able effectively to prosecute the
action, or a portion thereof.
The proponents of a settlement shall bear the burden of proving it to be in the
best interests of the Corporation and its shareholders. All payment or payments
made, or to be made, by the Corporation in respect of indemnification as a result
of the action shall be disclosed in open court by the parties prior to judicial
approval of the settlement and prior to any award of counsel fees pursuant to
subsection (g) hereof, and no subsequent payment shall be made which was not
so disclosed at such time.
(k) If a natural person is adjudged liable in an action under this section and
such liability is based exclusively on a Due Care Violation, then the financial
liablity of such individual to the corporation shall not exceed the greater of (1)
the highest Annual Gross Income of such person during the five calendar years
preceding the date of the verdict, or (2) the Aggregate Director's Fees, if any,
received by such person; provided, however, that if the court determines that
such a ceiling would still result in the imposition of financial liability dispro-
portionate to the blameworthiness of such individual, then the court may reduce
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such ceiling to a level not less than the lesser of (1) or (2) above. If the trier of
fact was a jury, the court may require a special verdict to determine the basis of
liability, and the burden shall be on such defendant to prove to the court that the
damages awarded exceeded such ceiling.
